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CHAPr.ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The decline of British influence in world affaire 1s one 
ot the more pronounced political phe-nomena or modern ti:nes. 
Over the past century key te-rritories subject to Br1 tish ·rule 
have been slipping loose from their imperial moorings at an ever 
more rapid rate. Those remaining subject to Br1tis·h authority· 
grow pro.gressi vely more belligerent. 
Iu his search for a-n understanding or this eclipse or 
British sovereignty, the contemporary historian finds himself 
groping through a network of complexly interrelated eocialt 
political, economic, and psyc.hologica.l proc-e·sses. One or an-
other student ·or history has argued that specific instances 
or groups of these processes are the mechanisms motivating the 
c.olla·pse of the Br1 tish hegemony. Among t!:lose mor-e con::only 
cited ·is that group or i~~luences intimately allied with ~r.d 
stimulated by the progressive maturation of voting fr8nc·hise 
reform movements within the United Kir~dom. In effect, this 
view argues that :franchise reforms introduc-ed radical changes 
in i~perial attitudes in the United Kingdom and that these in 
turn led to long-range t ·rends pointed at the splintering of 
the empire:~., the political decline of the landed ar1s-
·tocracy resulted in the creation of the Co~onweelth; or, 
! j 
I 
I 
I 
f 
I 
~ 
I 
l 
the rise or the Labor Perty cerr1ed with it 
a C!l!:lpB1gn e ·..:~ee~:s· 
tully aimed at the deliberate discarding of !~~erial ho 1 ~•- •4 
. •• • "'-. ··~. <>I • 
It is the purpose or this study to exD~1r:e 
....... this "r~:u::.,nt. 
Such an examination, it would seem, de~ands rtrst or ell ~ re-
view or the more obvious factors concerned in the !~te~rAt1~n 
and disintegration or the British empire. Th1 1 ~ , s rev I"!'" ~ •• Oll.~ 
provide a context within which s t)eci.:fic franchise re for:~!'\ w1 th1 r~ 
the United Kingdon can be rela·ted to other histor1ctll P.ve .nt~ 
contemporary with them but more specifically related to t~~ dis-
integration of Britain's imperial hegemony. It ie rr~~o6~d thnt 
these relationships should lead to an effective b~91a for n~~~"~-
ing the relative truth or f'alsehood of' the ergu.TUent thAt rro-
gress1ve franchise rerorm has been one of the h1etor1cRl trends 
largely contributory to the dismem·bermen t or the I ;r1 t ie!l e:::.j'11 re • 
Sinoe the analysis to be presented is 1n pert cor.t1~~ent 
upon a specialized un.derstanding of the ter.:l e~ntre, 1 t woul~ 
t begin With a derin1tion o~ this ter~. appear necessary o 
I. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Emp.1re ~ !. generalized term. The establ1s~en~ o: vast 
to have been one or the le~d1~g political hegemonies appears 
"~~ire~ 1~ e t~r.: 
political motives or Western c1vilizat1o~. 
d 11 such unions, b~t un!er somewhat 1ndiscr1minate_ly appl1e to 8 
careful scrutiny 
distinct types: 
to be aepare~le into ~h~ee 
they would appea.r 
d h egemony, or 1m~er1uo, the l) the land-base 
dominant political integration or encient c1v111zet1on8· 
• 
rather unstable transitional hegemony, or ":feud.o.l 
3
) em?1re"; ~nd 
the mar·itime hegemony, or emoire, the dom1nan t :ror:l 1n moJ ern 
history-. 1 
Impe·rium. or 1 d b --·---~~~- -- an - esed hegemony. Imp~rtum. as unjeretoo~ 
here, is a term accurately applied only to those agrarian ~b~ol­
previous to. the withering of Roman rule. utisms ·~ At v q r 1 ou s 
stages in the imperium's growth political authority, which w~s 
ab.solute, rested in the hands of soo-e type of pr1 e~t -l-:1n~, :.J.on _ 
arch, or emperor who was both a demi-god or de1 ty 1ncerno.te or 
hls state's religion and the chief prie·st of its usually vei-~e­
terian rites. Originally, a "nuclear core" located in eone 
favorably situated ~lluvial basin had provided the e~r1eulturel 
foundation r.e-quisi te to -expansion, and this "core" h!id grl'ld:.J-
ally expanded into an imperium by the piecemeal conquest of 
1 The generalizations here involved, though they ~ey wel~ 
apply to certain phases ot: Or-iental history, refer to ·.;·estern 
civilization only. The Athenian and Phoen1c1en exper1:nents w~...leh 
appear to be the principal exceptions to some erees of th1s 
det:inition can be construed as no·t the dominant no11tteal forms 
of' ancient times. T.hough. both were the cen.ters or e:gperently 
maritime hegemonies, neither was as successful nor as exten91ve 
as the usual. historical tree. ti se implies since ne 1 ther he<1 too 
successful a control of its colonies. Athens ~s5 but o~e o~ e 
group of pet tv w-arring Greek .city-states whose tenuous holciir.gs 
.., _, t 1 1 ,, "1'"1 
are ge-nerally lumped together as the A then an e!:l:" re. .D.a~ .... .a 
Graecia, supposedly its chief colonial area, was eno~ter colle~­
tion of petty Greek city-states anything but un~er Athe~1an 
control. And'carthage certainlY wes not under the control cf 
Tyre. It was a power in its own right and represented e threat 
both to Magna Graecia end ri s1·ng Rome • 
' 
\ 
f 
I 
I 
i 
i 
~ 
I 
_I 
l 
4 
societies abutting its land rrontier.s. The primitiveness or 
the core's technology had conditioned this- patter_n .or expansion. 
and habit conbined with relativ~l 1 
- Y 5 ow technological growth 
led to it·a continuation in la.ter imperial stages. The con-
quest of land neighbors was a continuous :function or the core, 8 
growth, end the armies carryin-g out this task were agents of 
the state acting under d-eliberate orders. Loot, the procure-
ment or slaves, and self-defense were some or the pr1no1pel 
mot"ives behind these conquests. Colonization, as understood 
in modern times, was only a limited agent of the "core's" ex-
pension end more or less under the tutelage of the stete. 
Several imperiums tried to expand through the establishl1ent 
of mar1 time colonte.s, but_ the 1r efforts do not a_ppear to have 
been too suc.cessful. Their relatively pr1m1 t1 ve technology and 
communications .so compounded the problem or ruling mari-tt:n.e 
colonies that sooner or .later the.se colonies :fell under the 
heel of competing imperi.ums adjoining their land perimeters: 
~··Asia Minor falling to the Persians, or Uagna Graec1a 
capitulating to Rome. Hence, even though the give-n i:nperium 
might possess a navy, the historical context of its expansion 
predicated that 1.ts military power _must rest pr-imarily in armies; 
imperium was predominantly a lend power. As a given "nuclear 
core" expanded, it created an imperium by superimposing its 
own abso'luti stic s·ocial, political, judicial' fis-cal • and other 
The economic rounda-
controls upon newly conquered territories. 
tion ot "its domain was basically agrarian, and i'ts technology, 
r 
5 
even though it m1gh t produce some monumental works, consis-ted 
principally or handicrafts and animal power. Slavery, but 
one impetus to the pattern of continual conquest, was the 
imper-ium's chiet' machinery. 
Historical _context at~~£! empires. Empires 
suoh as that of the British, on the other hand, even though 
they possess certain traits in common with 1mper1ums, present 
a rather- conclus.1vely different picture. They occur in a radic-
ally different and much later historical ma-trix. At the time 
of their appearance Western civilization was in the midst or 
a trans-ition from_ absolut-istic to representa-tive forms or govern-
ment. As an integral p-hase of t ·hts movement the unstable tran-
sitional hegemonies so much a part of life in the Middle Ages 
were wi ther.ing away, and the petty principalities which com-
posed them slowly were being combined to form modern central-
ized state.s. The now tully matured capt talistic era w-as well 
into its formative stages. Having already reached the basic 
patterns or industrialization, the whole civilization was head-
ing toward the complexity, specialization, and interrelated-
ness of our present "age ot te-chnology." In all walks of life 
Western man•s intellectual orientation was progressing tron a 
monistic to a pluralistic basis for decision, a change revealed 
in the growth of such social, political, and judi-cial instru-
ments as j-oint stock companies, oi tizen juries, voting franchises, 
the sep-aration ot gove 
rnmental powers, the separation o~ 
6 
church and state, the bj 
su ect1on ot the military to legis-
lative controls, the establ-ishment or parliaments, pet 1 tiona 
of' right rr-om c-itizen pressure groups,. nations and ne tional 
citizenship, guarantees of civil rights,~·· Though meny 
or these instruments had abortively appeared in imper1ums, 
t -heir appearance had been con.tined almost exclusively to the 
nuclear cores where their potential meaning was nullified by 
absolute executive prerogatives. ~hus, the imperium presents 
a picture of cult-ural stagnation and autocratic controls while. 
the empire suggests a picture of cul t ·ural flux end co-ntinual 
adaptation. 
~ charac-teristfc-s £! ~ empire. The introduction into 
the his-torical con.text a-t the dawn of empire or the knowledge 
that there were available for expropriation territories beyond 
the European land mass, a knowledge following logically rroo 
the "voyages ot discovery;" .set the stage for the birth or 
-empires. An empire is the cumul.at1 ve reaul t or ·the maturation 
ot historical trends present at the time or the rise of this 
tYPe or political 1ntegrati.on acting upon the territories avail-
able _for expropriation. In its expanding stages it is a rather 
ind-iscriminate compos! tion o-r widely scattered land~ and peoples· 
By maturity, however, in def'erence t -o strategic, d-e-nogrephtc' 
economic , and other eo nsi dera ti o ns , this di s -tr1 but 1 on be c oce 8 
7 
far more select! ve, -even though oceans and the de-signs or eoo-
pe:t1 tors continue to present a continuous ad.I!J.1n1strat1 ve prob _ 
lem. Except in the oase of Russia, empires have been anything 
but a continuous land mass, and naval power has thus had to be 
the key military arm of their expansion. Colonization has been 
equally important and has in one sense been more dominant. Ex-
pansion has .as often been the result o-f the acqu1s1 t1 ve acts 
ot priva~e citizens motivated by personal interests as it has 
been the result at' military campaigns- on the part or the state ; 
in ~aot, military expansion has been ineffective unless allied 
with or followed by colonizati-on. Politically, all these 
ohareoteris-tics have resulted in something or a duality in the-
administrative organization of the mature empire. Though 
representative government is typic-al of the mature nuclear core, 
the government 1 t grants to subje-ct terri to_ries runs the gamut 
from compromise-s about the- principles or rep.resentati ve govern-
ment to managed levels of despotism. Ultimately, such com-
promises in rule appear to be attributable to the 1.nterrela-
t1onships of several factors: 1) the role of colonization in 
the growth pattern or empires_, 2) the existence or representa-
tive forms of government, 3) variations in the technological 
potentials of the nuclear core and subject territories, 4) veri· 
ations in the technological potentials of the leading imperial 
oompeti tors, 5) variations in the "ba-lance of power" among the 
leading nations of the world, 6) the eost•accounting nature 
8 
or private enterprise, and 7) the 1ndtr~ 
.erent application or 
adminis·trative techniques risin.oo rrom ·" 1 o r~o st" attitudes. 
Acting together t ·hese :factors appear t h 0 eve e~prom18ed the 
degree ot authority that could be exerc1 d se successfully at 
any given time by an empire's. administrative center. 
Mean1.ng .2! empire· Empire, then, is a·u thor1 ty 11m1 te~ 
in various ways and dependent upon complexly tnt~rreleted tn-
f'luences. At best it means- the prerogative .£!:. power or certain 
single states .!£ command certain 11n1 ted acts £!_COUr8e.s of 
action~ the part o:r other states, territories, etc. which 
they~ conquered, colonized, £!. otherwise control. It is 
not an absolute author1 ty. Unlike the preroga t1 ves of 1rr.pe rium, 
it does not imply the managing state's (nuclear c·ore's) absolute 
ownership and control or lands ruled in its name, even though 
it does exero·ise varying degrees or euthor1 ty ov·er eny one ot 
them. Geographically, the e~pira has a maritime d18tr1but1cn 
while the imperium presents a solid land tae·ss. Both rise fron 
different political orientations, and the materiel base o: 
empire is technological as opposed to the agrarian way or· life 
typical in the imperium. The t ·wo represent the· political solu-
tions ot different historical epochs, and where· the one • im-
perium, rose !rom. the conquest of esta.blished civ1lizet1cns 
or relative equals, the other, the empire, gre~ first or ell 
as its nuclear core colonized primitive areas no ~ilitery 
match ror it and later as the sane 
nuclear core ebscrted the 
governmental prerogative-s of' other civil! d 7e societies that 
were its technological inf'eriors. G 
ranted these dtrrerences , 
the equa·tion or ancient and moC.ern pol1t1 1 h co .egemon1es ~r.der 
the term emptre would seem erroneous. The two type·s ere not 
alike; in fact, the only trait they appear to have 1 n e c:::r..c r. 1 s 
their inclusion under the term. political hegemo·ny •. .Em~1re 18 
the technologically oriented and politically 11m1t€d oer1t1me 
hegemony ot recent history, and imperium is the land-bA.sed, 
agrarian, political absolutism of the past. 
Empire ~ .!!!.! Brttish .hegemony. Thus viewed, er.Ip1re 
would seem to present a more ·precise defin1 tion of the nature 
of British power than d-oes the normal loose usat,e of its- t:leen-
1ng,. and 1 t · is thi . .s concept which is intended by tt:e term er.:-pire 
as used in this study. This study propose.s to point out that 
the administrative center of' an empire: i.e., the United Ki~g­
dam: is p-rimarily an administre..t1ve au.thori ty end subject to 
many che·cks upon its· use o-r power. Some of these. checlt.s rise 
from those the edm1n1stra.t1 ve center would control. Others r1 se 
from the designs of competing edmin1s.tretive centers, desi.gns 
whic-h may be military, economic, psychological, ~· • They 
derive also trom limitations inherent in the technological 
structure and. material potential of the nuclear core. The "tree-
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for-all" which has· disrupted the last ritty years or Chinese 
history 1s one o~ the more obvious illustrations or these checks 
and balances in action. As usual in history, the final resolu-
tion. or this problem took a military turn. 
Observations~ the foundation£! British_ power. Primecy 
ot political authority can be maintained only as long as one is 
able and willing to produce the military or police power necessary 
tor 1 ts e-nforcement. In respect to her mil1 tary proble·rn·s, Britain 
has been more favored than most of' her competitors. Her insul-
arity has provided her a nearly impregnable bastion, 2 at least 
until ·the recent advent of the submar-ine and air power. Thanks· 
to a fortuitous series of mineral deposits now approaching ex-
haustion, she has been able to maintain until quite recently her 
deliberate effort to keep her primary position among the world's 
foremost naval powers, 3 and she has been able to produce,. a lone 
or in coalition with other powers, the armies nece.ssary· tor her 
land campaigns. Nevertheless, from the moment or ita inception 
2 Ct • . Sir Halford J. Macl:inder, Britain and the Br1 t1.sh 
Seaa (Oxrord: The Oxford University Press, l906J: CE: 1; or 
~. Fawcett, A Political Geography of~ British Empire 
(Boston: Ginn and Company, l933), ch. 8. 
3 Ct. E. C. Ec.ke 1, ·coal, Iron, and ·.var (New York :: Henry 
Holt & co:: 1Q20}, chs. 1-~r a summary or-the role of mineral 
depos1 ts, particularly coal, iron, lead, tin, et_c. , in the 
success or British efforts. The exhaustion of~e United King-
dom's high-grade iron ore deposits (c. 191?) may yet underwrite 
the complete collapse of the British empire. 
her 1mper-1el course has been precartou.sly balanced and her 
material and m111 tary position have progress-1 vely declined-o 
11 
In a milieu of competing world powers, these gradual alter-
ations in her revered position have presented her administra-
tors with almost insurmountable problems in regard to the gov-
ernment ot her more important- holdings. Over the years her 
attempts to solve these problems have produced such political 
organ! za t ions and mechanisms as cro-wn co lon1 e s , dominio.ns , 
plebiscites, mandates, condominiums, and trusteeships, domin-
ions be_ing by fe.r the most important in terms of diminishing 
British power and the compass of this study. 
Dominion. The dominion is the result of attempts to 
provide stability and equilibrium to the conflicting social, 
politi-cal, and economic asp ira tiona struggling for recognition 
in the relations between the United Kingdom and th~ more im-
portant, usually Caucasian controlled, segments or its empire. 
Though now used in somewhat distorted fashion by other world 
power-s, the dominion is a political institution originally 
developed to provi_de a solution to problema peculiar to the ex-
panding British empire. Initially, as -in the case or Canada, 4 
4 cr. the British North America Act in Public General 
Sta-tutes,Vol. II, pp. 5 tt.: 30 Victoria c.3 (London: H. M. Sta-
tionery Office ., Reprint), an act passed by Parliament in 1867. 
The more signir1cant passages of this act may be round in 
Carl Stephe-nson and Ge-orge F. Maroham, Sources of EnT11sh Con .. 
sti tutional History {_New York: Harper &:. Bros. ,L'937 , p-p.'738 ff •• 
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·1 t was a legal instrument re present1r-g ~ agreeme~t bet~een a 
colony ~ .!h! United Y..ingdom under wh1ch ~ or.of'ess~·<! a 
cotmnon allegiance to the c own the 
-- --- r , colony wes --~~- brer.ted internal 
autonomy, and the United Kingdo --- --- - m reserved the riuht or review 
_ conducted ill ·1nternl'lt1.on"'l ~ ~ manner .!!!: nhi ch _the colony 
• a omtnion hes coce atteirs. Since that time, however. ell th t d 
o perat on under e conmon elle~iance to to mean is voluntary c o 1 
the Crown. This change is the end result of the reco~ende.tions 
of the Inter-imperia.l Coni'erence of 1926 5 end the enectme nt or 
the Statute o~ Westminster (1931), 6 which legalize~ ita rind-
ings. Dom1n1.on s. te tu s had been expected to -so 1 ve a numbe-r or 
administrative problems which had cropped up durin~ the years 
between 1750 a-nd 1867. These had erupted from whet epoeers to 
5 The records and re·corni'l.endetions or this conference will 
be found in their entirety in Vol. XI of the Perli.ementer P6t'ers 
of Great Br·i ·tain for the year 1926 (London: • Stet or.ery 
Office, 1926)-. The most significant ste.te·ment or the "Recoi:nend-
ations" 1s th-e lest clause of Par. 1, sec. II, "Sta.tus or Great 
Brita1nand the Dominions," which asserts that the dominions 
together with Greet Br·itein "· •• ere autonotlous co::unun1t1es within 
the British Empire, equal in status, in no wey subordl~ete to 
one another in any aspect of their domestic or external er:t'61re, 
though united by a common allegiance to the crown,. end freely 
as.sooieted as members or the Br1 tish Corrnonwealth or Ne ttor.s ·" 
6 Cf. Public General Acts (London: H. M. Stationery Of~1ce, 
1932), 22-George V, c. 4: p. 13 f. t:or a copy or this stetute. 
Whet little discussion ensued on this issue teo~ plece in Pe~-
11ement in 1930 end 1931. Cf. PerliementerY De oe te.s ( H .c · ilet 
5 
·) 
for those yeers. or particular note is the rect tEet this bill 
was passed by ell dominion parliaments before being given cursorY 
epprove1. 1n the u. K. Parliament I£!· 22 George V: v. 255, PP· 
2626-2627). 
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have been an almost inherent conrl1et between the basic 
pa-tterns which had produced Britain's colonial ex-pension and 
contemporaneous developments elsewhere in her iffipertal struc-
ture, such trends as the United Kingdon's growing gamble on 
the technological revolution and world t-ade ~ , the dawning 
limite ot British naval power, the problem or mounting stra-
tegic coste. the gradual but forseeable alteration or the 
British position in a milieu or- co~peting world powers, and 
perhaps in some measure, as many authorities would have one be-
lieve, the progressive maturation of repres-entative government 
and voting franchi-se re:form. 
~franchise re~orm ~ ~ historiographical problem. 
T.he possible effects of the spread o_f voting franch1 se pri vi .. 
leges in the United Kingdom upon the course of the empire would 
appear to have been treated 1n more -wishful 'fashi-on than any 
other aspect of British hist-ory, particularly as reE:ards the 
widely-held belief- that franchise reform and 1 ts diffused effects 
profoundly influenced- the 1nper1a_l decline. Certain questions 
present themselves upon the acceptance or this view. Cen it 
be proven, for instance, that British imperial policy was radic-
ally altered by changes in the orientations of Pari1ament fol-
lowing franchise reforms? If observable and verifiable, wee 
this radical change so _intimately allied w1 th the vote reform 
movement as to preclude certain other intellectual end material 
agents a-s more contributory to itlper-1al dec-ay? It would seem 
j 
I 
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that if evidence were available to show that the imperial da-
cline began before the introduction ·ot' franchis·e reforms • that 
such symptoms of imperial retreat as the dyarchical structure-
in colonial government existed before the introduction of vot-
ing reform in the United Kingdon; then 1, one would ·ha·ve to look 
e.lsewhere tor the seeds ot imperial di.sintegration. It is the 
contention or· this study that such evidence does· exist and 
can be verified, that certain observable influences combined 
to sow the seeds of imperial decay previous to the advent or 
franchise rerorm and that these influences stimulated a policy 
of imperial administration continued and developed since. 
Orienta-tion ..2!, :e_roofs. In order properly to assess 
such evidence as apparently does exist, certain gross material 
aspects of the rise, development, and decline of British colon-
ial po.wer will have to be reviewed. As previously· stated, this 
should provide a context within which franchise ref.orms can be 
sensibly related to symptoms or imperial decay and their effects 
asses.sed. This analysis will end with the confused and terrible 
years of World War II; for by then all major franchise reforms 
had been enact·ed and the imminent collapse of the British 
hegemony had been exposed. 
The voting franchise: a· deftni t1on$. For the purposes 
of this study voting :franchise may be defined ~ the legalll 
guaranteed right to exnress one's voice, !!!1, end desires 
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about the manner in which ~ is to be governed through ~ 
used .2!, !!:!,! elect! ve and represen·tati ve processes. Though the 
concern here will center about franchise changes in the United 
Kingdom, it is worthy of remark that all dominion bills and 
most imperial legislation subsequent to the first dominion 
bill (the North .America Act of 1867) grant .some type of voting 
franchise in subject lands. Such grants, however, have had 
little direct eff'ect upon the actions of the "home" Parliament 
in other imperial matters bec-ause they are symptoms of imperial 
decay rather than causes,_ the .end result of d:isintegre ting in-
fluences- r :e ther then their stimulus. 
Keeping these preliminary definitions and idees in mind, 
this sur-vey begins. 
CP-APrER I"I 
GEOGRAPHY OF BBITISH EXPMlSION 
An empire 1s a ge hi ograp c as ~ell as e pol1t1e~l ~n~tty. 
That or the British proves no exception to this rule. It 18 
composed ot more than one hundred b me~ er parts which ere widely 
distributed. They are located in some or the most well-known 
a.s wel·l as some o-r the more remote ereaa of the world. In order 
to establish and maintain its inf'luence over these ere"'s, Brttntn 
has had to develop and keep accessible broad avenues or co~uni-
cation with them. This is a .geographic e·s well es o r.ltl1tctry 
problem. 
Geographic and geopolitical rectors condl t1on1n r.~ Prt tt ~h 
expansion. The inf'luence o~ geography upon the expansion or 
England is best understood in terms or sever·al condittontr.e !"'o-
tors: 1) the resources and geographic locations o~ t~e newly 
dtscovered lands and markets which England end her Europe~n 
competitors wished to expropriate, a rae tor which cc;,bined· wt th 
geopolitical relations among these co::1pet1 tors cond1 t1onf!d the 
emergence or naval power as the pri~ary weapon or 1nternati~r.Al 
warfare; 2} the m1l.itary advantages inherent 1n Britain's in-
sular location; 3) the role or colonization in the develo~=ent 
ot expropriated territories; end 4) the totslized con~ext c! 
11 Britain's relations with her imperial 
competitors ~~1 e~!o~!es 
throughout the period or he.r imperial re 1gn. 
! ~ .2! ~ impertel sure;e. The opentng oc ;';nel or.!•" I ::P::::\:::v:p:::i::s •::: ;::e:::~P::e:1::·::::e:n (:~::,:~~ )~). 
j' "France, Ho.llen.d , and England were her e h 1 e r conpe t 1-t 0 r 9 • 
i 
I 
Cr.e 
by one over the next two-and-one-half centuries ( 1 :,5n -1Bl!: ). 
England, through a series o"f wars and alliances, succe~·!rfully 
undertook the. elimination of the others. The wars sr.~ .feu.,..~~ t n!~! 
the peace treaties which "followed provide a record o~ j~ot ho• 
satisfactorily she complete-d this task. Spa·in, Holl'lnd ,. nr~ <i 
France were stripped of the more importAnt of their 1~~er1"1 
gains.l Naval end military successes, however, are but oc~ ph~ae 
of Britain's efforts. r~ remained ror colonization to make 
effective her expropriations, since the best the veunted no·.-y 
~ them· 1t could not dev~lo~ the=. could do was bar competitors ~rom , 
1 For more detaile-d accounts of the wers e.nd tre" t1.,e •1 t~ 
R s ley Ex~~ns1on or F.n~l~~d these powers, cr. Sir John • ee . ' . s c ErTU..-e r"ro:-:1 !Rle=-. c 
(London: The Macmillan Co., 1883 ), Jo~~). ·J .. ",, .. 111;,;. Dart':er, 
to Empi.re (London: Chatto & ~indus, 19 Londo~: S=:ith, ::l:!er, 
The Rise and Decline ~ ~ *~~¥e~~~n~~b!rt ·G. Albion, A E1~t:J:ey 
& co:-;-T906T; end Walter r... ~ 
0 
1946) £! the Hri tish Empire (Boston: Ginn & C ·' · 
--
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lli two arms£! territorial exproor1at1on.·2 Britain's 
military campaigns against her European rivals and her coloniz-
ation were intimately allied forces and appear to have been 
the- two ch"ief agencies of Bri t1sh expansion, even though they 
emerged from sonewhat different, sonet1mes eo1nc1dent conbina-
tions ot social forces~ Until 1815, Britain's military cam-
paigns generally appear to have been precipitated by overt acts 
of the Crown or 1 t ·s agents, 5 though Parliament through 1 t ·a con-
trol of the royal purse sooner or later round itself involved 
in all of them. Colonization. on the other hand, was largely 
the result ot private initiative, providing a convenient out-
let r ·or social. demographic, and economic forces bursting their 
2 The views expressed in this paragraph are 1nt·erpreta-
tions of data to be found in ·the sources quoted 1mned1ately 
above or in the bibliography. In referring to Britain's cam-
paigns ·against the Netherlands, for exam:tile, Bark-er, £E.• £!.!•, 
points out that by 1630 " ••• the Netherlands had become the work-
shop of the world, the traders of the world, end the world's 
colonizers and planters." (p. 143)~ By 1634 they " •.• had some 
34,850 ships carrying on commerce all over the world." (p. 145). 
"The En811sh observed the progress of Dutch commerce with envy." 
(p. 509). "The King, the Court 1 the mercantile interests and 
the people were eager to attack the Dutch, end, as there was no 
just cause, a cause had to be created." {p. 311). The British 
began plundering Dutch holdings end attacking Dutch shipping 
on the high sees. New Netherlands was captured end the "·. •. Bor-
deaux fleet was intercepted ••• and 1~0 ships brought into 
England and condemned as lawful prizes." {p. 313 ff.). Seeley, 
2Q• e1t., points out the successful use of the same tactics 
against both the Spanish end the French-~ 
3 The campaigns in north America ere here viewed as the 
reflection or struggles elsewhere. 
f 
! ; 
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restraints in the "home 1 slands." B th o agencies, :!":cweve-- •~ 
struggling toward their 1nd1 vidual . , •~ goals rused into ~ e1~~le 
force directed toward t ·he common d en or s-Up;J lau t1 t¥: the au thor-
ity of Britain's European rivals in Asia end the ~ew ~orl~. 
Constancy of m111tarz effort (1553-lBle). Dur1r:r-~ t.er 
initial period of expansion, 1558-1815, u 1 r ta1n wes contlcuslly 
at war with other European powers. Th e constancy o~ th1~ c111-
tary effort is reflected in the followinR table or full-~cnle 
wars. 4 
In years, British wars against: Snei.n Hollend Fr"no·e 
1558-164-9 49 ~ 
1650-1763 37 g 4~ 
1764-1815 17 ::!4 29 
l03 ~ ~ 
On tne surface this table suggests that during e perio~ .or ..... ., • oJ . 
years (1558-1815), from the crowning of Elizabeth I to the Con-
gress of Vienna, Britain (first England end later the United 
Kingdom} spent about 30% of her ti:ne involved "in •ers e1:1~1! Plt 
territorial, strate-gic, or economic gains. In thi!! ., ho•ev'!r, 
the table is misleading because it does not teke 1r.~o eccc~nt 
the sequential rather then simultaneous occurrence o! sc~e o~ 
4 h k 0~ Tohn s. c. Bri~ge. _o~. _cit •• Condensed from t e wor s ~ ~ 
and Q,uincy Wright, A Studl, 21, ~, 2 vols. ( Chiest;o: Tt.e 
University of' Chicago Press, 1942). 
i 
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these conflicts, nor does it take into co&s1derat1o~ eueh 
belligerent circumstanoes as the never-ending proe-ess or ir::.-
per1al attrition represented b y permissive piracy under "letters 
of marque," certain unavoidable but violent sea car:tJle.1en8 
which erupted when maraudi B 1t1 ng r sh fleets encounterej tho~e 
of' -other powers or vice vers.a, end other minor colonial ekirt:l-
ishes which would bring the time percentage up to so~eth1ng in 
the neighborhood of 85%. 
Motives and results ot conti-nuous conflict. I , n p;er.ere_, 
this continuous conflict was aimed not only et the exrropr1n t1on 
of more territories and -the r-emoval ot c-ompeti tore; 1 t ?t-n s e i~e~ 
also at improving the quality and defensibility or the whole or 
the imperial structure. Surinam (Dutch Gu.1-ena) , for e7.ex:::ple 1 
a relatively worthless tropical area, was traded to the Dutch tn 
exchange ror New _Nethe_rlands which had been recaptured by the 
Dutch shortly after the Duke- of York's celebrated raid. 
5 
Th1e 
too often ignored trade cen hardly be considered uni~portent cr 
an accident, for it rather conveniently gave tte Br1t1eh un1n-
t .errup'ted control of the American coastline :rrom .Caine to Ylor1de • 
T-he acqu1si tion of Gibraltar r.as no accident e1 tber. Control of 
5 Cf Jo-hn F1 ke The Dutch and ~ueker Colonies 1n ~'"'!:e .ric~ 1 
• 8 ' - V 1 I -243-t~4 2 vol. (Boston: Houghton-Iar:r11n -co. , ~ -00) , o • PP · - • 
and Vol. II, pp. 1-5, ror the course ot this contro~ersy. 
f 
f 
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Gib-raltar meant strategic adv t · 
an .ages. Though w·rested rro::. the· 
Spanish by a combined B-ri t1 sh end Dutch 
fleet, it was ft Er1t18~ 
garrison whic.h occupied 1 t, thus g1 ving Bri tair. c ..... ntrol 
v or r.avel 
and merchant traf:t'1c in the Med1 terrane an. The net .benef1 ts or 
this 1n1 tiel phase or expansion were: 1) the· TYnite" 'l' 
.... ...... s. 1n,.: t!oi:l 
gained strategic control in the Atlantic Basi~, the ~editerr~-
nean Basin, the Australasian Basin. and t~ .. e Chin• 
• l• o ~>ens--1n other 
words, strategic control of the world's seas, and 2) 1t p~ir.ed 
colonial control 1n such -areas ot the globe as canada, Indie 8. 
Burma·, and Malaya. Further 1 t d ... 1 , remove ~pan, FrancP., ar.d 
Holla-nd, once and for all, as threats to British colonial ex-
pansion, though 1t did not reQove them as threats to British 
power on the "continent." 
Expansion ~ retreat. The Congres-s of Vienna oar ked 
the end or the great surge or the British expansionist movement. 
Subsequent to that time the mil1 tary ca:mpa·1gns of the t"ni ted 
Kingdom, except for iso.leted f'lurr1es in Asia end Af.rice, were 
primarily defensive and strategic, concerned with the t~o-fcld 
p·rablem.. of stabilizing the "continent" and defending co.lcniel 
life-11ne.s. True, the African campaigns did give Britain sotle 
strategic control&, particularly in South and East Afrte~, e~d 
colonization did make ef'fective her control in ~ustralesiP- en~ 
other areas; but these developments alter very little the teet 
that the United Kingdom has Bpent the major portion cf its 
energies from 1815 to the present time locke~ 
"' in a t1 tente 
... ., 
£..-.. 
strategic struggle aimed at consolidating and 
preserv1r.g t~oae 
imperial gains already made. On the one hand the United K1r.g-
dam had continually to be concerned with stab111z1n~ poltttcel 
arrangements on the "continent," while on the other it ha~ to 
be concerned with the internal stability And nrotectton or col-
onial holdings. This meant a defensive problem or ve~t pro-
portions because it meant that Britain hed to interfere in 
revolutions on the continent and ~ontain as they ecerged the 
global amb1 tions or Russia, Germany,. Italy, end Japr1n. Bri te1n 
had not only to anticipate these problems, she had to cont~in 
their eff·ects else control in her .colonial areas mipht be di:e-
rupted. The one depended upon the other and vice ver~a; they 
were part and parc·el of' an over-sll defen·si ve problem. 6 
Geographi-c b-asis of Br1 tish strategy. This adoption of 
a de-fensive posture was en end result o.f problems inherent 1n 
the broad, indiscriminate geographic structure of tte existing 
empire. Britain needed time to develop end consolidate colonial 
admin1stret1on in those territories acquired previous to 1815. 
Naval and merchant communications· had to be developed ar.d pro-
te·cted. Such needs placed the enp1re in e prime-rily defensive 
situation. Campaigns resulting 1.n acquisition entereC: er·ter 
u t m n A centur~ or 6 C'f G B Gooch and J ~- H. B. ~.las er a , -td 1"'1 'end 
-· • • . ' d • Allen and Unwin L • ·• ~ 1 Br1 tis-h Fo·reign Pol1cz .(Lor; on. ..,.,. . 
0 
e 1878_1919 tor e more G. B. Gooch, A Histor;x: £f. ~od-ern .tt.~ur P , 
complete account of these struggles. 
:; 
' 
23 
1815~ the Boer War, for exa~ple; were generAlly the unwAnted 
fruit of the overt acts or private cit1zen&j official br1t~1n 
) appeared desirous or avoiding them et all costs. neranse 8 nd 
consolidation were the o:ft'1c1el concerns. E:xpans.1on w~s ur:.dor-
taken only- for strategic or economic reesons end only U :..en uncter 
' i progress! vely more limited political instruments. 
I 
I 
~ Focusing ~ geographic problem. Concern witt defer.zse 
rises principally from the distribution of the sub_ject lnnds 
of- the empire. The United Kingdom is not contiguouo to the 
lands it administers. Lying just off the Europe en lend ~~ss. 
i ! it is separated :rrom 1 ts subject areas by oceans, cocpe t.1n~ 
, I 
; 
' f powers, and hostile oul tures. The t ·erri tories 1 t a<!:w1n1 ste r~, 
unlike the .subject a-reas of a Rome, Persepolis _, or other 1:n-
per1al center o~ the past, are exclaves, 7 Areas tar recoYe~ 
from end in no way abutting its national borders. 
factor of' profound strat·eg1o importance· 
This 18 e 
h d1:str1but1on of _en encipnt Cornparati ve geograp ·1c 
imperium. and ~modern empire. The subj~ct lends of the Ro~en 
ly the prOViLCe Cf tte 
7 The term exclave, more p~o~~rem hasize the ele=ent of 
_political geographer, is her~1 ~~~al unit~.._ W1 th tt.e e-x-ception interru,pted geography and po the subject land of mod-err. e~­
of recent Russian acquisitio~s,the vicinity or their s~1n1stre­
p1res are not even remotelY n - and antagon1st1c cultural 
t ·ive centers. Oceans, hostile pow~r~heir adlainistretive cecter, 
patterns inte_rvene between them a;~s of 1 ts 11:1perial s t ·ruct'l:.re • 
even though they are integral P 
8 
Imperium., for instance, wer-e one continuous geog_r~;>h1c mas:5 
radiating out from the impe.r .ial center at Rome. Though the 
Mediterranean provided one or its principal avenues or co~­
municetion, this imperium could be traversed without once 
crossing truly a lien terri tory or open water, .bot·h exposed 
areas in routes of communication and defense;· they are decided 
strategic problems. Rome's land mass was radial and her rule 
uninterrupted to its perimeters. Her military end adminis-
trative supply routes were primarily land routes and her supply 
lines relatively short and unexposed. An enemy moving 1nw<Jrd 
from her perimeter was presented with a progressively more 
stubborn. d·ef'ense. The further in he moved the more clos·ely 
did he approach the thickly populated centers where great.er 
defensive forces could be brought to bear against him end more 
defensive measures be taken. Obviously, Rome was predo~1n­
antly a land power; hence, her naval needs were minimal An~ 
h d 1 t h Perimeters 9 The Br1 tish em~ 1re. er expose areas on y a. er · · 
8 Rome is here used as a prototype. Whet is said or 
Rome is in general true of most of the ancient imperiums. 
9 Ct' Sir Halford J. Maokinder, Democratic Ideel.s4~ .......;• c 1919) chs 3 ·and "'or 
Reality (New York: Henry Holt &. 0 • 'A l!ackinde; 11rotlY ob-
a fuller expos1 tion of this the~ sci th: !.Iediterra:ne.en. Enemies 
serves, Roman land power ou tfla e , ·terms Her rsdie 1 cess 
were tree to attack, but only on Rome 8 inwa;d !rom. the thinly 
lef·t but one recourse for attack • m~vi~gof production end popu-
garrisoned perimet·er toward theddcei~i 6~81 inward mile cost the lation. The wresting of each 8 0 upolY lines shortened 
attacker progressively more dearly; Roman o~ld~ be brough:t to 
while his lengt.hene_d and grea-ter ri~rc~~I:l~ had sppa·rently dis-in-
bear against him. It was onlYt8 11 ~0 the marauding designs tegra ted from w1 thin that she e · · 
of her enemi.es, t ·he barbarians • 
f 
f 
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however, can hardly be said· to be so fortunately 
arranged. 
Even the most superficial appraisal of global geography ser~es 
to render this glaringly evident. Its exposed areas lie be-
tween ita tiny administrative center, the United Kingdom, end 
the great mas·ses which ere 1 ts subject territories. 
Origins. ~ Bri tatn·•s imperial di-stribution. Basically. 
-this distribution stems from two sources: 1) the fact that the 
United Ki"ngdom is composed of islands, end 2} that the lends 
opene-d by the "Age of Exploration and Discovery" were access-
ible only by maritime routes. Britain~ because it is separated 
from the European mainland and dependent upon the surrounding 
seas tor much or its diet, early developed a strong naval tredi-
t1cn and the crafts and skills necessary for the· building and 
maintenance o:r a strong naval fleet. The sea also served the 
Rri tish islands as a de1"ens1.ve bastion, protecting t ·hem from 
would-be conquerors on the European mainland. Not since William 
the Conqueror ( 1066 A.D.) have they been successfully inveded.lJ 
10 The 1 deas synthesized in thi.s paragraph and several 
or those f"ollowing are tor most part adaoted from t .he works of 
Sir Halford J. Meckinder, oo. cit., and Britain and the Er1t1sh 
Seas (Oxford: The Oxford University Press, 1906, partiCularly t 
chap. 1; and c. B. Fawcett, A Political Geography£!~ Britis 1 
Empire (Boston: Ginn&. c·o.' !933) ., particularly chapters B, 9 t 
end 10. All three works deal with geopolitical significance of 
Britain's unioue geographic position, and all find it important. 
Neither· Mackinder nor Fawcett, however, attach to it quite 
the wide signirieanee that it is given here. Both seem to c~n­
sider naval power end geographic advantage as sone.thing ax~r ted 
from resources and technology upon which their use is pre ca • 
j j i 
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This nearly impregnable is-lend pos1 t1on 1s one of the great-
est strengths or the ea-rly empire, but it is also, because 
of certain complicating rectors, one of its principal weak-
nesses in modern times. However this may be, the daT.n or 
Britain's imperial surge in the century following the Columbian 
voyages was coincident with the full emergence of navel power 
as the primary weapon or international warfare. Access to the 
newly discovered lands and defense of them was predicated upon 
the development of na·val power. England possessed the re-
sources r-equisite to this end .and employed them to the optimum. 
The fact that her insu1-ari ty outflanked the naval ambitions 
of the European mainland merely served to strengthen her posi-
tion; her real advantage lay in her technology and resources. 
Technological advantage combined with insularity helped her 
rid the seas ot the Spanish Armada (.1588) and freed .her of 
the last serious threat of invasion from the c-ontinent unt1.1 
modern times when she had lost much of her technological 
advantage. 11 Defeat of the Armada in the closing years of the 
sixteenth century, however, had left her free to employ her 
mushrooming naval power to the expropriation end development 
or the ·newly discovered colonial are-as. 
11 It is worthy of note here that, aside from this 
Spanish f'ailure, not since 1066 A.D. ha·s eny continental power 
seriouslY considered the invasion of Britain and attempted to 
carry 1 t out. 
I 
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The British pattern or strategic geographz. As Britain 
expanded, s-he developed_ a pattern of consistently inclu-ding in 
the holdings she acquired su-ch strategically valuable locations 
as islands, capes, and port sites for development into naval 
strongholds or bases. Those acquired in the Vfest Indies_, ror 
example, served both to outflank Spanish holdings ·tn South 
America end to protect English colonies in North America. 
Singapore, Gibraltar, and the Cape of Good Hope ere other ex-
amples._ The potentially weak line any given one of them might 
one day represent was of ·no importance so long as British fleets 
could be built to control the exposed ocean supply route-s. As 
long as British navel power reigned supreme, there would be no 
threat of invasion hanging over these strongholds. Wherever 
the British have colonized, this defensive pattern has been fol-
lowed, end it appears to have erisen from the average Britisher's 
awareness or the peculiarly fo_rtui tous s ·trategic value ot his-
homel_and' s insularity •12 For defense purposes, he has attempted 
to reproduce this- advantage wh_erever he has expanded about the 
gl-obe. 
12 Cf.the well-known writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
This is oneot the principal threads which ho-lds together his 
rambling dissertations on the role ot British see power in 
modern history; .!.:.!.·, The Influence £! ~ Power Upon His-to_ry 
1600-1783 {Boston: Litt!e, Brown, and c~., 191?), PP• 29-35. 
~"Achilles Heel" ~British strateg;r. By 1781, 
however, the nexus of a startling weakness in the British de-
:tensive deployment appears to have lain expo.sed to her r1 vals 
even though the overwhelming nat.ure o·t- con temporary Bri tleh 
sea power barred any of them :rrom taking advantage of the 
knowledge at that t1me. 13 The progress of the war in America 
had focused attention on this weakne·ss, ror it had impressed 
upon the world-at-large the tact that the totalized social, 
political, e-conomic, indust·rial, and demographic potential 
, 
at the immediate eonmand of the United Kingdom could r.ot sup-
port the logis·t ·t.cal ef'f'ort necessa·ry to the successful con-
clusion of large-soa~e land invasions at Britein's naval peri-
meters, even though her "Union Jac.k" might lord 1 t over th·e 
seas. This was in part a geographic problem and in pert a 
result ot the f'aot that Western oiv111zat1on had not yet 
d-eveloped the resources, arts, and machinery necessary tor 
1mplementt·ng t:he technique of full-s·cale sea-borne inv-asicns 
by combir.ed m111 t ·e.ry forces •14 It was also in part 8 result 
13 cr. immediatelY below and pp. 26!., 102f., 
14 The United States appears to be the only net1on ·in 
d ~ the industrial and mineral re-
modern history po_ssesse _o kind of m111 tary development ., and 
sources necessary for this 1 ly fifteen short years ago. she arrived at its realizat on on 
l 
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or what can only be calle-d- Britain's happenstance practice o-r 
discouraging the development of manufacturing industries 1n 
.her colonial areas. Though deliberate, this neglect of colonial 
industrial deve~opmen t appears to be one of those courses which 
arise from circumstanne rather than malice. Mercantili-sm ·the 
t 
prevailing economic philosophy at the dawn -of British expansion, 
encouraged the development -of manufactures and r1n1sh1ng in-
dustries at home and the sea-rch for resources abr-oad. Concen-
tration upon internal industrial development had little effect 
upon the empire during its formative years, but in later years 
it meant that the manuractures upon which Brittsh military 
might depend were separated from the raw resources which went 
into them. As the complexity of the "imperial structure increased, 
so did the weight ot this factor, particularly in military plan-
ning. Military authorities. became more and more aware of the 
fact that any power that could suo.cessfully delay -external re-
sourc.es- from a-rriving at the factories in the United Kingdom 
would have the who 1 e imperial structure in a de-fensive quandary. 
Britain's awareness of her strategic weakness. British 
military conduct since 1781 lends substance to this argument.-
Only -onoe (the abortive conflict. with the u.s. in 1812) in the 
period from the end of the American Revolution until World I 
did the British., warrins alone, conmi t to battle against 
civilized societ.ies on foreign shores tull .. scale land armies 
unless they had land bas&s contiguous to the areas they were 
1nvad1ng.15 At these bases Dritish for-ces could build up 8 
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v.ast material sup_ply bet'ore contacting en enemy. Even against 
relatively primitive and retarded states. the same rule was fol-
lowed, e.g. • the oempa·igns in India, South Afric.a _, and the· 
Sudan. 
The strategie-logistical-taoticel function or· the geo-
graphic matrix; the eentrel ~ographio problem of the stra-
---
tegic planner. The reasoning underlying this coordinated 
military .concept appears obvious and sound. After all, by 
1815 imperial administrators were confronted with the enormous 
problem of insuring the protection o~ some 80,000 miles of ex-
posed ocean supply routes lying between manufacturing industries 
in the United Kingdom end the resource centers and markets 1n 
16 the subject territories of the empire. In a context of com-
peting world powers, this has never been a small problem. 
Britain's rivals have. never quite given up. They hav·e h-arrassed 
British authority wherever and whenever possible.. They have 
15 Such c.ampaigns as that in the Crimea are here excluded. 
This rather puzzling conflict wa·s undertaken in alliance with 
France. British planners we.re willing to negotiate an end to 
this conflict as soon as Napoleon III made obvious his w~n1ng 
interest, even though sevastopol had already fallen. Britain's 
only .gain appears to have been a dela.y 1·n Russian naval develop-
ment. 
16 Cf. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order 
of Sea Power, (Princeton: The Uni ver.si ty Press, 1943"'J: "Ch. r 
and"2'"""for a more detailed examination of British navel strategy. 
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been only too aware or the Uni-ted Kingdom's del_icate grip 
upon the empire. They have been quite well aware or the log-1s-
t .ical weakness inherent in the separation of ra.w resources 
and manufacturing industries • and they have a-lso been aware 
ot suah ot-her f'a c tors, yet to be considered , as the 11:n1 t 6 
ot naval power (a tactical weakness) and the dependence or 
the United .Kingdom upon outside sources for the bulk or ita 
food. As long as her major holdings have remained quiescent, 
Britain has found manageable the d11"t1cult1-es inherent 1n 
these conditions. Tractable colonial relations have lett her 
free to deploy: her naval for:ces so as to pro·tect her colonial 
resources and :fend off her rivals, -but revolt in major colonie-s 
--indigenous or instigated by foreign rivals--or the invasion 
of a large, new terri to-ry has at times radically altered 
Britain's control o:r her strategic situation. Major segments 
of the fleet have had t ·o be l-ocalized to c-ontrol supply ·routes 
to a given invasion point. This has tended to expose- both 
colonies -and undeveloped clatms to competitors ever hovering 
in the background waiting for the opportunity to pounce. 
Revolts have allowed Britain's colonists and rivals, or her 
rivals alone, to combine against .her at her most vulnerable 
paints as happe-ned in the case of the revel t in the .American 
colonies. The tardiness or t-he- British fleet at Yorktown and 
such viotori.es as were e-njoyed by America's puny and infant 
naval forces were the fruits ot a strategic deployment which 
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saw the British navy spread over Asian ~·edit 
, ..._ erranee.n, Korth 
Atlantic, and West Indian waters. From this tactical st~le-
m.ate and from the War of' 1812, Br1 ta1n learned that she could 
use her t'le·et to protect her colonial developments or to tend 
ot'f' her competitors. but that she could not dtatribu te 1 t 80 
as to successfully war with both at the same time. She 
observed also that the problem was doubly co~plicsted by the 
s1.ze and speed of available transport, the stab111 ty or· the 
continent, end the location or her raw re.so.urces and mBnu-
facturing industries. By 1815 Britain was well awa.re of the 
fact that neither she nor any other major power at that ti~e 
possessed the resources ne-cessary for the control of her vest 
domain under any other than non-belligerent circunstances 
unless her major colonies chose voluntarily to sub~it to such 
1? 
rule as she wished to impose. 
The compromis·ing ~· British statesmen he ve et all 
times since the American revolt realistically appraised these 
conditions laid down by the geography of the vast world sees 
and thereby have controlled their more disrupting tendenc 1es · 
The somewhat vulnerable sea life-line has contributed to 
British willingness to compromise intra-imperial problems 
and has helped along w1 th other rae tors yet to be discussed 
1? Cf. pp. 120-194. 
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I to produce the present distribution or ?r1t1sh hold!:: .. :s. '!'!':.1s 
select distribution has not al~ays been . r 
so, or, 631de fro= e 
few strategic strongholds, no _pe.r·ticu~ar planning te evidenced 
in Britain's patterns or territoria-l acquisition. The ~::. ~1 j o.r 1 t y · 
of territories acquired appear to have been taken as a catter of 
expediency. Their acquisition ·was a .i:ned at 11 eakeni.n~ 11 co!'l-
petltor by stripping his holdings or removin~ hi~ 85 8 co ;-..:;~ r-
cial or strategic r .ival. Colonization, the real key to the 
development or these acqu.1red terri tortes, a ppears to ·hnve been 
something or an accidental de.velopment • 18 By 1815 the rnther 
will-nilly character or British expansion hAd resulted 1n ~ 
loose, somewhat disorganized emyire whose member parts were 
strewn indiscriminately over the face of the eRrth. Sone 
attempts had already been made to consolidate their adminis-
tration, but most of the consolidation has taken place slnoe 
1815. Units unwieldy or .recalc1 trant in one wa:r cr o.nother 
have had to be pac1ried, controlled, stabilized, or CAst l oose. 
All administrative arrangements made have had to co~ply with 
the fundamental verities or the British strategic end socio-
economic. situation. They had also to be predicated upon cer-
tain material and c.ul tural t'actors whose sum totnl 8 ct ing 
g reat degree underlies both upon this strategic situation to a 
These oater1el ecd cul-
tbe rise and decline of British power. 
or the following d1scuss1on. 
tural f'actors are the substance 
18 .2.!• .PP. 44-49. 
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CHAPI'ER III 
SELECTED so-ciOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC , DEMOGRAPHIC, 
POLITI-CAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
RISE AND DECLINE OF THE BRITISH :E:l!PIRE 
I • CRUCIAL ELEMEN:rs IN THE RISE OF 'l'HE BRITISH ID!PIRE 
At the outset, this s-tudy grants to the English their 
somewhat obvious imperial ambition, though the point at which 
1 t appeared and the degr-ee of' deliberateness involv-ed in 1 ts 
appearance may -be open to some question. The disputability or 
these matt.ers rises largely :from how one views the particular 
influence o:f several insensibly blending and interrelated his-
torical trends. The first o~ these is the growth and matur-
ation o'f industrialization in Engla-nd. The sec·ond is the new-s 
of the Columbian discoveries. The third results from the in-
flue-nce o'f industrialization and the Columbian discoveries 
combined w1 th Spanish threats to the soverei-gnty of the Br1 tish 
home islands. The fourth is the effect of British naval 
successes a gainst Spain and other .imperial competitors. And 
the fifth trend rises rron the particular courses and atti tude·a 
o'f essentially antagonistic social groups acting upoL the 
opportunities presented or stimulated by the effects of t -he 
other four. 
~ growth .2! industrialization. The industrialization 
of England appears to have begun with the maturation of the 
I 
!i 
35 domestic system during th 
e period or the Hundred 
( 1347-1453). Toward the cl 
Yeer'e Wer 
ose or this per-iod the seeds or 
industrialization appear to have been 
germ1na t -ed 1n the birth 
ot the factory system.l Together, these developcents bred er.d 
stimulated the acceleration or the ftinclosure" movements 
encouraged the growth 0~ towns and cities, end 1ntroJucec1 the 
first symptoms of the e t 1 ven ua decline of agrarian cer.~ers. 
Manufacturing stimulated the development o-r re~uler prectiees 
and c-hannels of trad.e, solidified the mone.y--ag-e 
n ays tem • and 
conditioned the emergence of mercantilism as the dominant 
economic philosophy. Mercantilism in turn encourap,ed the 
search tor and development of new markets overseas, thus stlm-
ulating naval development. 
J Mercantilism, ~ Columbian discoveries, an::! ~ SnP.nts·h 
threat. Continental markets appear to have been developed first; 
1 The view presented here is in esreernent ~ith thet pro-
posed by Lewis -Mumford, Technics and Civilization (1;e':t' York: 
Harcourt, Brace, & Co., l934). Itls l.!u."':lford's view in this 
definitive treatise that factory system and industrial revol-
ution ere synonymous teres and that the movement cocmonly 
referred to as the "industrial revoluticn" is really., oore 
accurately speaking, a technologi-cal revolution. It 1e !~urord 's 
view tha-t - industrialization began with the ~erge-nce o~ t:-.e 
racto-.ry system which introduc-ed the u-se o: cechanicel power 
and the specialization or manufacturing or proa~ct1ve func-
tions. Special.izat1on or :runction was part and parcel o~ tt:.e 
development of timed operational production and st1~ulated 
the gradual substitution of machine work tor hand labor. The 
technological revolution began w1 th the me-chenic~l 1n7e~t1cns 
which increased the use of mechanical power, advanced special-
ization of function, and almost completely eliminated r.end 
production. 
t following thei·r saturation, the facts or the c·olumbian 
discoveries, and the emergence and quell.ing of the Spanish 
threat, the search for new markets and resources reinforced 
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by the emerging mercantilist philosophy was eredually channelled 
int~ the development of the new areas as both markets end 
sourced for raw mater1als. 2 As the age of exploration and 
discovery "following t ·he Columbian voyages .had matured ( 1492-
1600), English naval power had rapidly expanded in response 
to several stimuli: 1) the dawn of English nationalism, dom-
estic advanc·es in production, and the emergen-ce with them of 
mercantilist yearnings; .2) Spain's jealousy toward growing 
English sea power and her threats to English sovereignty; -and 
!3) the emergence at some point along the line in the. quelling 
of the Spanish threa-t of official and popular desires to share 
in the wealth that Spain and Portugal were looting trom their 
impe-rta·l enterpri-ses, the first real symptom of a burgeoning 
imperial .ambition. These factors led to the building or 
publicly and privately financed naval craft, the ma jori.ty being 
indiVidually owned .and financ-ed "privateers" to be used sec-
retly under the Royal Seal to loot Spanish argosies the world 
2 cr-. Johns. c. Bridge, :9..1!.· cit., Chaps. 1, 2;· or 
John Seeley,~· cit.;· or the somewhat d1fterent views in • 
;r. R. Green, A. Short History £!: lli Engli.sh People (New York. 
Harper & Bros7, 18?9), pp. 251-278. 
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over. This program proved very effective; ror, by 1588, ebout 
one century after its inauguration, it had succeeded in creat-
ing a naval force capable of crippling Spanish sea power and 
plundering the Spanish empire at will. The det·eat of' the 
Spanish invasion f'leet, the "Invincible Armada," in 158"8, not 
only removed the threat of invasion from English shores, but 
it so seriously weakened Spain's grip upon her empire that it 
opened up the newly discovered lands· to the inroads of other 
powers.3 
Grou,p antagonisms~ imnerial ambttion. It is at this 
point,. the scramble ror ·colonial "footholds which followed the 
defeat of the Armada, that British imperial ambition oomes to 
fruition, and it is precisely at this point that its real 
direction end meaning become lost in the aims of essentially 
antagonistic social groups, each striving toward its separate 
goale. Parliament, a somewhat non-representative body, mer-
cantilistic. in orientation, the Crown, guardian ot hereditary 
interests and prerogatives, and the "common citizens," strug-
gling toward pluralism in government are the groups or their 
roci.4 Acting upon the situation left by ~he defeat of the 
3 Cf. Green,~· cit., pp. 396-421, or Ramsay Muir, 
A Short History of the BXltish Commonwealth (New York: 
Houghton, Mifflin-Co., 1935}, Vol. 1, pp. 370-384, 525-541. 
4 c·r. infra, pp. 38-42, for a discussicn of these 
group roles. 
I 
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Armada, their competition appears to have created certain 
developmental rorces which .had a common meeting ground in some 
att·i tude toward the development or the newly dl s·covered lands 
or their resources. Each in 1 t ·s cone-entre tion u.por~ the aug .. 
menting or its own particular interest in the new lands appears 
to form one or· the interlocking and coincidentally struggling 
elements or a movement identifiable as a dri v·e toward empire. 
In truth, it would appear that the social forces of no other 
naticn have ever worked more assiduously toward the construc-
tion of a political hegemony, even though each might be striv~ 
ing toward a separate goal in t ·he process. By the same token, 
it would appear, the social forces of no other nation have 
ever more seriously, if not blindly, s-et about the business or 
making it impossible to finish what it had set out to accomplish, 
the construction or a political hegemony. 
Contradictions~~ patterns of construction of~ 
British empire: ~ stat.ement ~ ~ problem. A sensible 
explanation. or this contradiction leads this study into an 
examination o~ the internal pressures behind English colonial 
expanston, a·n analysis of the role of exte-rnal interferences 
rising from diplomatic relations with competitors, a summation 
ot the fundamen·tal attitudes and cultural patterns· of colonists 
(whether English nationals or absorbed by conquest or other 
means), and a briefing or the constantly changing matertal 
and strategic aspects or the 
British colonial s1tu~t1on. 
certain geopol1 tical aspe-cts 
or British acquisitions have 
ready been discussed, the next logical 
step would ap~eer to 
be -an examination o:r the pressures_, internal end exte-rnal 
I 
the patterns characteristi-c o-r British 1 expans on. 
I.I. PRESSURES AND PATTERNS UNDERLYING COLONIZATION 
Opening the colonial ""rea s. 1or 1 
_ _ a .... ave power • as t:'llreedy 
end. 
discussed, wss the chief' agent in opening th-e newly discovered-
areas to .British colonization. Its role, however • contrary to 
Mahan and others, 5 is not to be misunderstood. N-avAl power, in 
fact, had only a limited versatility. Though 1~ could open up 
the new lands t _o Bri t1 sh designs, 1 t could not develop them e-nd 
could only partially protect t -hee.. To say that English interests 
5 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influe_nce of Sea Po-we.r rt)n 
Histort, Hi00-1783 (New Yo-rk .: ""Little, Br-own~ena-co., 19 1 
pp. 1- 0, 25-90, propounds his strategic concepts. Sailor that 
he is, he appears to overemphasize the ~alue of see power be-
cause he 'fails to consider the t 1) the ef fe c ti v ene s s of s-ea 
power diminishes in proportion to its localization in defense 
of land operations; 2) that it diminishes in proportion to just 
how much Of its raw materials are separated from its ship· 
building centers; 3) that it is not tt.e effective agent ot 
colonization, only one of 1 ts de·f -enses; an_d that 4) granted the 
rest, its effectiveness in stretegic terms cen be m1n1rn1zed 
by the designs of other powers, especially when it is ~lready 
committed to some major defensive operation. The first con-
plicated by distance, and the second, progressively more pr~­
naunced, are two of Britain's principal strategic weaknesses. 
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were immediately aware ot this fact, however, is grossly to 
misrepresent the case. Awareness dawned gradually, and com-
bined with certain other facets end facts or contemporary 
English li:f'·e 1 t oondi tioned the devel·opment of "pr1 va te colon-
iz-ation" as the -chief mechanism of Br-1 tieh expansion. 
Bri t1sh colonization .! pattern .conditioned .£l ~ histor-
ical matrix. In the a.ssertion of claims which had followed 
the defeat of the Arme da·, England, now the o verwhe lm1 ng sea 
power, had the initial advantage, but official circules appear 
to have been puzzled about just what to do at th.is stage of 
expansion. Parliament appears to have been little concerned 
with the opportunities presented by the defeat of the Armada, 
while the Crown's involvement was somewhat hapoenstance, being 
stimulated by the visionary designs .of pri vet.e ci ti?ens. Such 
orficial policy as did come into being developed gradually. 
The eventual resolution of the colonial problem had been sug-
gested ~revious to the defeat of the Armada. Before that time 
there had been Raleigh and Gilbert's two unsuccessful attempts 
at crolonizing 1n the New World. Though official sanction had 
been given these ventures J they had been privately :financed 
and had literallY to be badgered out of an at first recalci-
trant crown. Raleigh, after ell, had visions of a new and 
greater Engla·nd rounded upon private colonization, an England 
in which colonists would be left pretty much to governing 
themselves and would enjoY the same pr·i vi leges as citizens in 
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in the home islands; in ract~ as Ralei€~ would tave it, they 
v'>'ould enjoy tar more.. Obviously, this visionary .dreec co u!.C. 
not have been too palatable to the absolute prero£at 1 ve.s or 
monarchy; but, since no other means could be found to establish 
the foo.tholds in the New ·.7orld a-pparently desir·ed by the Crown, 
permission was reluctantly granted. Though these attempts· at 
colonization tailed, they appear to have set a precedent teken 
up some years later in suc-cessful inroads into t ·he Eew World 
1 
and they also appear to have developed in the Crown a desire 
and a plan about just how the c·rown could restructure 1 ts wan-
ing absolutism and ·authority through colonies in the Ar:.:ericfls 
and elsewhere. The Crown's legal p.olicy developed gradually. 
Following the first colonial failures and the defeat of the 
Armada there appears to have been a lull of two decades in 
British attempts at colonization. Bath Parli~ent and Crown 
seem to have had no set policy about whet could ·be done w! th 
British opportunities in the now open areas in ~sla and the 
New World, but the continued insistence of pri ve·t .e petition-
ers appears to have provided them with a solution they would 
one day regret. Based upon the precedent set by the Baleif',h 
affair, the parade of Royal Colonial Charters began with those 
granted the East India Company in 1601 and the We.~t Indio 
Company in 160?. 6 
6 Cf'. Ric-hard .Hakluyt, Princ~Ja 1 1~a vigatlons, 12 v~ls. 
(Glasgow:][akluyt Society, 1903-190o , Vol. B, p.l? f. ~0 8 
copy of the Letters Patent to Sir Hun~~fe~ Gi~~;r!'c~~de~sat1on 
Stephenson and March am, op. cit· • P • · 1 
o:f the Charter to the East India Coo?any · 
i 
J 
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Nexus ~ Eressures behind English co·loni zet1on. A n\.;.::1.-
ber ot !'actors appear to have conspired to br"ing to pass this 
particular solution or the prdblen or what ~0 do with the lands 
now available for ex_propriation rrom Spanish claim, but each is 
one way or another related to the aims or competing social 
forces or institutions in the hOI!le islands. Among the tActc.rs 
of greatest influence were the limited versatility or naval 
power, trou.bles between Cr.own and Parliemen t, the -sources -and 
solvency of the Royal Treasury, d1srupt1 ve soc·ial forces seeth-
lng under the s-urrace or English life, and expending industry's 
need for new and vaster trade outlets. Examining the points 
ot orientation of England's three great social forces sheds 
same light on just how they were effective. 
Factors influencing ~ royal ~ to ·R9rd !!:!! dev~lop:tent 
£! ~ lands. The Crown had to take many factors tnto eccount. 
Naval power obviously had 1 ts limits. "Though 1 t might fend ort 
rivals from the new areas, it would be hard put to do anything 
more than establish forts as colonies, forts which would put en 
additional burden on a nea-rly insolvent Royal Treasury. l.;avsl 
colonies would expend monies rrom the treasury rather than 
increase its revenue. on the ot~er hand, the particular solu-
tion of:fered by pr·ivate pet1 tioners might promote a substBntial 
increase in the Royal Revenue _, since the chief fount or 
royal purs·e independent o-r Parl.iament was reeeipts· froo 
the 
cue tom's, 
re-ceipts which might be tremendously expended under the pro-
posed c1t1zen-financ~d and controlled program o-r development. 
Royal grants could also be used t r d o e eem certain o~ the rcy!l 
financial obligations: e g th P 1 • ., e ennsy venia grant; thereby 
improving the fiscal position of the Crown. Adc1n1strst!ve 
pos1 tions which would a-rise as these areas were developed. 
could be used to reward deserving subjects; the staffing or 
administrative units would open up a host o~ new government 
sinecures for dis tri but· ion, particularly e.nong the c m:L."tloner 
sons or aristocrats or those aristocrats whose families h6d 
long since s-quandered the family -estates. Last but not leRst, 
these lands could be used to rid England of some o~ its more 
rabid religious and political dissenters. All these sdvants~es 
would bolster the tenure of the Crown and increase its ef~eo-
t1veness against Parliamentary inroads into its authority. 
Parliament•s !!!! ££ colonization. Parliament's view 
of the opportunities inherent in colonization was one of e-lmost 
complete ne-glect at this stage of expan-sion. Aside from e. 
somewhat intermittent interest in Nevi.gation Acts, the Puritan 
Interre.gnum excepted, Parliament pref-erred to let the direction 
or legal precedent take its course until the middle of the 
-e.ighteenth -century. This was _probably because Parlienent ' -
8 
t ry was the problem 
paramount concern during the seventeenth cen u 
1 f the crown. ~here of wresting internal political contra ron 
j 
I 
! 
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was also the not too a-pparent in:rluence inherent in the t'sct 
that the interests of individual members or Parliament were 
pretty much identified with those of ~eroantile and other 
citizen groups involved in the expansionist movenent. 
Commoner~· Crown £a colonization. Ordinary c1t17.ens, 
however, viewed the new opportunities with a somewhat differ-
ent eye. Merchant interest viewed them as a potentially v~st 
new market end source or raw materials. even though the Crown 
might have its eye on customs receipts and naval strategy. 
Religious and political dissenters viewed them as a sate heven, 
while the Cro-wn a·nd Parliament viewed them afl a place hapJ1ly 
available for the banishment of troublesome elements. Other 
citizens envisioned in the new lands the possibility or A life 
free of many or the social, po-litical, end economic restric-
tions to be round at home, though they would find that, 
administration being the problem it is, they had borrowed but 
a t ·emporary respite. Almost all alike saw the possib111 ty or 
acquiring land and propertY o~ their own, en eventuality al-
most impossible at home. This lure appegrs to have been partie-
tho-se Co ':""'""Oners who had been displaced ularlY strong among ~~ 
by the enclosure £t commons (es oppo&ed to the enclosure of 
wastelands which appears to have displaced no one).
7 
? in G Talbot Griffith, Ponuletion 
cr. the discussion • d Ca~bridge Unlversity 
Problems of~~£! Malth~I (ionl~n~he discussion ot the work 
?ress, 1926), p. 170 t., par cu ar 
of Professors Slater and aonner .• 
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They viewed the new lands, particularly those in North Americ·e.. 
if they could f"ind the means to get to them, as places in 
which a true "son o·:r the soil" could acquire land of his own 
from which to eke an honest ~~n•s 11vi.ng.a  These and many 
other commoners· would, if necessary, contract themselv.ea into 
years or bonded serv.i tude merely to pay their passage cos.ts. 
J Here the Crown was somewhat in accord with popular desire-s. 
Since 1t also desired the development of the new lands, it 
the possibility or acquiring one•s own land proved a lure to 
the potential colonist, s.o be it. This the Crown view.ed as 
8 The true force of the enclosures and the attendant 
lure o.f free l ·and are rather difficult to assess with any sub-
stantial accuracy, certain contradictory facts having to be 
take.n int·o account. On the one hand, it is comnon knowledge 
that 1 t was rathe·r d1f ficul t, if not impossible, for the aver-
age commoner to acquire land once the enclosures had begun. 
·Ha.ll and Albion,££· ·cit., p. 480 tt., end Wi.lhelm Dibelius, 
Englan·d (London: .Jonathan Cape) !1!· give conflicting accounts 
of the number of English landholders in the 17th century, but 
a fair estimate is that in 1688 there were 1?~,000 landholders 
in England in a population of 5,000,000. By 1784, ther.e were 
1,000,000 in a population which had mushroomed to 23,000,000. 
Even more surprising is the fact that in that same year, 1784, 
250,000 ci.t1zens owned nine-tenths of' the land, while 4,200 
of that number owned half or it. Griffith, ££• ~., pp. 170-
1?9, on the other hand, shows that despite tne periodic accel-
eration of enclosures in the period from 1450-1845 the number 
of families making their living from the· soil continued to 
1ncreas.e from t ·he time the enclosures began. Only after 1845 
does the agrarian base of England begin to reveal a decline 
in the number or .families involve-d and a truly significant 
decline as the principal source of British 1ncone. These facts 
obviously contradict one another, so the reader will have to 
assess to eaeh his own particular estimate of its importance. 
I 
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certainlymore to its advantage than the actions of that 
group 1t had bred by its own writs in the struggle against 
Spain, a lawless tribe who. bowing to adventure's " • siren call " , 
often contused their curiosity about exotic la-nds w1 th the 
right to "freeboot." 
The seeds 2£ emoire. No more motley a group of social 
forces was ev·er more eager to act u_pon the possibil1 ties in-
herent in a global situation. Each was eager and desirous to 
develop in a menner of its own c·hoosing certain of t ·he ne" lands 
or commercial poss1bil1 ties end resources. For·ce and direction 
was needed to weld them together, else they should endlessly 
work a·t cross-purposes. This rorce and direction, though not 
too readi.ly discernible, appears to have originated from 
citizen groups guided. by the Crown and was finally conmandeered 
by Parliament. It was the Crown that worked out the charter 
system which gave direction to the grow.ing ·internal drive ror 
expansion and unintentionally laid down one of the bases of 
future legalistic and revolutionary conflict. It was also the 
crown that reserv.ed to itself--apparently deli·ber·ately! --cer-
tain preroga.ti ves that would sooner or lat-er lead to attempts 
to centralize the political administration of colonial areas 
and thus form a world empire. Here the Crown was apparently 
quite successfully attempting to use the energies of others 
to accomplish 1 ts own purposes: the fend.ing-off of Perliamen-
tary inroads end the bolstering of its fiseal position. 
The 
47 
Crown's control of the charter &ystem is the focal point or 
the imperial ·ambition which burst· upon the world or the sev~n­
teenth century. 
Constructing a political hegemony. Once given direction 
1mper1 al amb 1 tion held f'ull sway, but regard 1 e s s 0 r wh1 c·h dire e-
tion it took 1 t was the Royal Seal ·which directed 1 t, imple-
mented it, and gave 1t legal status. The direction might be 
military conflict or piracy ai~ed at checking the expansion 
of other powers. It misht be the chartering or a particular 
trading group which desired to ga1·n exclusive control or 8 
given ·market. ar·ea. Or it might likely be the desire or 8 given 
social group to gain excl-usive control of land for· coloni.zing 
purposes. Regardless of what direction it was, the group con-
cerned was without authority to act until chartered by Royal 
Writ. The Royal Seal was used in all cases both to fo.cus and 
satisfy the desires of' England's thre·e great socio-pol1 tieal 
forces: Crown, Parliament, and the common citizen or citizen-
trader-colonist. Though the point of view o~ each group might 
stem from different premises, e-sch conve.rged at the collll!lon goal 
of imperial expansion because each needed the fruits of expan-
sion to accomplish its particular ends. Only the Crown was 
aware of the tact that· 1 t had preempte-d the author! ty to direct 
the impatient tmperial forces, but as awareness grew the 
d d •o coalesce into e single force citizen groups involved ten e ~ 
4.9 
because they built up a desire to keep governmental interfer-
ence, whether from Crown or Parliament, at a minimum. This 
development, however, is somewhat ahead or the story. The real 
point at issue here is the r.ect that 1 t was the Crown which. had 
worked out the most er!"-ective and satisfactory solut.ion -to be 
found to negate the conrlicts inherent in the drives or the 
se-veral imperial forces_.. The use or "letters or marque," 
grants,_ and chart-ers which defined the rights, duties, and 
privileges of the expansionist r ·orces in question were quite 
without precedent for the purposes they were used until the 
Crown preempted and developed such uses. Royal England may 
have envisioned in such an assumption or- authority the poss1-
b111 ty of escepi.ng Parliamentary encroachments upon its power 
through the creation of a political hegemony remote rrom 
Parliamentary control, an beg.emony which might provide both 
monies and power for its own use. That such e pur~ose railed 
of accomplishment is or little moment, for the fact still 
remains that it was the Crown which gave direction to the 
conflicting desires for expansion. The Crown's probable pur-
pose in encouraging i!!lperial expans·ion served only to com-
plicate and make well nigh impossible the establishment of 
a centralized colonial authority once Parliament had begun 
to strip it or all semblance of power. 
III. P.ATTERNS OF ENGLISH E."{PANSION ( 1500-1367) 
_Patterns 2!. expansion. Once given autho.ri t .y under the 
Royal Seal the forces o~ English expansion developed se~er8 1 
techniques or patterns of growth, though m111tery power w~s 
an integral meohani.sm of ell or them. One pattern involved 
exploration followed by a simultaneous process or col.on1ze.t1on 
and neutralization or decimation of natives when found. Natives 
were contained by a combination of military force end the 
individual efforts or trader-colonist groups, the greater 
part of the military effort more oft~n coming from the letter. 
British North Americ-a is the principal example of this .pattern, 
though French intrigue with the Indians periodically· compli· 
cateQ its operation. The next pattern involved a-n initial 
phas-e of m.1li tary conquest which wrested !'rom othe.r powers 
localities they had already carried through the explorat1on-
colonizat1on-nautralizat1on phase. Areas so conquered were 
then .subjected to a-dm.in.istrati ve centro ls whioh were a com--
bination o-r already established procedures and regulations 
desired by British conquerors to encourage colonization by 
British citizens and traders~ French, Spanish, end Dutch hold-
ings in North America, part1culerly New York and Canada, are 
good illustrations of this technique. Another· teehnique 
involved infiltration by trad14g groups. Infiltration was 
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generally followed by a period of 1~tr1gue against elready 
exis-ting native governments and trading groups representing 
other European powers. A combication or mercenaries ·hired 
by the trading companies _, some plain adve-nture.rs 1 and occa-
sional segments of His Majesty•·s forae.s then carried out 
piecemeal acts of conquest a.gatnst the native rulers. The 
conquered ruler was generally allowed to keep his position 
and titles, or someone ., a native, was substituted in his· place 
and an administrative group DJ.Bde up o·r officials hired by the 
trading company was set up to rule the area through the "princer 
an indirect ·c.ontrol. The prince was left pretty much to rule 
his subjects as· he chose so l .ong as he no longer interfered 
·with the prerogatives desired by the trading company. India 
and the early infiltration or the Straits Settlements are 
obvious examples or this pattern. Still another technique 
involved t ·he conquest of" strategic locations, e1 ther ·by con-
quering the native_s or wresting them from the control of some 
othe.r European power, and following this conquest with the 
establishment of a m111 tary governme-nt. G1braltar
9 and other 
9 Though Gibraltar is not really en island, but a part 
of the Iberian Peninsula, it is for strategic purposes consid-
ered an island because it has almost all or the advantages of 
insularitY· It is, however, connected to the Iberian land 
mass by an extremely narrow isthmus. 
I 
I 
I 
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en-d other strateg-ic islands or capes ere good examples of this 
pattern. A final technique involved infiltration by traderst 
particularly in island lo-cations, followed by conquest in the 
name o~ the Crown, followed by little interruption 1n the 
native government, the existing ruler merely taking on the 
additional burden of ruling his subjects in the name or the 
Crown and thereby insur-ing protection of the traders. The 
Tonga Islands and others exemplify this pattern which differs, 
but not too greatly, from its relative technique used in the 
case of India.lO 
Roles of government and citizens in the early patterns 
of British expansion. Throughout all these patterns certain 
roles and elements are evident. In every case, though in vary-
ing combinations, Crown, Parliament, and citizenry, social 
forces whose existence would one day prove antagonistic to the 
administration or en empire, worked together -toward the common 
goal of expansion. Expansion and colonization generelly 
depri v.ed na·ttves of lands whi.ch at a later date ·might "morally 
be con-sidered: their property; but, since- Bri te.in possessed the 
military power, particularly the naval s.trength, requisite to 
their acqu1s1 tion, the- question in the early years of the empire 
10 cr. C. E. Carrington, The British Oversees (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1950) whic~s something of an exposition 
of this thesis on techniques of British expansion ~ 
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was or little importance .. Naval p·ower could not really develop 
these la·nds, and such land power as was needed was as often 
supp.lied by private in1 tiati ve as by establ1 shed governmental 
forces. Though the Royal Seal was the key to all action, 
development ot the new territories was largely the fruit or 
the e.f:forts or private ci t1zen groups and so was the establish-
ment or t.errttoriel defenses. Except for the passage or the 
Navigation Act·s, Parliament was lert pretty much out of this 
stage or development. 
IV. EMPIRE AS .AN AININISTRATIVE PROBLEM 
Focusing an administra-tive proble.m. As territories con-
tinued to be absorbed, certain new elements were introduced 
into the British expansionist ~vement and an administrative 
p.roblem was created. The heart or the problem lay in the types 
or territories absor-bed, the manner, state, a-nd sequence in 
which they were absorbed, and the degree end manner of their 
assimilation desired by the Crown, Parliament, and citizenry. 
This was no small administrative problem,_ and. it had to be 
solved as the territories were being acquired and developed. 
Origins £!_ e.xpand.ing British. holdings. A brief look at 
some of the typ.es of ·territories gained provides some idea of 
the enormity ot this administrative problem and the mechanisms 
used in attempts to solve it. North American colonies, for 
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I j instance represented several social traditions in the British 
ji historical picture and various types of legal 1.nstruments 
' carrying the Royal Seal. -othe-r North American terri tortes 
wrested from the control of competing European powers represen~d 
somewhat different cultures and institutions ouite alien to 
those of the British. New York, Dutch in origin, presented the 
problem or a-lien allegiance end such unfamiliar social tradi-
tions as the patroon system. Canada, particularly Quebec, 
presented the problem of an "-unpopular" religion, Roman Cath-
olicism, and a certainly alien tradition of civil law based 
on the Roman Corpus. In the East the conduct of trading com-
panies had been such that some- effort had to be -made to satisfy 
their desires while s-till satisfying those or the government. 
All these factors had to be brought into some compromise amen-
able to the functions of the established socio-political and 
economic instit-Utions- of the United Kingdom, els-e- adminis-
tration of them would end in horri-ble confusion. In other W-ords, 
all these acquisitions and developments had to be brought 
to heel under some centralized administrative agency. 
Effeot of hapnenstance origin of colonization. This 
was a problem which had developed step by s_tep. Originally, 
largely because it could see no better means to protect its own 
particular -interests and make effec-tive its claim to territories 
then available tor expropriation from an humbled Spain, Royal 
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Engla-nd had acceded to the request·s or pr·i vate pe,t1 t1.oners in 
regard to the development or the new .lands end contemplated 
channels or trade. Parliament almost totally ignored this phase 
or development except to pass Navigation Aots which were aimed 
more a.t encouraging continued naval developme·nt at home end 
satisfying mercantilist and. industri-al interests than they were 
at encouraging infant developments 1n the col.on1ea. In follow-
ing tt...eir separate· courses, however, both had stumbled into 
sanot.ioning· the construction or a. pol1t·1cal hegemony without 
really heing aware. or the remit·toations of their ecti:Ona. The 
generosity of obart.era granted pote.ntial colonizers end traders· 
beers mute testimony in this regard, 11 and so do subsequent 
attempts of both Parliament and Crown to abrogate certain or 
the charter rights in their efforts to superimpose a central-
ized administrative control on coloni-es already e.stabl1ahed 
end those being aoquired. 12 
Growing -awareness £[~administrative problem: mechan-
isms developed in the administration of Bri t .1sh hold1nes 
11 cr. Hakluyt, ££~£!!.,Vol. 8, for a view of some or 
these charters and patents. 
12 dr. infra, pp ... 39-46, 62 f., 65 .. '?2, et ~ ... cr. elso 
H. L. Osgooa, The Americall Colonies in the Seventeenth ~ntury, 
3 Vol.s. {New York: The Macmillan Co., HW4-190?), Vol. 3, for 
an exposition of the etiology of attempts to abrogate
1
thesie 
does not take quite the v ew g ven 
che.r·ters. Osgood, however, elat1vel~ successful. here. He ·believe-s the attempts were r ., 
~ 
,. 
I 
.! 
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{1500-1867). Even by the time o'f the Restoration _(1660) the 
limited e .. xpansion England had undergone had created 1n govern-
ment circles en awareness or a growing administrative problem. 
A COI:mli ttee or the Pri v.y Counc-il was organized to administer 
colonial holdings, mostly those in North America. By 1695 
1 
' :: this comni ttee had given way to the newly created Board .or Trade 
and Plantations, mercantilistic in orientation. whose object 
was t .o unity th-e administration or established and expanding 
colonial -holdings. The eighteenth century saw the creation, 
-abolishment, and re-creation o-r e Colonial o:rr1ce and Secretary-
ship. The same century (1784). saw the establishment or a separ-
ate Board ot Control ro·r India. Revolt in America served to bre~k 
up the Board of Trade and led, in 1801, to the final establish-
ment of a fUll-blown Colonial Office, still separate from the 
admini-stration or India, and later, in 1925, to be separated 
from the administration of dominions, which had since been 
developed. Thetr administ.ra t1on, to be discussed later, was 
g1 ven f'or the mos·t part to- a Dominions Office create-d by an 
act o:f Parliament. The India Of_fice Act of 1858 superseded 
the earlier e-stablished Board of Control ror India and was 
somewhat _modified in 1919. In @Bneral, these were the prin-
cipal depar~ents created in attempts to unify administration 
and establish consistent controls throughout British hold1ngs.
13 
13 Cf. infra, p-p. 94-118. 
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Parliament's role in ~ estab.l1sbrn.ent .2! unified 
colonial administration. A number of reasons may be advanced 
for the order Of development and the courses of action followed 
by these depar·tment·s. The first ot these would be that Parlia-
ment neglected the administration of Bri t ·ish holdings • aside 
from the Pu.r1 tan Interregnum, until 1695,. a short w·htle aft·er 
it had: stripped the Crown or most or its authority. Until l6g·5 
the Privy Council of the Crown, mercantilistic in orientation 
and absolutistic, was the chief fount o-r co·l .onial ad.-rn.1nistrat1on. 
a conditi-on of authority which pretty much gave s-ubstance to the 
Crown • a subsequent claim to rule and .dominion o·ver the colonies. 
Even at't.er 1695 Parli_ament appeared 11 ttle concerned with t ·he 
administration and assimilation or colonies until the pertod 
just pr eeeding the American Revolt.. Admin! s tra t 1 on of the 
colonies was left exclusively- in the hands of a Colonial 
Secretary buried somewhere on Downing street and all but ignored 
by- Parliament. A second reason would be the example or the 
American Revolution which pointed out to British administrators 
and the ~orld-ot-large the "Achilles heel" of British military 
might and to other colonials- the ant·agonisms inherent in the 
structure of British rule. In regard to this latter point, the 
.Americans l:Bd demonstrated to the whole empire the tact that 
the crown and Parli~ent could be maneuvered into positions so 
~-
' . 
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totally at odds as to renQer them almost ineffect1ve.l4 A 
third reason, one most singularly Br1 tis-h, would be ·the lege.l-
1st1c foundation of British expansion, a practice initiated by 
the- Crow-n but inhere-nt in preceding internal developments which 
had re so 1 ved some of the di ff'erenc-e a between Crown and c 1 t 1 zenry. 
Internal influences behin_d legalistic implementation E.!_ 
Brit is-h _expansion. In an over-all vie-w, this study can present 
but brief accounting for the legalistic element in British -ex-
pansion. The impetus behind the legal instrumentation of 
colonies specifically British in origin appears obvious enough, 
but the nature, even the very existence, of the type o:f decree 
or legislatio.n setting the rule over areas -wrested from other 
powers, native or European, is a matter of somewhat more oom-
plexity and obscurity. ·Taking first things first, several 
traditions and influences combined to produce the agreements 
and laws setting the rule over specifically British colonies. 
The most obvious to any student of British history is the strong 
common-law tradition of t -he English people: a tradition often 
referred to as- "an irrational reverence for the law." Its 
i _ntluence is particularl-y evi-dent in the ac-tive struggle over 
civil rights coincident with England's imperial beginnings. 
The struggles between common-law courts- end the Crown, Parliament 
14 Of~ infra, p. 63 f., particularly Note 18. 
I, 
I 
<1 
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and the Crown, end citizens end Parliament over such procee-d-
ings as those or the Star Chamber a·nd Court of the North, James 
I' s ( 1603--1625) attempts to "legislate by procla:!l·at1on, and the 
social forces behind and the results or· the Interregnum c-er-
tainly did not pass without their influence. ..Another influence 
is to be found in the already mentioned imperial acts of Elizabeth 
I ( 1158-160"3), acts whose very existence indicate the cro"n' s 
desire to steer clear or Parliamentary pi t!alls and e-stablish 
the primacy of 1 ts own authority in subsequent colonial deve1op-
ments. These acts also exhibit the traditional distrust be-
tween commoner and aristocrat, reflect the social changes Accom-
panying Elizabeth's reign, and set -a tradition which, s1 nee 1 t 
had not seen fit to contest it, Parliament would one day find 
unpalatable. Elizabeth's chartering under the Royal Seal or 
Raleigh's unsuccess~ul attempt at colonizing in the New World 
and the exclusive charter she granted the East India Company 
(31 Decenber 1600) quite evidently set the precedent in law. 
From that time forward, Parliame-nt failing to enter exceptions 
to its authority, it was the Crown or its agents which must be 
petitioned if one wished to trade in or develop the new lends. 
As matters stood, Elizabeth's acts implied that all British 
acquisitions, whether legal (by right 'of exploration and dia-
l ( f and Peace treat~) were the clelm covery) or extra-lege war are ~ 
or property Of the Crown and to be- dispensed with as the Crown 
., 
1 
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It would be some time before Parliament would enter 
exceptions to this cla~.l6 
Inf'luence.s behind legal 1nstrumente.t1on £! ceotured 
holdings. Accounting for the pacification or conquered European 
developments in the new l -ands, however, presents a sorne.what. 
different problem and sends one into a maze of conplexly 1nter-
rela ted forces--social, political., economic, psychological, end. 
strategic--constantly in the process of modifying and altering 
·the·ir highly. unstable relationships. In each spec1f1 c case e 
good acc.ounting can be g1 ven, though no two colonial .govern-
ments are in any sense identical. The one thing all have tn 
common is that they represent the particular resolution or e 
three-way struggle between Crown., Pa.rl1ament .• and citizenry 
(.Engl1 sh and absorbed) ove·r the p rero gat 1 ve s or rule to be 
allowed each in a milieu of competing world social, political. 
and economic powers that wished to contest English authority 
in general. Rule developed ror New York, for example, com-
promised the privileges desired by Dutch nationals ., asserted 
the primacy of the Crow.n, and largely and deliberately improv-ed 
15 Cf Richard Hakluyt oo. cit., Vol. 8. Parliament's 
failure to c~ntest the royal prerogatives implied in Letters 
Patent and Charters is a legal admission of this .claim. 
16 Cf. infra, pp. 61 t · , ~ se.oo • 
~--
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the British strategic situation in North .Aoe ·rica. The Quebec 
Act ( 1774}, ta.king another example,. though maneuve.red by the 
Crown was largely the result or both the Crown's and Perlie-
ment's desire to mollify French Catholics and neutralize canada 
in event or further disturbances in the Thirteen Colonies. 
It also stands out, though the Crown hardly expected this, 88 
one or Parliament's earliest successes in wresting political 
control or colonial affairs from the grasp of the Crown. The 
North America Act (186?), on the other hand, resulted fron e 
co!Ilbination of the following ractors: 1) memor 1e s or le sso·ns 
learned from failure to quell the American Revolt or succeed in 
the War or 1812;· 2) a change in the economic orients t1on of the 
British people who had given up mercantilism in favor or lAissez 
faire capitalism; 3) the resulting changes this al tera·t1on or 
economic orientation had institu~ed in the House of Co~~ons 
and its citizen makeup; 4} changes 1n the British strategic 
picture; 5) a desire on the pert of the "new" Parliament to 
reduce the burden~ome costs of administering an empire wh1oh 
apparently did not bring to Britain the benefits of empire 
(in this they may have been mistaken); and 6) a desire to 
maintain and augment the economic and social arrangements 
already established between Canada and the United Kingdom, 
di t d by flurries or c1~11 arrangements continuallY being srup e 
disorder. The act of Parliament (1?.84) settir..g U:;> the Board 
of c·ontrol for India is a still different exacple. It .served 
....- ..... •E-.! 
fl 
both to placate the interests or a 
trading company possessing 
duly chartered rights and to 1d 
avo a staggering m111 tary prob-
lem possibly beyond Britain's capabilities. The India Act 
(1858} merely served to 1 
same arrangements. 17 
mprove Parliament··' s author! ty in the 
The Crown ~ ~ symbol of' aut.hor1 ty. Through all these 
changes there threads one or the outstonding facts of British 
colonial expansion, the acceptance or the principle that ell 
terrftor1es acquired by exploration, c~lon1zat1on, conouest, or 
combinations of all three were to be claimed in the name of' t ·he 
Crown and in the formative years of the empire developed f'or the 
most part by private citizen groups acting under specific 
legal instruments carrying the Imperial Seal. This practice ot 
claiming and developing new holdings under the eeg1.s or the 
Crown has never been discarded by the B.ri tish, even though e.ctual. 
administrative power in the colonies rully pes.ses into the hands 
of' Parliament- subsequent to the American Revo·lt. Alleg1enee of 
colonials is always to the Crown, symbol of authority, even 
though the Crown bas 11 ttle legal or political control over ·any 
of them. 
Problems raised £Z ~ ~ £! legal 1nstrucentat1on. 
Legal "instruments have always served to define ·the rights of 
17 C:f. intra, pp. 141-]45. 
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Crown, Perl fament, ·and colonial developers, whether English or 
the absorbed natio·nals or other powers. Parliament's failure 
to challenge the claims implicit in early royal grants and 
charters until much too late appears to have laid the aeeds of 
a tradition which effectively preserved the tenure of the Crown 
and endlessly confused future attempts a creating an i:n.peria·l 
adm.inistra t1on once its need had become apparent to all a-nd 
sundry. In fact., early Parliamentary behavior promoted a 
situation Which, as it matured, allowed dissatisfied colonials 
to use a "defeated" Crown as a club with which to smash exist-
ing a dmi.ni strati ve rela ti.onship s between the government at home 
and those in specific colonies. Parliament • s lack of challenge _, 
it is true, may have ste~ed from ·the fact that the Crown was, 
at the opening of the imperial drive, still a considerably 
forceful authority, but the fact nevertheless remains that its 
:failure· to enter exceptions to the i;nplied significance of the 
Royal Seal appears to have laid one of the more importa-nt cor-
nerstones o:f future colonial struggles ror self-determination. 
In fact, much of the conflict over the prerogatives of various 
governmental institutions which has preceded Britain's loss of 
control over many of its holdings, particularly those of 
Ca-ucasian origin, has been of a legalistic nature and appears 
to have been rooted in the shadowy definition of the roles of 
Crown and Parliament in colonial affairs. Colonials, partic-
ularly those in Caucasian areas, were continually proposing 
~--- -1 I 
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differing 1nterpr~tat1ons of both the substantive and adjec-
tive legal aspect·s of grants, charters, proprietorships, and 
the civil and legal status of colonial subjects under the 
British Constttut1on. 18 One need but look to t ·he events which 
transpired in the Thirteen Colonies, the Ionian Islands, and 
Canada to observe the precedent setting examples and to observe 
that tmperially-minded England was eventually willing to settle 
for whatever prerogatives it could impose and enforce a.t any 
gi.ven time. By the time of the Union of South Africa Act 
18 It should be noted here that t .he Brit ish Constitution 
is not a single document, but rather a long tr.adi tion of organic 
common law, a tradition subjected to continuous modification in 
efforts to .keep 1 ts conce.pts abreast of the particular soc1o-
historical milieu in which any given accumulation of it operates. 
As such it is a very flexible instrument. It should also care-
fully be noted that wherever Bri ta"in has round areas in which to 
expand its nationals have. migrated to them, carrying w-ith them. 
such aspects of home culture and traditlons· as they ·respected, 
particular1y an abiding regard ror home laws end their rights. 
under them and an .abiding regard for the rights contained in 
the charters implementing the·ir colonizing efforts. Is 1 t any 
wonder then that the basis of subsequent struggles between 
colo~iels and the home government should often be rooted in the 
interpretation of legal issues doubly complicated by factors of 
chronology? On the one hand, recalcitrant colonials, professing 
al1egiance to a · "shackled Crown," would claim all rights tradi-
tionally held or recently acq.u.ired by home citizens; yet, w1 th 
considerable effrontery t .hey would deny Parli·ament the sam-e 
authority over them that it had over· home citizens. On the 
other hand, it is no wonder that both Parliament and Crown would 
do their best. to limit colonials to their own interpretations 
of ·the exact! tudes and contexts ·of the original legal instruments 
and subsequent edicts and laws of Crown and Parliament aimed at 
the establishment of centralized imperial controls. This kind 
of legal dispute has often preceded or accompanied open rebellion 
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(1909) this willingness to compromise is altogether obvio~s. 
The act is a very 11c1 ted poll tica·l instrument and ts the 
beginning of Britain's usage ot progressively more limited 
polit.ical instruments in the establishment or colonial con-
trols over newly dominated areas. 
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18 in British colonies, particularly in the case or ~he 
American Revolt • . As Profe~sor S. E. Morrison. By Land and~ 
Sea (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), pp. 219-=233, part!cu-
l .arly p. 221 f., indicates, the views of' the d1ss·at 1sf1ed 
elements in the Aoerican colonies eppear to reflect resolved 
and continuing struggles ·between the three protagonists At 
home: Parliament • Crown, and ordinary c1 tize·nry. He observes 
that Thomas Jefferson, well aware of the fact· that Parliament 
had shorn the Royal House of its political prerogatives, sub-
mits his .,A Summary View of the Rights of l3ri tish .Anerics," 
..9...!...!. , t ·o George III ( 1 '760 -1820) whom he eddre sse s as "Chif' t 
Magist·rate of the Br1 tish Empire." He observes also the t this 
poper denies absolutely the ri.ght of Paorliamen t to le g1s late 
for the colonies which are. "bound. to the mother country only 
by and through the Crown." The net efrect of this argument., 
which amounts to dominion status when combined with t ·he 
·"Novanglus" papers !1.:..!• of Samuel Adams, won t t' use the pow.er-
less Crown as a club with which to gain concessions fron 
Parl.iament, pla clng Parliament end Crown in attitudes from 
which neither could make concessions without flatly admitting 
the other's political supremacy in colonial af'fairs. Parlia-
ment's pre·vailing ·philosophy, d.espi te the fact that 1 t was 
being maneuvered by the Cr.own, was predi.cated upon the estebl1sh-
:rn.ent of imperial controls under tts own bnnner, and so ·"as that 
of the Crown which claimed prior rights~ This meant the sub-jug~tion of British nationals to restrictions· they would toler-
ate neither in the home milieu nor in that created by charter 
guarantees and c.olonial precedents. All future B!,itish which 
co l .oniels anpeer to have prof! ted by the ensuing ,ler in · · r 
?arliamentary and Royal forces were bested partly be~ a~se 0 
a stretegic weakness, pertly because of hopeless div 5d~~~ded 
within Parliament. and partly because of the bitterlY 
purposes of Crown and Parliament. 
r 
I 
:, 
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UNIFIED AND PERMA!-:"ENT IMPERIAL ORDER 
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Origin ~ ~ 1'ailure to establish a unifi-ed 1~roer1al 
order. Osgood•s19 unparalleled study of the first two cen-
turies of the North American development studies the first pro-
mounced -example of England's failure to establish a unified 
imperial order. It comprehensively exam:ines the complexion 
of British expansion in that aree and records the etiology ot 
the complete f't:ri -lure of Brit-ein's attempts to superimpose a 
unified impe-rial oxder or administration upon the rather diver· 
gent, but sometimes similar systems its own governnental writs 
had instituted in the Thirteen Colonies. Both Crown and Parl1a-
ment want.ed a unified empire ruled by 1tselt' alone; but eech 
had to be willing to settle tor what they could get. There is 
little need here to take up a lengthy survey of the process 
whereby imperial desires were compromised, but certain t'acts 
involved are germane to subsequent discussions. 
Source of royal failure to establish 1mner1al controls. 
19 Cf. Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 
SeventeentnCentury (Vol. -3 of Imo-erial Beginninfs. 3 vOTs i 
New York: The 1Iaom1llan Co., 1904-1907) ;_ Vols. and 3 of 
The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century. 4 vols. 
(New York: The Columbia University Press, 1924). 
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Largely 88 8 result or Parliamentary neglect and a tradition o~ 
royal origin, Bri t1sh colonial administration wes in the he.nds 
Of the Crown. until the latter h lf f h a o t e eigbteenth century. 
During tha-t · per1o.d, as Osgood would have it, 20 the Crown hod to 
some degree reasonably succeeded in superimposing upon about 
hal:f its American colo·nies a mercantilistic royal edmt-nistret1on 
in place of the earlier charter guarantees. These royal govern-
ments, however, because Parliament was of little help, ~ere 
precariously established and authority constantly fluctuated 
between Crown and inhabitants. For example, the Domini-on of 
New England established by· efforts ot the Crown collapsed fol-
lowing the Boston uprising of l6B9 and th~ old colonial govern-
ments were pretty much restored. In fact, .Massachus-etts wes 
given a new charter or rights ( 1691) ., even though 1 t accepted a 
royal governor of limited power end a secretary for royal appoint-
ments along wi tb that c·harter. Rhode Island end Connecticut 
escaped with their corporate charters intact. New Jersey con-
tinually struggled ·back. to 1 ts _proprietary government. after 
short bouts under roya-l reign. Pennsylvania went through the 
same proces·s ( 1692-1694). Nowhere was the Crown entirely sue-
20 cr. H. L. Osgood, £E· cit._, end particularly his " 
essay, "The-classification of Colonial Governcents 1n America, 
to be round 1n the American Historical Associetion Annual 
Renorts, ·1895 (Washine;ton: The Government Prir:ting Office, 
1896), pp. 6·1.7-627. 
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cessful in establishing unified imperial rule. All through 
th:e pe.riod from 1660-1 ?60 Crown and colonists were at logger-
heads over prerogatives or rule. The Crown was powerless with-
out help from Pa-rliament, and Parliament was in no mood to 
help, being· concerned principally w1 th wresting internal poli t-
ical control from the Crown. 21 
Parliament •·s fl'lilure to establish imperial controls. 
Parliament itself appears to have fared 11 ttle better in t ·he 
matter of establishing unified imperial rule, being for the 
most part concerned with controlling trade and manufactures 
through the Navigation Acts during the period when the Crown held 
full sway. Even then, when it did get into the act in earnest~ 
the policy of the administrators charged with enforcing its 
regulations was pretty much one of "salutary neglect," since 
most were unenforceable becaus-e they entailed the employment of 
naval :rorc.ea f'ar greater than England poss-essed end some, part-
icularly those aimed at curbing the development of manufactures 
in the colonies, were .rather short-sighted since the. colonies 
were not yet ready or able to undertake such developments end 
such enforcement as they were· given would later lead to a 
strategic problem of staggering proportions. For the most part 
these regulations which stemmed from the dying merc.ant111st 
·21 C:f. H. L. Osgood, !h.! American Colonies.!!!, the 
Seventeent~Centu£l, Vol. 3. 
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philosophy were soon considered undesirable, but such as did 
have their erreots so retarded the development of manufac-
tures that they later le-d to the previously mentioned s tra-
tegic problem, the separation of raw materials and industries. 
Be that as it may, by the time Parliament had succeeded in 
wresting internal political control from the Crown (1680-1?60), 
it appears to have been too late for it to do anything about 
the successrul establishment or unified imperial controls over 
existing Caucasian units, though it might have succeeded had it 
started earl·ier and presented a different economic a ttl tude. 
Parliament later had some success in bringing under regulation 
some of t ·he non-Caucasian colonial units, but success varied 
from unit to unit, being dependent upon a host or variable rac-
tors.22 Generally speaking, Parliament had an uphill battle 
whioh has fina-lly in our own century brough it to the brink of 
complete failure. Though Parliament struggled mightily, the 
Crown until the latter half of the ninet·eenth century was 
hardly willing to be of any help to it in the imperial st.ruggle, 
preferring to play off Parliament against the colonies in an 
attempt to preserve its own waning prerogatives. In the early 
years of Parliamentary .interest in colonial development, the net 
result or this situation was the Anerican Revolt, a lesson in 
strategic politics whioh Parl1amant appears never to have for-
22 cr. infra pp. 103-115, 196-200. \ I 
I 
gotten. From that time forward 
• depending upon the part1cul8r 
set of' c.ircumstances • Parliament 
would placate the Caucasian 
units or the empire while co.ncentreting its 1mper1·el e!'f.o:rts 
on those non-Caucasian .in origin; they woUld wrest control or 
these. areas from the Crow d n an managing business grou·ps only t .o 
have them f'inally slip gradually into self-determ1net1on or into 
the orbi t .s of hostile powers as the British strategic, econoo1c, 
social., and political _picture changed relative to the t or co:n-
peting world powers. 
Colonists' role in Britain's fa-ilure to establish unified 
1mner1al oo·ntrols. There is also the colonists' side of this 
matt.er. Probably the most overlooked point in this r -egard as 
far as Ca·uca·sian un1 ts are conc-erned is that these colonies were 
developing cultures and traditions quite alien to those in the 
home land, even though t .heir governments m1gh t be .English 1n 
or·igin. Such social forces as the "11 berterian" trad.i t1.on and 
the very isolation of these colonies froo the problems foremost: 
at home supported the growth of a psychology essentially belli-
gerent to the exercise oi' controls emana-ting from external 
sources. such forces bred also a jealous regard for the pre ·~ 
servation of civil rights and carried w1 th them the ~maries 
of their dissenting origins. Some colonies had been rounjed 
ti~n at home Otters had primarilY es havens safe from persecu "' · 
been rounded by corporate interests who woulj hardly wish to 
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surrender control or the tr.ade and pro"fi ts tor which they had 
b.een founded , -even though. they m1 ght tra d.e s.ome me a s.ure or their 
auto·nomy in return for British naval protection and rights es 
home citizens. As far as concerns- those Caucasian colonies 
extant prior to t _he American Revel t, these factors combined w1 th 
the foreign origin of some of them, an origin which looked for-
ward to sharing in the pr1 vi leges- of government g-1 ven to some 
other British holdings, tended to mesh into the creation or 
communi ties of inte_rest and cultures a a different as they were 
geographically separate from that in the homeland. 2~ Often 
these Caucasian developments, particularly in the East,_ would 
take on a good deal or the coloration and attitudes or the cul-
tures they had absorbed politically. As for the natives them-
selves, in these. Eastern and still later African and -other cul-
tures, they would slowly begin to use the successful struggles 
of the Caucasian units as arguments in defense of their own 
c-laims to self-determina-tion, though, as will be d1scusse.d 
later,24 this eventuality is more complicated than simple argu-
ment. 
23 Cf. H. L. Osgood, ~ American Colonies in the 
seventeentnCen tur~, Vols. -1 and 2; and The .Ar:lerican COI'on1es 
1n the Eighteenth enturz, Vols. 2 and 4. 
24 cr. infra, pp. 103-115t 195-250. 
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Imperbw or empire: .A "'robl ~ d 
- _ K em~ ef1n1t1on. The fact 
that the attitudes of these three groups t 
s emmed from different 
aims and premises is perh~ps the fulcrum 
of the whole early imper-
ial problem. As matter t d s s oo , the behavior of all three appar-
ently stemmed from essentially antagonistic pol1ticel at-titudes. 
The Crown, aping historical monarchs in general and the Spanish 
in particular, seems to have been bent upon the establishment or 
an imoerium -consistent with the absolutistic· attitudes ot mon-
archy, ev.en though. 1 t did make concessions 1n order to get 
colonial development started. Its attempts to abrog~te its own 
charters and grants and its attitudes and decrees concerning 
government in both the Thirteen Colonies and the East amply 
attest to t ·his fact. On the other hand, Parliament's role 
appears to have been a confused one, undoubtedly reflecting the 
attitudes and conflicts inherent in its royalist-libertarian 
makeup. Parliament seems to have wanted to legislate 1~nerium, 
a contradict ion in procedure which could lead only t.o conrusion 
because it forced Parliament to tread a tight-rope betwe.en rel-
ative despotism 1n colonial policy and the relative radical-
ism evident in its attempts to establish pol1t1cel democracy at 
home. Its behavi-or 1n passing the five so-called "Intolerable 
Acts" contrast·ed w1 th its vee illation in the. feoe of the 
Amerie·en Revolt lends· credence to this view. Parliament was here 
caught in its own contradictory proce~ures. Colonials also pre-
--
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sented mixed attitudes developed from se-veral sources, but 
most eventually ·tended toward the same goal, self-determin-
ation. Though perhaps the largest segment ot colonials re--
.flected royalist etti tudes, the more vocif-erous elements among 
them reflected both the struggle of the common citizenry at home 
in the direction of democracy and the drift ot Western civiliz-
ation toward political pluralism. Geographic detachment trom 
the homeland and indigenous influences in the colonies themselves 
tended to drive o.olonis·t away trom the acceptance of direction 
from the homeland where administrative attitudes reflected a 
lack of understanding of both the cultures growing up in the 
colonies end the problems, aims, and interests pe-culiar to them. 
The majority of these atti"tudes were not particularly amenable 
to manipul-atio-n by either Parliament or Crown in view of their 
a.tti tudes, a conflict of viewpoints which could only lead to 
trouble and did. 
The compronise of em2ire: The British maritime hegemony. 
From the viewpoints of the Crown, the Royalist segment of 
Parliament, and "imperium, those British coloni-es prior to the 
American Revolt which were Caucasian in origin had been left 
to their own devices much too long. Had Crown and Parliament 
joined together to subject them to the prerogati-v-es of imperium 
from the moments ot the.ir origins, the final reso1ution of 
British expansion might have been a different a. tory; a-n imnerium., 
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though this point is highly speculative without regard to 
stra-tegic,_ economic, and other historical consideraticns, might 
well have been established. As events transpired, this was not 
the case. Imperial rule had to be superimposed upon systems 
already in operation. Not only was this true of the American 
scene, but it was true of other colonial developments es well. 
The turning point in B-ritish efforts to establish en 1m-:)er1um 
appears to have been the American Revolt. From that time for-
ward in history, B_ri tain has found herself in a continual 
struggle to maintain such prerogatives of rule as she has been 
able to impose- and enforce on even her most primitive areas. 
The best she has been able to achieve is a very transient empire, 
a maritime hegemony. This is because she has had to fend off 
one rival after another, one potent-ial revel t after the. other_. 
She has had to try to minimize such changes in he·r strategic 
or industrial potential as have altered her relative power 
position.. By 1932 .she app-ears to have been ready to concede 
that this might be a well-nigh 1mpos.s1ble task. The Statu.t-e 
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o~ Westainster admitted frankly that she could no longer attempt I_ 
to force the issue with her Caucasian colonies end suggeated 
to t ·he watchful that 1 t was only a matter or time before she 
would give in on the issues of rule over her non·Cauoasian 
units. The etiologY' of this admission and the accele.ra ted dis-
memberment of the empire are the substance of th& following 
discussion. 
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Recapitulation of historical matrix. In general, the 
turning point in British efforts to establish imperial rule may 
be seen in the forces represented in the American Revolt, even 
though their effects might not be openly evident until joined by 
the forces of several other disrupting elements appe-er1ng tn the 
events of the f'ollowine; century. Earlier ( 1642--1660) the Pur1 tan 
Revolt had signalled the rise of pressure groups 1n English 
government and with them began the attempts ·to subst 1 tute the 
p 1 urali sm o t" ind 1 vidual frane hi se for the .monism of monarchy. 
Mercantili -sm was introduced as the- dominant _philosophy of col-
onial administration, and the seeds of capitalism were germin-
ated in internal a-ffairs. The rtGlorious Revolution" ( 1688) 
pretty well :finished the internal preroga ti.ves of monarchy but 
lert still unresolved the question of its authority in colonial 
affairs. Eighteenth century British history is pretty much the 
-story of the- development of these social forces .combined w1 th a 
global strategic struggle with Franoe. The revolt of the nTh1r-
teen Colonies" 1-s a part and parcel of this context which not 
only forc-ed the rerolution or some of its problems but con-
tributed materially to its success. 
Immediate signi.ficance £!_the .American Revolt. The 
\ 
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immediate significance of the American Revolt lay in several 
areas: economic, strategic, and political. First, 1 t s1gna1led 
the turning point in the struggle between the waning forces of 
mercantilism and those of risin-g capitalism (free enterprise), 
which began its assumption or the dominant role. Alo.ng with 
capitalism came the r .i sa of the "sterling b) ook," and 8 -system 
or balanced money exchange in colonial and international trade. 
Balanced trade on at least a ~ pro quo basis became an impor- \ 
tant ea:onom.i-c goal. Notes on unfavorable trade balanc-es were 
redeemed in gold. Second, it battered into the consciousness 
of the aver-age Bri.tish administrator an awareness of t .he exploit-
able antagonisms inherent in mixtures of imperial rule and rep-
resent·ative government. In such a situation imperial rule would 
ge.nerally have to be superimposed on existing structures by 
force and revolt thus always threatened. Third, the cultural 
cl·tm:ate ot the revolt displayed from another viewpo-int the 
"antagonism to i~perialism" inherent in the legal origins of 
many British colonies, part-icularly those peopled by migrants 
from home who were potentially the technological equals of home-
land forces. These antagonisms were- exploitable because of the 
conflict between c-rown and Parliament over prerog-atives or rule 
both a·t home and in the colonies. Fourth, the actual military 
conflict invol-ved in the revel t unintentionally expo sed to the 
rest of the European world a basic strategic weakness in the 
British military armor, though--taking into consideration the 
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strength of the B-ritish navy--it is ·readily o·bservable that 
other European powers were even more vulnerable at this point 
if functioning alone, but not necessarily so if functioning in 
combinations. Nevertheless, the course or the revolt revealed 
the fact that Britain's over-all logi stioal potential was not 
sufficiently developed to handle the problem of land warfare 
at her naval _perimeters against people of the same cultural back-
ground; i.e., Caucasians; particularly, when British lend forces , 
were up against s.uch problem·s as exposed supply routes, raw 
resources separated by these same supply routes from manurac-
turins centers, unfamiliar terrain, unfamili-ar battle tactics ,25 
and the interfering designs of competing powers. The likeli-
hoo-d or this latter point is revealed by the fact that .only 
once since the American Revolt, the War of 1812, have the British 
been caught in this strategic trap by their own vol1tion. 26 It 
is worthy of remark in pa·ssing that in both ttese cas.es, the 
.Americ·a-n Revel t and the War of 1812, it was commitments against 
France elsewhere that appare-ntly render.ed ineffe·ative British 
efforts against the American colonies. 
25 Guerilla tactics were at that time unfamiliar to the 
average Br1 tish commander or ·so.ldier of the line. Britain, 
however, seems to have profited by then, since they were later 
used agai.nst Napoleon's forces in Spain. They are typical of 
the accounts given or Wellington's tactics in that area. 
-26 cr. intra, pp. 153 .. 194, where this point is considered 
in considerably more detail. 
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Results or ~ American Revol-t. Failure at quell.1ng -the 
American Revolt appears to have instituted e permanent trend in 
Bri ti.sh colonial affairs, di vid1ng colonia 1 un1 ts in to two gen-
eral c-ategori-es:- one, those colonized, peo-pled, and managed by 
Caucasians (who may or may not have neutralized or decimated 
nett ve populations:); and two, those peopled by non-Caucasians 
but managed by Caucasians alone or combinations of Caucasian 
ana native rule. Deferential treatment has been afforded 
Caucasian colonies ever since the American debacle, while that 
offered non-Caucasian units has varied considerably, degrees or 
subjugation or control being dependent upon variable factors. 
Both groups have been administered through t .he use of the 
dyarchicel principle or colonial rule which emerge.d fol_lowlng 
the .rev-olution. 27 The r _i-se of the dyarchy was signalled by the 
Irish Appeal-s Act {1783) and the Canadian Constitution Act 
( 1791) , and its appli cat "ion, to be consid-ered later on, 28 var 1ed 
a.s applied to e-ither Caucasian or non-Caucasian holdings. Before 
going in to the applic-ation of d_yarchy, .however, certain post-
27 In general, dyarchy 1s joint rule. As regards British 
colonial policies, it is that principle whereby colonies were 
allowed varying degrl!es of inter.nal autonomy in exchange for 
the homeland'·s control of their external affairs. The greatest 
variation in ~he application of this principle is evidenced in 
the non-Cauc-asian colonies, that in the Caucasian units be1:ng 
quite uniform. 
28 Ct. infra, pp. 133-201. 
~ 
I 
I 
r 
I 
I . 
I I 
i I 
I 
I 
.; I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
J 
t 
78 
revolutionary trends concerned with its development had ·best 
be considered first. These undergird the Bri t1sh decline. 
VII • SIGNIFI CAl IT TRENDS: POST-REVOLUTIONARY 
PERIOD TO YIORLD WAR II 
MateriallY; rele ted ~ material trends. ·The problems 
focused by the American Revolt were rurther complicated and 
intensifie-d by several trends appearing in the following cen ... · 
tury. During this period there arose a growing, but perhaps 
mistaken • awareness· on t .he part of Bri t1sh adm1nistra tors, whose 
e·conomio orient-ations suffered through rap"id changed, or the 
staggering end mounting costs or i~perial rule. This was merely 
intensified by the constantly chang ing co~plexion of British 
economic fortunes. In the first half of the nineteenth century 
(1800-1850), largely because of a fortuitous aeries or· mineral 
depos1 ts and en 1n1 tiel advantage in the "Technolog1.cal Revolu-
tion," Britain enjoyed en unrivalled econocic position despite 
periodic economic depressions. Economic advantage also gave her 
poli t leal advantage ., e 1nce it made her better able to handle the 
cost or defeating compet1 tors ei-ther in trade or on the field 
of battle. The end or the American Civil War, however, saw Britain 
enter a period when her economic and political position relative 
29 cr. infra, p. 96 for a discussion or this possibility 
and comparethis w1 th the statiatica·l data, pp. 156-16? • 
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to the balance or· power among her European and Asian oo·mpeti t-
ors would be constantly ln flux and gradually deteriorate. 
-
Largely as the result of discoveries or mineral deposits in non-
British areas and the increasing pace and influence of the tech-
nological revolution,_ several _powers--among them the United 
States, Ge·rmany, and Japan--began making rapid inroads into 
Britain's favored. economic position. By 1goo the United States 
and Germany had pretty well o·vertaken her 1ndustr1e.l might, and 
Germany, Russia, and Japan were pos14g a constant threat to her 
political position. The advent or such technological advances 
a·s the submarine and aircraft coupled w1 th the separation of 
raw resources from manufacturing centers has intensified this 
threat, rendering the empire ever more vulnerable. Along with 
this growing threat Brita·in has dropped from. tirst among the 
world powers to a lesser economic and political posi t.1on. 
Economic produo·tion in the United States,. Germany, and Russ.ia, 
outstrips that in the United Kingdom. In military and political 
power, it is l .ikely that Britain would rank no higher than 
fourth behind the United States, Russia, and China. Coneommit-
ent with the·se changes, there has developed two gradually wor-
sening trends. On the one hand, the rapid end progressive 
change in the geographic distribution of populations in the 
British empire has worked against the British, particularly the 
percentage or the whole represented by the small population of 
the .home islands. On the other, the food and raw ma-terial 
I 
~ 
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supply problems have gradually worsened, picking up their 
tempo of deterioration following the historic gamble on tree 
trade, subsequent losses of markets to competitors, and the· 
advent of threaten-Ing technological ad.vances such as the sub-
marine. The food supply problem has been further complicated 
by the course of' British investments abroad.. Recent wars have 
pretty well decimated them. 
Ef~ect1veness of these trends. Admittedly, the effec· 
t1veness ot e..ny g:iven one of these trends has varied from time 
to Ume ., depending upon its relationship to other factors and 
the supp~rt it may have received from various complicatir~ in-
flue-nces. Within the compass of this study there can be pre-
sen ted ·but a brief su-rvey of the effects of these tre.nds, but 
such elements as are consi:dered should serve to indicate, explain, 
or substantiate the views presented concerning modes of rule 
developed by British administrators and their willingness to 
compromis-e. 
Abstract£!~~~ agricultural problem (1?70-date). 
To begin with, coincident with the American ·Revolt, several 
startling· modifications were .introduce·d into the· workin.gs of 
the mother country. One was the avera-ge c1 tizen' s growing 
awareness of the changes in the relationship to his government 
and livelihood or the positions of hereditary aristocrat and 
L 
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c.erchant. This is reflected b th 1 30 
o n S~ith's classic study 
o.f private enterprise ( 1776). ·and in the gradual rise or tte 
economists (1776-date}. An h 
ot er was the beginning, with Watt's 
improvement of the steam engine, of the United Kingdom's total 
gamble on the forces and machinery or the technological revol-
ution. 31 The net e.fi'ect of the first, the rise or the entre ... · 
preneur, was gradually to raise to political eminence in the 
House of c·omm.ons individuals whose eyes were as much up-on w.het 
amounts to the ancestor or cost-accounting, particularly account-
ing the costs o-r imperial government, as they were on anythin-g 
else .. Along with them came the "little Englanders." The net 
effect or the second, the gamble on ·t ·he :forces or the "so-celled 
Industrial Revolution t" was three-fol-d: 1) e stimulation ot 
the birth rate, 2) acceleration in the development or urban 
centers concomitant with a ·progre-ssive, though relative, decline 
in rural areas, and 3} a growing dependence upon outside sources 
30 C"f. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. 
31 Watt's improvement of the steam engine resulted not so 
much in an industrial revolution as in a technological revolu-
tion. England had already reached basic 1ndustriel1zat1on. 
Factories were in existence, as were machines, but Watt intro-
duced mechanical power as a replacetlent for water. power, ·treadles, 
etc.. This led to technological improvements suc.h as vastly 
different and more mobile machinery and a further substitution 
.of machine power for hand power and hand operations. 
L 
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for the bulk or staple foods compounded later by e similar 
dependence upon outside sources for the bulk of raw ma terial.s. 
The staggering~ problem. The rapid decline or rur-al 
areas combined with explosive birth-rates in the expanding urban 
areas soon bred a complete reliance upon 'foreign food sources-; 
in fa-ct, " ••• in food supplies, she [the United Kingdom] ceased 
to be self-supporting about 1830 ••• ". 32 The intensification of 
the enclosure movements in the latter half or the eighteenth 
end the f"irst half or the ninet-eenth centuries coc:l"bined w-1 th 
the rising birth rate had stimulated agricultural production 
end increased somewhat the domestic production .of food, but 
this success wa5 limited and had little retarding effect upon 
rood 1~ports bec-ause it failed to meet the risin-g demand for 
food created by the concentrated explosion of the birth rete 
in the urban centers. 33 Although agriculture is still far end 
32 E. H. Carr, The Twent~ Year's Crisis, 1919·1939 
(London: !.facmillan and Co., l94 ), Chap. 8, p. 2~-
33 Cf. infra, P~ 83, Note 37. Note that it is the rela-
tive posi-tion of the rural areas which has declined. Food pro-
duction has been increased to an opttoum, but it has never been 
able to overtake the rise in birth rate of the eighteenth end 
ninete-enth centuries, even though the population of the United 
_Kingdom is now relatively stable. The loss of foreign invest-
ments in the last halt century has sharply focused this problem 
in the mind or the average Britis-her. It has seriously 
threatened his food supplies, at times reducir..g then to little 
better then subsistence levels. 
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away the single gre-atest domes-tic employer, 1 ts relet1 ve 
economic end demographic positions have declined. For the mo·st 
part, this is beosuse the absolute number of urban births has 
been rar greater then that in rural areas and because 1ndus-
try,34 since 1845, despite periodic economic depressions, has 
absorbed most of the labor potentia-l represented by the popu-
lation incr·eese, there being an absolute 11m1 t to the number 
that e·ven an 1ntenstf1ed agriculture could absorb. Recent year.s 
find but ? per cent of the home population directly involved 
in domestic egr1culture, 35 as compared with 75 per cent in 
175036 and 22 per cent in 1850. 37 Fifty per cent of the 
British rood supply is now imported. 
Food and economic geography. These alterations in the 
complexion of' the economic geography of the Un1 ted ·Kingdom he·ve 
34 c~. Griffith, on. cit., PP~ 170-179. 
- --
35 J. Ru.ssell Smith,. and M. Ogden Ph.1111ps, Industr1e1 
and Commercial Geography, 3rd ed. (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 
l946} t p. 425. 
36 Hall and Albion, ££• cit., p. 479. This figure 
appears to be somewhat high. cr. and compare with Griffith, 
£2• £!!.,Chap. VII, particularly pp. 170-179. 
37 Thi·a figure· represents a projection from tables and 
me te·risls to be round in Griff! th, ~· cit., Chap~- VII, pp . 
. 170-1?9, and may be in error as· much as 4 _per cent on the 
pos1.t1 ve side; the percentage could be as 11 ttle as 18 per cent. 
Griff! th also notes, p. 176, that t .he e-nclosures did accomplish 
their purpose for the short period of the American War, but 
this has little· effect upon long range trend of progressive 
food deficiency. 
... 
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had a progressively more telling e!'fect upon its rela-tions 
with the member parts of its empire and with the world-at-
large. They have certainly conditioned much of Britain's 
behavior toward her colonial holdings, past and present • and 
have had much to do with the pattern of British investments 
abroad. As· the :food problem has grown more acute, more and 
more British capital has flowed into areas from which Bri ta1n 
can buy food. The most recent example is the African experi· 
ment, but for almost a ce-ntury and a .half--at least until the 
world-wide depress.ion of the late 1920s--the Br1 tish bread bas-
ket has been her present and former colonia 1 holdings 1 part 1 c u-
larly the Uni.ted States and those Caucasian .areas now e-njoying 
38 M dominion status. illions or pounds of investment capital 
f'lowed into these areas. Earnings from them were used to pur-
chase food and ra·w materials. That oapite·l flowing into the 
non ... caucasian holdings of the emptre was aimed princi_pally et 
the development of the raw materials necess·ary ror the con-
tinued prosperity or the home industries. 
38 This statement ·and those following in the next sec 
represent an interpretation of information to be found in th tion 
Statistical ..A.b s tract-s £!: the United Kingdom (London. H M ose 
Stationery or:r1ce, C. 1821? - dat.e) availaole at thls ·ti • 
of the more ·not able revelation-s of these abstracts is th m.~ ·i One 
moments or economic disturbance, the United Kingdom h ~ n 
her trade inward upon the member parts or h.er e~ ire as urned 
particularly noticeable in the trade tables to b-~ f • dThi·s is 
·pp. 162 ... 165. The food factor also helps ac·coun oun infra' 
in Bri tis·h a:rf"a irs Of groups as the .Anti-Corn r.! fLor effectl veness 
w eague ~nd others. 
Patterns and QUrpos~s or Briti h i ~ The --......'----:::.....;,~ _ s nve st_.ent~. 
pattern of British investments appears to have been anything 
but a haphazard a:rfair, at least not since the opening of the 
nineteenth century. Brit! h 1 s nvestments since thAt time appear 
to have had a three-fold purpose. First, they were aimed at 
the acquisi tio.n o:r raw materials needed to keep home industries 
in motion. Second, they were aimed at earning monies in ereae 
possessing surplus foods for export. Third, they were aimed 
at controlling the transport facilities so vit~l to the con-
tinued flow of these goods. The potential food surpluses or 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in large measure account for 
the amount of British capital invested in those areas end the 
nature of the investment.s thems.elves. Since 1830 Bri tein has 
desperately needed increased food suppli.e·s to keep pace- w1 th 
her exploding population. The "1ndustriel-technological 
revolution" was well into its maturing phases berore British 
planner·s became .fully c.ognizant of 1 t ,s implications. By this 
time (1840-1860) the information compiled 1n the Statistical 
Abstra.cts was beginning to reveal a fearful dilemna to Br1 tish 
planners. Population shifts were well under way, technology 
was maturing, agriculture had seriously lagged behind popu-
la-tion growth, materiel resources were showing a relati-ve 
decline in yield • and the ·united Kingdom was being r ·orced to 
commit itselr to further industrialization and dependence u~on 
world trade. There was no other way to feed en expanding 
I ,, 
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population which had long since outgrown th& capacity or 
available food producing racil1 ties, nor was there any other 
way to keep functioning smoothly an economy whose raw resources 
in their relationship to available markets &nd production 
facilities were declining in productivity. Is it any wonder, 
then, that Bri ta,in would undertake her histor-ic gamble on world 
trade? What el.se could she do·? Only in a free market could 
she hope to o·btain needed foods and offset her other mate·riel 
deficiencies. High tariff policies had to be discarded and 
were.39 
Effect. of economic seography £!! col.onial governments. 
There seems little doubt that awareness of these problems has 
conditioned and colored the differing types of ru·le which 
oritain has established ov·er given units or the empire. These 
governments are neither noble nor ignoble b·ut have the virtue 
of being eminently practical solutions of existing problems, 
9roblems related not only to the United Kingdom itself but to 
the whole empire and the political economy of the world in 
general. 
39 In this regard it is interesting to note for compar-
ative purposes the growing sentiment toward lower· tar iff 
pol.icies in the traditionally high tariff United States. This 
sentiment has, with periodic lapses, r~en growing stronger over 
the past thirty years. One. can expect tha·t 1 t will con t 1 nue 
to do so as .A:m.erica exhaust·s her pri!llary mineral resource-s, 
though she may be more fortunate than Britain in that she 
should not have· the same food problem. 
.. .,. 
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VIII·. GEOPOLITICS AND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Political economl, strategic politics, and colonial 
administration. For the British administrator the political 
economy ot the world in general has never been a small problem, 
nor has the problem of maintaining political controls over 
colonies once they have been established. In the case of non-
Caucasian holdings, both the resource-s they cont~rined and ·the 
technologica-l 1nfer1or1 ty undergirdin-g their military weakness 
have always presented a lure for the pote·nt1al aggressor. These 
resources might provide the potential aggressor with en opening 
wedge into Britain's control of the "lion's share" of the 
world market and place in his own hands co·ntrol of an economic 
or industrial asset in which he was de~icient. British adminis-
trators have also ha-a to take into account the fact that 
largely because of cultural tradi t .1ons and ·potential technolo-
gical. equality Caucasian holdings have been fertile soil for 
the act1v.1ties of revolutionaries. Disputed interpretations or 
constitutional matters supported by the Bri t1sh adm.1n1etrator' ·s 
hesitance about facing a conflict that could weaken Britain's 
delicately balanced strategic grip have more than once laid 
the rounda tion tor internal mac-hination and revolt in these 
Caucasian units, as evi.d.enced in the case of the Thirteen 
Colonies and Canada. There was the further problem or pro-
tecting the .home economy and there-by· Britain's strategic 
strength by protecting the in vestments hone ci t1zens had made· 
~-- ---
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in colonies, foreign trade, and fore·ign lands, 8 problem 
almost hopelessly complicated in the case of colonial holdings 
by matters of profit and loss and their relat-ionships to poten-
tial strategic advantages or difficulties. All these problems 
were further complicated by th.e potential de signs of hostile 
powers. Foreign instigation or intervention in areas of British 
influ-ence or control has presented Brit ish a.dmin1 s tra tors with 
·more than one problem in their ·efforts to maintain the unstable 
prerogatives of empire. Together with the previously-mentioned 
internal course of the United Kingdom itself, these factors 
served to create a single problem in terns of imperial rule. 
Vulne.rability and colonial compromise. Vulnerabil1 ty 
to foreign assault, for instance, has certainly conditioned 
·Britain's treatment of her non-Caucasian holdings as much as 
has the matter of protection or her own nationals or their 
investments. They are but two facets of the same problem, the 
protection of the mother country's paramount interests by con-
tinuing the existence of the colonial relationship because the 
continued ar-t.iculation of the home economy is in some vi tal 
way dependent upon it. Carrington's analysis of the progress of 
British rule in Southeast Asia presents numerous examples in 
40 Cf. C. E. Carrington, The British Overseas (Cambridge, 11 
England: Tiie University Press, 19 50) , particularly the "Argu-
ments" which begin each division of th.1s study. 
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point. Original.ly, British interests entered this area in 
order to take advantage of the "luxury trade," to supplant 
Dutch and French interests as well as those. of Portugal and 
Spain, and to obtain strategic advantages which insured pro-
tec-tion Of the luxury trade. British cep1 tal and management 
'followed. Economic development took place a-nd trade relations 
were established. A segment of the British economy became 
dependent upon these arrangements. To mov-e out after suc·h 
growth had transpired would have been fo·olhardy in the extreme, 
since it would have left the area at the mercy of foreign 
invaders and might well disrupt the precariously balanced 
British economy and strategic power which by the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century was almost totally dependent upon the 
rubber, tin, oils, tea, etc. derived rrom investments in these 
areas. Arter all, the British had no guarantee that their 
economic arrangements would persist once they had voluntarily 
relinquished political .management of a given area. Since 1830 
Britain has been absolutely dependent upon trade for food 
supplies, and since about 1880 she ·has become more and more 
dependent upon outside resources for the basic o.peretion or 
her economy until now she almost totally dependent upo.n them. 
Political oo·ntrol of non-Caucasian colonies has been one .of the 
principal guarantees of the- acquisition of these necessities. 
Abstract of British Economic interests in South€ast ~· 
' 
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British economic interests it southeest ( Asia nnd thrcu~hout 
non-Caucasian holdings ror that matter) 
reflect eco~o~1c ctenr.es 
in the United Kingdom. In generel, they have reflected t~o 
trends: 1) the continuation of the traditions or the luxury 
trade, and 2) the gradually growing dependence or the ~nited 
Kingdom upon outside resources and food, the letter trend betng 
by rar the more important today-. Ini t1ally, os already men-
tioned, British economic interests, prompted by the prorttB 
obtainable from the spice and tea trade, had entered the luxury 
trade in Southeast Asia. Next came the develcpment of the op1un 
trade and the introduction of rubber cultivetion. Prcf1t w~s 
the principal lure at thts stage, and its motivation is reflected 
in the- conduct o-r Bri t.i sh administra tive interests- in the ~re~ 
at the time. As often as not, colonies were ecquired to cor.trol 
the trade or rubber planting, though because ot o strate~1e 
element in all territorial preemptions these colonies were often 
saddled with the costs of their own protection thrtu eh the 
41 
exaction ot "sums of tribute" from native interests. Rub:er 
cultivation, however, though originally promp ted by luxury 
interests brought with it a new concern for edm1n1str~t1ve 
planners. The transplanting of rubber trees first discovere~ 1n 
41 i t OD cit DD 254 f., 4 02-·1C5, Ct. C. E .,Carr ng on, _._., · - • 
416 f. , et seg. 
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Brazil rrom that area to London end thence, step by step, 
rrom London to India, to Ceylon, end to the Fee! ere ted 1.~!11 ey 
States involved British interests 1 
, pr vate a~~ public, in ~cn-
siderable expense and was prompted more by the value of rub b~r 
·as a luxury item that it we s b.y the- ru ture indus tr1_, 1 uses to 
which it might be put. 42 Rubber cultivation wes stert~d on 
lands lying idle and was r1nenced rna1Lly by British c~ ~ 1tnl. 
As rubber grew in industrial importance, so did the vr:lue of 
British administrative control of th.e areas tn wh1c·h 1t wna cul-
tiv-ated. It was at this point, c. 1870, that the dt'rter.de cf 
technolog-ical and industr.ial developments coupled with the relA-
tiv-e inadequacy of home resources began to assert its domir."lnt 
inrluence upon British policies in Southeezt Asia. Eccr.on1c 
interest was by this time a definite strategic 1r.te·re.st. It 
was also a definite demographic interest becP.use of the fOQd 
supply problem. continued trede meant adequate rood ·sup ~ liee 
and the raw materiels necessary ror industrial producttor.. 
Granted these matters, the impos 1 t"icn of f'ree trnde up en Indi 6 
which followed was a logical ste·p, 43 and so ~8s Eriteir. 'a 
44 Each move w!'ts e -str~te~ic 
entrance into tin-mining in :Malaya· 
42 Cf. Smith and .Phillips,£..£.· cit.' 'Q p. lc 9 -17 F3 , fo:- the 
developmentof the rubber i ndustry anc.ruober plan tin;;: .. 
4.3 Cf. Carrington,££·.£...!_!., PP• 928-~40!4 for the 
developmentof British economic 1nteres·ts in Inc. ... c. .• 
44 Qt. Smith and Phillips,~· ~i;~'s;~t~~!!tf~;ie:or the 
development of British mining interest 
--~ 
and economic necessity Fo 
• r exemple, as Cornish tin ~1nes tell 
behind industrial demands, British interest in ex 1st 1 ng !.!altl.yl'!n 
tin deposits began to quicken. Until 1892, tin-minir.~ tn. thAt 
area was almost exclusively in the hands or t .he Chinese, thou~:h 
the British had some interest 1n a few compa.nies. by 1 89 ~, 
however, British i .nte·rests began to s·ee e real necessity ror 
the use and control, it' possible, for greatly exp~ndel! tin 
SUpplies. rn that year the first exclusively };ri t1Ar, cor::peny 
began tin-mining in the !!ala yen peninsula. 45 Th1 s W'l.S f,..r from 
control of' mining operations in that area, but the !lritish h~d 
the ·k-eys to eventual control: money and special machinery. 
T.he e-asily worked deposits were b·eginninp; to decl1nP. 1·n pro-
ductivity, world wide demands for tin were 1x.cre'ls1ng, and the 
British had the machinery and know-how necessary ror work1tl£ the 
vast remaining deposits-. As these deposits declined in produc-
tivity, British control of' the machinery necesaery ror wcrk1nr, 
the rema1t.der became the real means of ."3r1 tish central. By H~20, 
the British had acquired control of 36 per cent of the totsl 
of the Malayan output which was twenty-five per ce~t of the 
world supply.4·8 By 19 39, combined with Dutch end Fre1:ch i-nterests, 
the-y had through various purchases geir.ed control or s1xty-z:1ne 
45 Smith. and Phillips, O!J. c 1 t. 1 p • 214 • 
---
46 Ibid. 
-
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p·er cent of the Malayan output. 47 Now, they control 1 t almost 
exclusively, but it amounts only to about eight per cent of 
the world ·supply, enough for British needs and 11 ttl.e more. 
The Br1 tish eppe·ar deliberately to have set out t.o gain th1.s 
control because they had to. Only through political and 
economic control of resources could they guarantee the oo nt-!nued 
articulation of the home economy. 
~ materials end their effects upon ~ administration 
.or non-Cauoas1en colonies. The story of tin end rubber is in 
mi·crocosm the key to an understanding of the persistence of 
British controls in ·non-Caucasian areas. In miniature these 
two resources represent the whole food a-nd raw materia l.s quen-
dary in which Britain finds itself. Ever more persistently 
Britain has been made aware -of the fact that she has to maintain 
some type or control over these areas else her whole precar-
iously articulated economy is in danger. r ·t is the only way she 
can guarantee t ·he continued flow of resources and· food ·to home 
industries. The need for some tYPe of colonial control to 
guarantee a vital resource coupled with her strategic quandary 
is the reason she has been willing to settle in the past half-
4
.
7 Ibid. It may be of note that ninety per cent of the 
world's supply of tin presently comes from Hritish a-nd Dutch 
controlled companies on the Dutch-.held islands of Banka, Singkep, 
and Billiton in the Malayan Archi_pelego, an area strategically 
controlled by Singapore. 
century for progressively more limited controls over newly 
dominated areas. 
·The "League" mandates are a case in point. 
Britain needed these mandates to protect one resource or another 
or fo.r strategic purpo·ses. Control of these resources is the 
v1 tal key to her nati·onal existence e.nd, as shall be discussed 
further on, 48 the reason ror the myriad range of governcental 
instruments setting the rule over non-Caucasian colonies. 
Caucasian colonies, economic "fu turea .," end colonial 
administration. The development of rule over Caucasian colonies, 
on the other hand, presents e.n initially di.fferent picture, but 
it ends in the same morass of food inadequacies~ raw material 
deficiencies, and strat·egic problems. Looking beck to the 
period between the .American Rev.ol t . and the North America Act, 
it is readily observable that only a few of the Caucasian 
colonies, the smallest, paid, though ell appear to have been 
potentially useful. Larger units such as North Ameri.oa and 
Aue.tralasia did not pay and would not pay for so·me time, but 
all appear to have been viewed by administrators and investors 
as potentia-l breadbas·kets and sources f'or raw materials:: in 
fact, potential resources in many of them was the reason tor 
their founding. They were not yet developed industrially·, 
and existing economic arrangements appear to have discouraged 
48 Cf. infra, pp. 156-172 et ~· 
r-- · -
any serious efforts in this direction. As metallic Rn~ otter 
resources were discovered and developed, the path ot quickest 
profit and least resistance appeared to have been to shtp the 
raw materials to the ready homelan~ k t 
"' ~ mar e- for process1nt,, the 
most obvious course in the existing economic structure. And 
just as- expedient and obvious a course was follolfed by the home 
capit-al flowing into these areas for investment. Investn:ent 
capital was channelled into agricultura1 development, Dining, 
and transport, three areas in the ex1st1n~ econot:1y in which 
pro.fi t was all but guaranteed by existing and growinf~ home 
demands. -Though it might be argued that the princip~ls con-
cerned--administrators, investors, and colonia ta --wer-e uno ware 
of these matters, the existence of the Statistical AbstrActs 
would indicate t -he contrary. The continuous and purposeful 
modification of these compile tions suggest rather a mature 
awareness both of the course of the British economy and a real-
istic appraisal of the value of colonies to the continuation of 
that economy. They suggest also that British edm1n1stretors 
were well eware of the existing and po~ential weaknesses 1n the 
fabric of co-ntrols they and their predecessors hed woven over 
the caucasian colonies. Administrators appear to heve been aware 
or t -he fact that, though theY were not yet developed industrially, 
the Caucasian areas were at the same cul-tural level e s the hooe-
h 1 leal e nuals They were cer-lend and po-tentia-llY 1 ts t -ee no og 'i -· 
tainly aware of the fact that, _granting ex1st1ng strategic con-
,.--- ·- . 
d-1 t ·ions, one ot the lar.c-e s t 
o of the early Caucasian units, the 
Thirteen Colonies, had with rore1gn id 
a - proved a ntl1 te_ry 
match for e:x;peditions sent :from the- hooeland and freed 1 tse lf 
of all controls. The arfair of the Thirteen Colonies end the 
troubles in Canada also served to point out the teet ttet 
because of cultural patterns similar to those in the ho~elend 
the Caucas-ian units were always sitting on the thin ed,.--. e ot 
revolt over constitutional matters, further 1ncrees1n~ the 
costs or governing them -and thereby decreas"ing the reel be-nef1 ta 
derived t'rom them. C-aucasian units frankly had little desire 
to -share in the costs of their own defense, at least n.ot with-
out constitutional guarantees, ~nd they seemed equally reluc-
tant to assume this burden even with s-uch guaren tees. The 
conflicts inherent in this colonial s -ttuation gradually develcped 
into a raging controversy at home as to just whet coulj be done 
to so~ve them. 
The ~-empire- view 6 On the one hand "ere the -groups 
totally opposed to empire-, the chief and most vocif"erous of 
49 
which was the "little Englanders." They so~e~~at shcrt-
49 cr ~the "little Er.glander's" princ1psl s~okes-
-· one o_ 1 nd Discussions (London: 
·men' John stuart Mill, Di ssertat on sial I , leo f- 1 ?9 _..,o::. 
186'7) Vol. , PP• ·• .. _ ... , Longmans, Green, & Co., , interesting facets of t .he "11 ttle 
for his- view-s. One of the more hest su oort seens to 
Englander's'' views is that the;r ~;~u:l~;ther- t~~n the 11~er'!ls, 
have come fron the landed ar1 5 " 00 - · Y m""neble to dying r:er-
sugO'esting that their views were more 8 _- -
cantilism rather then nascent capitalism. 
sightedly pointed out the fact th9t the administration or 
Caucasian holdings appeared to be a losing proposition in 
terms or trade returns. even though these areas were still 
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under development. From this apparent lo.ss r ·actor they argued 
that the financial burden entailed in the defense of these areas 
was somewhat pointless. Further, they added fuel to the heated 
disputes about demands for self-determination in Caucasian areas. 
~ empire-mar! time hegemony v.iew. On the other hend were 
the groups composed or administ-rators and ir.vestors. The more 
canny or the administrators {unless o·ne can believe that the 
information available in the Stattstical Ab-strRcts was unused 
and meant nothing) couli foresee the day--the food problem was 
looming large--when these areas -would not only bring f"1nonc _tal 
returns and- be self-_paying, but the day when they would be the 
salvation or the home ec-onomy. By 1849 the motur·ing s1 tuntion 
of resource dependency bad forced a study of the s1 tua·tion in 
Canada (the Durham .Report, 1839), the re~eel of the Cor-n Lews 
(1846),. and the repeal ot the l~avigatton Acts (1A49), 911 eii:led 
at insuring the stability of coloniel governnent end the con-
tinued f'_low of necessities- to the homeland. Investor senti:Lent 
was demanding relief from what it considered 1nequ1 table- costs, 
but along with administrative interests it could roresee the 
day when despite a "virtual autarky in several 1r~ustriel 
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produots _, " 50 the Un1 ted Kingdom would 1 
oak to these areas both 
for the bulk Of her food su,pplies end the bul-k or her raw mater-
ials. Both were already encouraging further investment on the 
basis of this belief. In other words, they, administrators end 
investors alike, could see the need for continued control of these 
areas, but they also wished relief from what they considered to 
be conditions under which they burdened themselves with an inequit-
able share of the costs involved. Colonial clamor had to be 
satisfied in the interests or governments 1 stab111 ty ,_ but not at 
the- expense of making the particular colonial unit vulnerable 
to ~urking foreign assault. The United Kingdom- w·anted to be rid 
ot. strategic costs, but it still needed the a-ssurance of the 
trade relations so vital to its national existence. Stable 
c1 vil condi tiona in colonial areas could be the only real a-ssur-
ance of the-se trade relations, end they would be better assured 
it' the homeland could have- some control over their direct ton. 
~ and responsible government: The maturat_1on .£!:. the 
legislative dyarchy in ~North America Act. The compromise 
worked out to solve the Caucasian problem was, as Howe 51 would 
50 C:f. E. H. Ca-rr_t £1?.• cit., Chap. 8, for a discussion of 
these factors. in their historical context ... 
51 cr. in regard to this compromise, hereafter referred to 
as the legiSlative dyerchy, the Durham Report (1839), sections of 
which may be :found in Stephenson and Marcham, £E• cit., PP· 776 
ff .- , or the entire report which may be foWld in the--british ~ .. 
liamentary Papers, 1839, No. 5(London: H.M. Stat1oner's~Off1ce, 
Reprint). In regard to Howe-, cf. his celebre ted and ~n.~..luen tia 1 
letter to Lord .John Russell noted immedi-ately below, t ... ote 51. 
\ 
have it, "eminently British." 
g9 
It was the compromise of ~r9nt-
ing the particular Caucasian untt 8 lorge u measure o!' 1nt.ernal 
autonomy in exchange r ·or the United Kingdon's control or the 
particular colony's roreign affairs, diplomatic And economic. 
As Howe stated the matter in the case of caneda,52 responsible 
government, " ••• the remedy pointed out. while it possesses the 
merits of being eminently British--making them so respons.1.ble--
1s the only cure tor those [Canada's] evils short or er rnnt 
quackery, the only secure foundation upon wh"ich the power or 
the crown ean be established on this continent [or in other 
colonies~ EdJ ~ ~ ~ defy internal m2Ch1nAt1on nnd foreign 
assault." (Italics, E~) Thus administered, Caucas18n colonies 
could be saddled with the costs of their own internal edn1n1s-
tration and part or the costs or their defense, end honelend 
administrators could review decisions inimical to British inter-
est·s and prevent sue h foreign agreements· as Vi\JUld con!'11c t with 
the over-all stability of the im?eriel structure. ~he legis-
lative dyarcny created by the North America Act (1367) 53 is the 
52 cr.. letter written from Halifax by Jose~h H~we, Pro~­
inent c.it1zen of Nova .scotia, Britain's Secretery of ~t~te for 
war and the Colonies from which this quotation is teken. This 
letter may be round in Stephenson and Uarcha~, ££· ~., P· 7?9. 
53· cr. Public General statutes, II, 5 f.: 30 71ctor1ae 
c. 3 {London: H M stationery Office, n.d.). Other acts men-
tioned may be f~und in their appropriate locations in the same 
source. 
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first mature example of this compromise, which hed begun with 
the Irish Appeals Act ( 1783) .• 54 Article III of this act expl1-
c:1 tly locates exec-utl"ve author! ty in the queen (by this time-, 
1867, a captive of Parliament) in its opening statement: "The 
executive government and authority or and over Canada is hereby 
declared to continue and be vested in the queen." Article rv, 
on the other hand, creates the legislature ·and lays the corner-
stone of internal autonomy, though its last paragraph a .sserte 
the right of royal review and veto, review end veto functioning 
through the governor general, queen,_ e.nd Privy Council. Art1cl.e 
VI s·pecifically enumerates the legislative rights reserved to 
the colonies while implying the paramount authority of Britain 
in external affairs. This same pattern of government and divi~ 
sion of power, the legislative dyarchy, was later followed in 
the cases of Aust-ralia and New Zealand (1900), the Union of 
South Africa (1909), and the Dominion of India· (19-46)7 though 
India, largely because of Britain's imperial quanda..ry following 
World Wars I" and II, was given a wider matter of choice. 
Legislative dyarchl ~ ~ solution j£ the problem of the 
administration £! Caucasian colonies. This creation of the 
doninion, or the establishment of the legislative dyarchy to 
handle internal administration in colonies of Cauuasian origin, 
1 t can be seen, h-ad the virtue or being .able to satisfy everyone 
54 c.f. infra , p. 1·:33 f · 
\ 
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from the "little Englanders" and tho n 1 1 ~ ew y-r sen "private-
enterprisers" to the Canadians thenselves. After ell, tt did 
satisfy the "little Englanders" on the question 0 r self-deter-
minetion. It did satisfy the Canadians, for the time beicg, on 
the question -or constitutional guarantees. It r,uieted the 
nascent forces ot private enterprise in Parliament on the mntter 
of the- costs- or imperial government, since Bri t .ain \Vould be 
free of the costs of putting down revolts and be reliev-ed or a 
goodly share of the costs of strategi-c defense in Nort-h . .:. ner1ee. 
tali tary planners -were also made much happier s-ince it relieved 
t -hem or the problem of localizing navel forces end left th.em 
free to distribute them for the protection of the trade rout-es 
so essential to British welfare. The principles of this com-
pro:mi se also ser-ved_, inc !dentally., to deliver the coup de gr'3ce 
to mercantilist forces in the British _government • t .hough they 
did not alter one jot an essentially mercantilistic fector, the 
food and raw materiels problem, in British government. 
Potential failure or ~legislative dyarc~y. The dyarchy 
however, was not a- complete success. Had it satisfied all the 
forces in conflict, there seems little doubt that Britein would 
still be the world's foremost political and_ military power. The 
distribution of the power potential inherent in this union or 
colonies and homeland would have been well-nigh invincible. The 
United Kingdom would have been the heart or a lasting global 
\ 
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hegemony. Un:fortunately, the administration structured by the 
legislative dyarchy could not bring this eventuality to fruition 
because the deve.lop1ng his tori ca 1 picture would leave the United 
Kingdom too vulnerable. Though Canad.a and other areas would 
enjoy the protection af'forded British subjects, it would only 
be ~ matter o:r time until they were suffie!ently developed to 
chafe under restrictions both in government a.nd upon the course 
their economic development was- to take. This would and did 
lead to demands for complete autonomy. Changes in the United 
Kingdom's over-all economic picture led to a number of imperial 
conferences in which the United Kingdom frankly wooed increased 
trade relations with the member units of the empire. The rise 
of Germany, Russia, and Japan es military powers· led to a 
corresponding decline in Britain favored military position: in 
fact, partially because or Britain inability to demand military 
help from her colonies,. Germony in. World rlars I and II blatantly 
exposed to the world-at-large the point at whic.h the mi.l1 tar;~r 
might of the United Kingdom was most vulnerable, the matter of 
food and raw material imports. In both cases, had it not been 
for the timely interference of the United States, Britain might 
well have gone down to defeat; the British empire certainly 
would have been dismembered. World ~ar I also served to 
decimate British investments in North America, thus tremendously 
weakening the United Kingdom's normal economic position. 
.... 
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Possibility £! ~ empire parliament. There is also 
another side to the r.:L6tter. At any time until 1880 under the-
legislative dyarchy, the United Kingdom m1£ht have c;ambled on 
the first truly international government, an empire parliament, 
and won out by persuading the Caucasian units of the wisdom of 
this end. Beyond 1880--certainly after ~orld War I--she had 
reached the realm of no return.- The combine tion of ·pressures 
upon the imperial structure- building up after the North America 
Act reached a culmination in 1931 with the Statute- or -ilestm1n-
ster.55 Under the dictates of this statute the United Kingdom 
voluntarily relinquished all claim to governmental prerogatives 
over her Caucasian units, with the exception of India, and includ-
ing the non-Caucasian unit of Papua, a dominion administer-ed 
jointly with Australia. 
Modes of rule amon~ non-Caucasian colonials. This somewhat 
deferenti-al treatment af'forded Caucasian units since the .American 
Revolt may be contrasted with that offered non-Caucasian colonies. 
Colcniel governments among non-Oa.ucasien colonies have varied 
considerably, degrees of subjugation or control being dependent 
55 Cf. Stephenson end Marcham, ~· £:!.!·., pp. 839-841, or 
the PubliciGeneral Acts of the United Kingdom, 1932, p. 13 f.: 
2.2 George V, c. 4, ~most s-ignific-ant provision of this ect 
bei~g the statement " ••• that no law hereafter made by the parlia-
ment or the United Kingdom [sic] shall extend to any of the said 
dominions aa part of the law of that dominicn otherTiise than at 
the reauest and with the consent of that dominion ••• ". The 
dominions referred to are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, .South 
Africa, the Irish Free State, and 1-Jewfoundlend. 
., , ...,.. .. __ .... 
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upon variable factors, but the essential principle behind 
them ell was that or an ad!ninistrati ve dyarchy. rtherev-er 
practicable or forced, internal rule was placed in the hands 
of the netives, but British administrators exe.rcised 8 great 
deal of control over these affairs· even t ·hen. As always, they 
exercised full control over external affffirs. 
Desi:rab.1li ty of non-Caucasian holdings. To begin with, 
in dealing with its non-Caucasians, the United Kingdom was 
dealing with groups inferior to its own nationals in material 
culture, especially in the tools and techniques of warfare. 
These peoples--Burmese, Malayans, Africans, Amerindians, Pecific 
Islanders, etc.--were no military match for the British, et 
least not by themselves. None of these groups possessed wea-
pons equal to those of their European overlords who were not 
about to supply them in any se·rious quanti ties. Almost all or 
them, China being the exception,56 lacked a sufficient differ-
·ential tn population with which to offset material de.fic 1enc1es. 
Their desirability as colonies was predicated on their possession 
of either ·a s·trategic location or material resource desired by 
the British. 
56 India might here be considered a non~Caucasian unit, 
but for the purposes of this st·udy 1 t is in the end, e s anthrop-
ologists classify 1 ts people, Cauca·s.ian. In recent years it 
has finally received the treatment afforded c·aucasian units • 
L. 
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Conditions contributing to variations in rule among the 
~-Caucasian colonies. Had the above conditions alone obtained, 
the end result might have been the complete subjugation of all 
non-caucasian colonies. As things worked out, they did not.-
Cert.ain "natural" che-cks appear to have operated to minimize the 
total effectiveness of military and other disadvantages. First 
was the limit to the number of individuals who at any· specific 
time could be spared from the home population to provide col-
onial adm1.n1strators w1 thout e.ndangering the efficiency and 
security of the home gove.rnment. Publi.c education could pro-
duce only a limited number of trained administrators, able 
57 though they might be. A aecond check was of a .military nature, 
there being rather definite demographic, financial, and indus-
trial limits to t -he number and size. of -armies whtch the British 
could at any given time comm1 t to the support of colonial expan-
sion or protection w1 thout, again, endangering home sec.urity or 
the stability and success of the colonial movement- itself. This 
is one of the basic reasons that trade-r-colonists often had to 
go 1 t alone in the est-ablishment of governmental controls ov-er 
57 ct. Rams·ey Muir, How Britain is Governed (New York: 
Houghton, Mifflin Co •• 1935}. One of the prir..cipel these_s of 
this work i .s that public education in Britain has had a pronounced 
effect upon colonial administration. Muir contends that public 
education in the United Kingdom is the key to the Colonial 
Office's po_licies and thereby the key to British colonial com-
promises-. 
' ..,. 
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non-Caucasian peopl-es and one of the reasons for the common use 
of mercenaries, such as Sepoys, fiuanced by private rather than 
governmental interests. Another ltm1t was the disruptive forces 
latent in the imperialistic designs of competing powe-rs. These 
functioned as serious checks, part-icularly after the advent of 
nationalism in non-Caucasian areas because, if British rule 
became too arbitrary, th-e attra-ct! v.eness- to native groups ot 
revolutiona-ry enterprises financed by Britain's imperial rivals 
would increase by leaps and bounds. Rueso•Br1tish rela~ions in 
the Khyber Pa~s area would be an examples or this check in oper-
ation. Still another check was the s.heer cost of putting down 
rebellion, the cost often being out ~f all proportion to the 
benefits derived from the enterprise to be preserved. A fur-
ther check arose from the tendency of many natives to adopt 
the cultural patterns of their British overlords, a tendency 
aided in no small measure by missionary enterprises. The early 
behavior of Gandhi and the recent behavior or Krishna Menon are 
cases in point. The adoption of British culture- in their ce ses 
and many others generally ca-rried with it a corresponding demand 
for goverr.mental privileges commensurate with this cultura-l 
pattern in the United Kingdom. Another check arose fro-z:1 the 
machinations or var-ious boards of control which were not too 
eager to surrender to the dictates of Parliament c-olonial 
prerogatives which they had won largely -as a result. of their 
• I 
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own efforts. 
58 
What· might be considered a final, perheps the· 
most important check, s.tellllled from the need .of the United 
Kingdomts need for the raw materials and food provided by these 
o.olonies. Continuous warfare or civil strire would upset this 
flow or necessities and thereby seriously impair home living 
standards and, more important, the British geo-political 
potential. 
Sacerdotalism ~ na t1ona.l1sm. Counterbalancing the pla.y 
of these forces were both sacerdotali.sm and neticnalismt partic-
ularly in the Near Ea.st and Asia. In the early years of Br1 tish 
rule, the net effect of sacerdotalism was to meke non-caucasian 
colonial.s more docile. After ell, these people were accustomed 
to following the dictates of divine rulers who, in their turn, 
were submitting to the dictates of British administrators •. The 
net effec.t or nationalism, the curse of later imperial years, 
was, on the other hand, ·to unify and intensify all over the 
world native struggles agains~ colonialism and to produce con-
tinuous periods of civil di.sturbance among native peoples. 
Recent African troubles and the conduct of peoples in the ~ear 
East and Southeast Asia are two of its more startling errects. 
Plight of native colonials:: An impetus to nationalism. 
58 The actions of the East India Company would be the 
supreme example. £!·Infra, p. 141 r., under the discussion 
of the India Office Act (1858). 
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Part or the emotional fuel behind national! ti 
s c reove~ents emcng 
non-Caucasian colonials appears to have risen from the treatment 
they have recei v.ed at Bri t ·ish hands. Treated in an indifferent 
"_racist" fashion until the advent natio-nalism in the- closing 
years of the nineteenth century, these colonials had been paid 
their meagre wages and pretty mueh ignored. As lone as ttey 
remained docile, worked for their wages, and left the Europe en 
compounds alone, they were lert to their own devices. Except 
, ... 
for a few public health programs and periodic femine relief, 
British administrators _, until the period when the rumbles or 
! \ 
nationalism could no longer be ignored~ had done little in the 
L ' 
' 
way o:f improving the lot or advancing the cultural level or the / , 
native-s, though missionary groups had done much in this regard. I 
Official policy had generally been a case o:f "let sleeping dogs 
lie." 
The administrative dyarchy- amo.ng ~-Caucasian coloni'lls. . , 
There appears little reason to condemn British administrators 
for this policy which, 1n the end, fed the flames of naticnalis~. 
Aside from the fact that such a policy left thez:I :free to dep_loy 
Britain's strategic forc&s in the troubled European area, the 
truth would appear to be that native rulers were as much if net 
more responsible than the British for the persi-stence of pr1oi-
t1ve conditions. Colonial adm1ni.streto_rs early learned among non-
ti l and Cheapes t method of msin-Caucasians that the most prao ca 
tain1ng stable civil co-nditions in which to do business • their 
I ' 
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primary concet"'n, was to leave the giving of direct-tons, as 
much as possible,, to native rulers who were guided from behind 
the scenes by these same administrators. For the purposes or 
this study, this system in its various ramifications is referred 
to as the administrative dyerchy. This is to be distinguished 
from the legislative dyarchy in t ·hat admini.s·tretors kept a firm 
hand in internal administration though they hid it whenever 
possible. For obvious reasons already considered, t.his we s the 
cheapest and most ·practical form of rule which I3r1 t1sh ado1n1s-
tra tors· could. devise. It uti.lized the cultural institutions of 
these native peoples to keep civil order and in later imperial 
years proved an effective delaying tactic in the ~atter of denends 
for the removal or British controls-. 
Na t ·ionalism !!.!!. ~ factor in Brit ish colonie 1 g overr.me nt. 
The chief forc-e behind the demands ror the removal of Bri t1 sh 
controls in non-Caucasian areas has come fron the emotions of 
nationalism. Nationalism, harking beck to former cultural 
glories as its well-spring, has fallen upon the .ide-elisti c, 
though perhaps sentimental, economic views of various political 
theorists: men such as Locke, Rousseau, Proudhon, Engels, 
Marx, and the "Fabians-:'' to produce the unifying anti-colonial 
cry, "exploitation," in non-Cauca.sian areas. Non-cauca.sians 
have latched upon the views of these theorists as justifications-
for their demands for autonomy and the removal of British 
~ ~--- -
controls. 59 
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E~onomlc nationalism has proven a potent d1arup-
tive .force which has more than once canpelled British admini.s-
trators to make ed.I!l1n1strat1ve co~pronrlses they would rather 
have done without. Civil disturbances disrupt indus-try end 
trade, and as the nineteenth ce·ntury progressed trade became 
a more and more vi tal issue with British planners, and so did 
the flow of raw materials from colonial area s, flows which 
might hal.t to a trickle during periods of civil disturbance. 
This -possibility appears to have been very effective in com-
promising British rule in non-Caucasian as well as Cauca.sian 
areas. 
The demographic-strategic factor. Another fac t or which 
helped compromise British rule in colonial areas was the grow-
ing population differential between the United Kingdom and sub-
ject territories, particularly those differentials represented 
by the enormous populations· of non-Caucasian are-as. For exa~ple, 
assuming that the British colonial popul-ation was zero in 1606 
and that of Engla·nd 4,000,000 _. the lopsided growth of populatior .. s 
throughout the empire produced sorae interesting results. By 
1800 the population of the United Kingdom had grown ·to about 
25,000,000 while that of the musbr.oo:cing empire hacl exploded to 
59 Cf. Hans Kahn, The Idea of Nationalism .( New York: The 
Ma c:n1llan Co., Ul46) for one '()"fthepioneer studies in this area· 
Kohn, however, does· not place quite the emphasis upon th·e econ-
omic aspects of nationalism that this study does. 
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one-quarter billion. By 1900 the United Kingdom had grown to 
40,000,000 while the empire encompassed some one-half billion 
souls t unless comm1 tments in the Chin~ area include the. stab-
ilizing of that population which would run the colonial popu-
lation close to one billion. Adding European stabilization 
to this d1:fferential, 1 t is readily observa·ble why Brit ish 
administrators were so willing to compromise in the matter of 
imperial rule in order to stabilize the flow of goods so 
necessary to the United Kingdom's survival and to free the 
United Kingdom of colonial troubles in event of d.istur·bances 
in the status~ aoong the civilized nations of Eurasia. Ser-
ious civil disturbances occurring simultaneously in both Europe 
and Asia, as later events were to prove, would have forced the 
Britain's vaunted two-ocean navy into a dangerously thin 
strategic de·ployment. 
Troubled Eurooe: ~ fulcrum of ~ strategic oroblem. 
The problem. of stabilizing Europe has had the most profound 
influence upon the compromising of rule over non-Caucasians. 
For the best part of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
deployment of British strategic forces has been concentrated 
in the European area. This deployment appears to have resulted 
from a be·lie:f on the part of British strategists ., quite logi.cal 
in the circumstances, that the key to continued British colon.ial 
control lay in the maintena·nce of the status quo or balance ·of 
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power in Europe, at least until the rise of the Japanese navy 
in our own century. As strategic potential was distributed 
in the European ere.a, Britain had by t'ar the u_pper hand; and, 
taking into cons"ideration her two-oce-an navy, she appears to 
have expended considerable effort to protect it. Any sign or 
-disturbances in the distribution of power in Euro pe would ·bring 
British forces into the "thick of it." From the Polish par-
tition-s through the revolutions in the Ued.1terre-nean area, from 
the French Revoltu1on through the "year of revolutions" (1849), 
from Laibach and Troppau to the Franco- Pruss1en War _, Europe 
had to be stabilized by t ·he threat of Brit ish power. This 
meant the concentration of the major part of British naval 
strength in the European area where sat Britain's t ·echnolop;ical 
rivals, those most capable ot waging successful war agAinst 
her, and 1 t also meant that Brita-in could not afford to have 
to divide this strategic power between maj_or troubles in Europe 
and Asia at the same t1~e. This strategic difficulty also 
helps account f'-or British ac-ceptance of innumerable stre tegic 
protectorates f'ollowing World War I, particularly for the feet 
that Britain was asserting its predominant interest under 
extremely limited political instruments. She had to protect 
her vulnerable areas and keep her life-lines open, but she could 
60 
not afford the expense of making protectorates colonies. 
60 Cf. Harold and Margaret Sprout, _Foundations of, N;t1onal 
Power {Princeton: The University- Press. 194::>), PP• l63- .... B.)\for 
the changing character of the British strategic picture and ts 
central problems. 
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And this strat~gio stalemate also helps account ror the Hood, 
Prince of Wales,. and other British nave_l disasters during the-
early years of World VIer II. Had 1 t not again been ror the 
timely interference of the United States, Britsin's strategic 
quandary might have broken the beck of the British empire. 
Administreti ve results of the interplay £f. these nertin--
en t influences _upon British ~~~-Ca-ucasians. The end 
admi.nistrati ve result arising from the interplay of these social,_ 
political, s~rategic, economic, end other forces was And is a 
stranse series of compromise governments among non-CRuc~sie.n 
units of the empire. They run the gamut r -rom the al;nost com-
plete subjugation of the Crown colonies to the rather broadened, 
bu~ not complete internal autonomy of some of the island and 
Afro-Asian colonies. The eff~ctiveness of the adm1n1stret1ve 
dyarc-hy varies from colony to colony a-nd is now often main-
tained merely as an effect! ve delaying tactic to insure the -con-
tinued flow of necessities to the British homeland. In general, 
the administrative dyarchy functioned through the following 
governmental instruments: 
I. Self-Governing Quasi-Dominions: i.e., Southern 
Rhodesia is a self-governing territory whose 
exter.nal affairs are directed by the government 
of' the United Kingdom which also has some control 
in matters directly effecting ·the government 
managed by the native population. 
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II. Condominiums: areas such as the Anelo-Egyotien 
Sudan jointly administered by the U.K. and . other 
sovereign states. Though no longer applying to 
the Sudan, this pattern fits for the Kew Hebrides. 
II.I. Burma: a type well ad vance·d on the road to inter-
nal self-government. Domestic affairs with 
certain reservations, are in the hands.or quas1-
.a·ppo1n.t1ve administrators directly responsible 
to en elected legislature. (Burma is now free. Ed.) 
IV. Colonies: represent a wide range or goverrunenta1 
forms exhibiting various pha.ses o.f the adminis-
trative dyarchy. They range from Crown colonies 
administered by a gove·rnor alone (Hong Kong) up 
to administration by a governor who has the assist-
ance or a nominated Executive Council and le~1s­
lat1 ve body electe-d by the people (Gambia,. Sierra 
Leone, Niger.ia, Basutoland, Malaya, Ceylon, etc.). 
V. Protectorates; states possessing internal sove-
reignty, the members o·r which are "Br1 t1sh pro-
tected persons," but not Br~tish subjects~ North 
Borneo, Uganda, and the protectorate& in Somal1land 
and Central Africa- would be examples falling in 
this category. 
VI. Mandated T·erritories: territories administered .by 
e1 ther the United Kingdon or one of the se-lf-
governing dominions under a ma-ndate from the 
League Of Nations. Palestine, :r.:esopotamia, New 
Guinea,_ a-nd Western Samoa would be examples in 
this group, though the mandates now stem from the 
United Nations. 
VII. British India:* has a central government cor.sist-
ing of a Viceroy, an ~xecutive Council, a Council 
of State, and a legislative assembly. In each 
province there is an elected legislature enjoying 
almost complete self-government in p~ov1ncial 
affairs, but 1n certain provincial and larger 
matters the Viceroy ·1s the final word,. he being 
responsible to the Parliament of the United Y.in~dom 
and the Crown. 
Indian States:* ruled by hereditary p~inces who 
have treaty relations with the Crown end who 
exercise their authority under the suzerainty of 
the King-Emperor and his representatives. 
* Note: India is here treated as a non ... caucas1An 
colony, though it will later be treated as a 
Caucasian unit. Cf. infra, pp. 179-184, for 
India's transition from administrative to legis-
lative dyarchy. 
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Q.ui te obviously,_ in many of the above cases. nat 1 ve 
peoples have been left pretty much in charge of internal govern-
me-nt while British administration has remained -si:aply to protect 
British interests, internal and external. These conpron1 se.s 
under the admin_istrat1 ve dyarchy a_ppear to r...ave arisen froc 
the 1nterpl.ay of the principal concerns of British adminis-
trators contending with the syndrome of forces previously dis-
cussed, their concerns being the main tenanc.e of stable c tvil 
conditions within the given colony in order to promote trade 
and the flow of raw mnte_rials, the checking of the possible 
designs of competing powe_rs, and the stabilization of Eurasia 
at the same time. In some areas, British forces have be-en gar-
risoned as much to as act a strategic- check upon the aob1 t ion.s 
of competitors as they have been to act as a check upcn the 
natives, tho1~h there is a definite element cf the latter in 
all cases. All along the line, however, l3ritish administrators, 
9S the compilation of governments shows, have been forced into 
compromises. 
The British maritime hegemony:. Whe_t the British have 
developed, then, according to the preli~inary definition given 
of p·oli tical hegemonies, is an empire rather than en inpe ri um. 
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Only in rare instances does Britain exer~1se authority even 
remotely approaching absolute prerogatives-, and 1n almost all 
cases her controls are in various stages of disintegration. 
Britain has developed a rapidly disintegrating political hege-
mony on a mari tir:le basis in which rule, as much a-s- is pract1c-
able or forced, as shall be discussed further on, is divided 
between the United Kingdom and the subject area. So~e measure 
of internal self- Government has been g! ven to most of the non-
Caucasian units -because conditions forc-ed this concession upon 
British administrators-, t .hough Bri ta1n has re-tained varying 
degrees of control over their external or strategic affairs. 
In the case of Caucasian units, the United Kingdom really has 
no con~rol at all, conditioLs having forced her into a plea for 
voluntary cooperation between herself and the erstwhile colonies 
enJoying dominion status. 
How this rapidly accelerating disintegration came about, 
end Just what effect franchise changes in the United Kingdom 
had upon 1 t, t ·he crux of this study-'s special _problem, is the 
substance or the rerr~ining discussion. 
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CHAPI'ER IV 
FRANCHISE REFORM TII THE UNITED KING001.~ 
At the opening of the nineteenth century, the go·vernment 
of the United Kingdom was organized along the lines of a 
constitutional monarchy. The Crown, however, had no real po11t-
ica·l authority, the extremely 11m1 ted extent of 1 ts prerogatives 
having b.een settled by the agreements terminating the "Glorious 
Revolution." Actual governmental author-ity rest-ed in the hands 
of a rather non-representative Parliament composed of two del-
,.,...,. 
; 
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1 bera ti ve houses, Lords .and CoiDI:l.ons. Seats in Lords were hered- . I 
itary, residing ei'th.er in a family title or church office. seats 
in Commons, on the other hand, were subject to the ballot of an 
extremely limited electorate because the voting franchises which 
co.ntrolled the:c:t rested in parcels of land granted representation 
by the writs of' former ·tancastrian, Plantagenet, and Tudor 
monarchs end were continued in this pr1 vi lege by cus·tom. Delibe-
rations in Coi!li!lons were conducted by the recently developed 
"party cabinet" system of operation, while those in Lords were 
conducted on the basis of pr-ecepts conte1~ed in long-accepted 
custaus and practices. Under this system very few citizens, 
about one in forty-five, had the right to vote. Property was 
the basis or the voting franchise, and, as earlier r -emarked, 
there were very few landholders in the United K1ngdom1 
1 Cf. supra, p .• 41, Note 8. 
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Clamor ~ reform. As the n1neteentc century opened 8 
great clamor 'for the reform of this sytem rose up in the Gnited 
Kingdom. The ba-sis of' this and subsequent cries for continued 
.reform are quite we 11 known to any student of Brit ish history, 
and, because they are of lit.tle use for the purposes of this 
study, they shall be almost totally ignored. Rather, tte 
concern here will center upon the changes wrought in the make-
up or Commons as these reforms progressed. Lords will be left 
out of the picture because, for ·the most part • until 1911, th1 s 
-body was unaffected by the course or r ·ranohise reform, seats 
in this body never having been subject to election. 
Focus of the ,!ltta-ck upon the existing governmen_tel system. 
Because seats in Lords were heredi tery, perha-ps for more then 
any other reason, the cry for the ~eform of the existing struc-
ture centered its attack upon the seats in the House of Commons. 
The ends desired by those cla-moring for refo-rm were en extension 
Of franchise privileges to more citizens end redistribution of 
the seats 1n Commons on both a geographic _and demographic bas1s.2 
Those clamoring the loudest and ba.ck1ng t -he rest were the rising 
group or industrialists Who were without voice in government end 
2 Cf. Indexes for Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 
(H. c. Deos.) for the year 1831, particularly the'?etition"of 
Uerthyr Tidvill," Vol. 2, p. 206 f., or the discussion of Old 
-Serum" in Vol. 2, pp. 1061-1089. 
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who Wished to make an inroad into the hereditary aristocracy's 
strangl-ehold upon governmer..t. By 1831 their clamor could r.ot 
be ignored ., so Commons took up the subject of reform in the 
electorate. 
Reform Bill of 1832 and its s1gn1f1cancs. The first 
successful reform of the eleot·orate and inroad into the power 
of the hereditary aristoc·racy· was the F.r-anchise Reforn P-111,2 
really the franchise reform bills, or 1832. The passage or 
·this bill a-ppeared to accomplish several things. First, 1 t 
apparently destroyed once and for all the lended sr1stocrecy's 
semi-feudal monopoly of the British government and made the 
first sue cessful inroe d in to mercantil1 st p·rtnc tple s in govern-
ment. Second, it made wealth as well as property a basis for 
voting enfranch1sement. 3 Third, while newly enfranchising 
many c.itizens, it disfranchised many others; but the for:mer 
were by far the larger group. One citizen in thirty now had 
the r~ght to vote, which for the most part served to give fren-
chise privileges to the industrialists. Laborers, because few 
could afford homes whose rental value reached en anr~al average 
of ten pounds, were still without the vote, e~d so were· women. 
3 Cf. listing of Coz:mi ttee Report.s listed in the Ind·exes 
of Vols. ~end 7, Parliamentary Debates (Third Series: H. C. 
Debs) for the gradual introduction of this change into the reform 
platform. 
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rtscot and lot" ci t!zens were pretty well disfranchised 88 
were many of the artt sans, a bout ten per cent or tt.e lA t te.r 
group being left With the right to vote. Many "rot t ·en bor-
oughs" were destroyed and their seats redistributed, thus 
making for a more representative geographic distribution or 
the seats in Commons. The principal evil or th-is bill ley ·tn 
the fact that 1 t lacked the secret ba.llot which had been asked 
fer. Lack of such a safeguard left e good deal of the voti~g 
open to coercion, particularly in the old and new c-ounty fran-
chises- where weal thy· l -andholders could coerce the lesser prop-
erty holders, or ''leaseholders," a group which before the bill 
had in some counties ou·tweighed the power of the gentry. On 
the other hand, the newly arrived indust-rialists also found 
the same advantage, though inherently an evil, accessible; so 
its effe.cti.veness was somewhat lessened. On the whole, the 
end result or the bill was some realignment in political power 
among the social class·es of the Unit.ed Kingdom. The niddle 
class rece.ived a substantial increase in representation, and 
the upper middle, o-r industrialist, group was elevated to a 
post tion about equal to tha·t of the aristocracy. Commons 
received recognition as the House which would eventually dominate 
the British Parliament and government. In other words, this 
reform, which s.l:rn.ost wholly internal in origin, wes a typically 
British :measure; almost every group received a sliver of the 
cake, but no one group was permitted to .gorge itself upon it. 
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Municipal Corporations Act of 1835.4 
---
The Reform bill 
of 1832 was closely :followed by the Municipal Corporet·tons Act 
of 1835, a law which introduced ·some reform 1r1to the adm1nis· ... 
tretion of boroughs, giving th€ general public a little more 
voice in their administration and ttereby further augmenting 
the posi.tion or the nascent industrialist group. A~ore !n.por· 
tent franchis-e reforms simne.red beneath the surface. 
c·hartism. The :first overt symptom of the determ1net1on 
behind this simmering was the explosion on to the British 
pol1 tical scene of a sometimes reckless movement known as 
Chertism, given considers tion here bece.u.se 1 t represents two 
important facets of future political ref~rm: 1) it represented 
the d-emand for fra-nchise privileges on the pert of th.at vast 
group, laborers and ordinary citizens, who had been ignored 
by the reforms of 1832; and 2) ~he fact that five of the six 
points in its platform are the sum and substsnce or subsequent 
major franchise reforms. Chartism, though. it ultimately petered 
out as a political movement and failed directly to im?lement the 
reforms its sought, was effe~tive in other areas too. In com-
bination with Anti-Corn Law League it helped brir.g about the· 
4 Cf. statutes of the United Kingdon, LXXV, 389f: 5-6 
~~~~- -- ---William IV, c. ?6. 
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repeal of both the Corn Laws {1846} and the Navigation Acts 
( 1849}, thu.s cutting into the financial power represented tn 
the agricultural wealth of the landed aristocracy and deliver-
ing a serious blow to the forces of mercantilism. The "Peoples 
Charter" is their principal contribution to the British fran-
chise reform movement, even though it remained for other polit-
ical groups to bring its ideas to pass. The six points of this 
charter are: 5 1) the institution of universal manhood suffrage 
for both men and women (women had not been enfranchised by the 
reform of 1832) ; 2) the adoption of the secret, or Aus·tre lia·n, 
ballot; 3} the creation of equal electoral districts; 4) the 
elimin-ation or property qual11'ications for membership in Pa.rlia-
me·nt; 5) the instit·ution or s-alary payments for members or 
Commons;. and' 6) the institution of annual elections, the only 
measure which has not been adopted .in some fashion. 
Renresentat!on of the People Act£! 1867 and its si~n1f1-
cance. Except ror a f ·ew minor county and borough measures, 
reform., as far as Parliament was concerned,. remained quiescent 
until Gladstone's memorable speech6 in the Rouse of Comnons 
5 Edward P. Cheyney, .Reeaings in English JI1story (Boston: 
Ginn & Co .. , l908),pp. 702-704, contains a copy of the first 
Chartist petition which contains the·s·e provisions, end pp. '704-
'713 contain further docunenta-ry material on this movement. 
6 Cf. Gladstone's speech introducing his reform bill, 
"On the Advance of" the Working Class,'' in Parliamen·tary Debates 
(Official Ed.: H. c. Debs.}, CLXXXII, 1129 .. 1135, and .ensuing 
debate. 
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in 1867. Though his introduction, es Prime Hinister, of 8 
proposed reform bill ended shortly in the proroguin~ of his 
P-arliament·, the Conserve ti ve s who maneuvered ther!lsel ves into 
power on the strength of defeating his bill found themselves 
having to face up to the passage of reforms, anyway, if they 
would stay in power. The bill introduced by D1srael1 tn re-
sponse to riotous public s-entiment was even more lib-eral than 
that previously proposed by Gladstone and became the ''law of 
the land" as the Representation of the People Act of 186?. 7 
This act extended the franchise in the counties and all 
but made suffrage for men universal in the boroughs. This 
was accomplished by a provision of the act, startling for its 
time, that all men who paid direct taxes should vote. In 
essence, this provision had the ef.fec t of shifting th-e balance 
of political power toward the working classes and solidly 
establishing the middle classes in Parliamentary control. 
This was in keeping with the trend instituted in the reform 
Of 1832 which had begun to shift the balance Of power in Co~~ons 
and government toward the more numerous popular groups, though 
by this time· the upper stratum of the middle classes which the 
reform of 1832 .had enfranchised were fairly well identified 
w1 th the erstwhile ·ar1.stooraoy. Commons was thereby becoming 
more solidly entrenched as the dominant organ of the British 
? Cf. Public General Statutes, II, 1082 f.: 30·-31 
Victoriae, c. 102, for a copy of this act. 
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Parliament. One person in eighteen now had the vote~ though 
women were still left out. Labo.r received 1 ts enter1 ng wedge 
into the Parliamentary arena, thereby liberalizing the views 
of Parliament .even more than had the reform of 1832. One 
evil, howev.e-r, remained still untouched; the open ballot 
remained to plague the unwary, leaving the laborer or any other 
voter open to all sorts or reprisals and leading to such ridi-
culous situations as employers trooping their employees to the 
polls to see to it. that the voting proceeded as they wished. 
The Secret Ballot Act of 1872. 8 As soon as the e~ils or 
- ---
this si-tuation became apparent, the Secret l:!allot Act ( lR72) 
~ollowed as a logical development. Gladstone's bill asking 
for the -secret ballot was quickly ~ssed in Com.11ons, and Lords, 
now mindful of the inroad.s into 1 ts power, gave a q uick and final 
nod to the measure rather than precipitate en election or 
create a basis for the civil disturbances which usually followed 
in the wake of refusal of needed reform. The net effect or this 
measure was more solidly to entr-ench the trend of shifting the 
balance of political power toward the more numerous popular 
groups; Labor could now develop its own voice because it could 
no longer directly be coerced. 
8 Cf. Public General Statutes, VII, 193 f. :.35-35 Victoriae, 
c. 33, ror-a copy of this act. 
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Representation of' The Peonle Act of 1884.9 For twel"l·e 
years rollowing the passage of this act, the clamor for reform 
was held pretty well in check ., but, i.n 1883, when thre8 tened 
wi t ·h a split in the forces of his Liberal Party, Gladstone 
a·gain brought up the issue of' political reform, a subject upon 
whic·h all liberals apparently could agree, to heel the breech. 
The ministry brought forth a bill proposing to gi"le the agri-
cultural workers in the counties virtually the same franchise 
privileges that the bill of 1867 had given to workers in the 
cities. Agricultural workers had only recently been supplanted 
as the most numerous group in the population, but they had yet 
to win franchise privileges for thems·elves. S.imple j ustice 
demanded that they receive franchise rights at least e ~ual to 
those gained by the laboring elements in the cities. Though 
the bill took a bit of forcing, it passed ·rather handily, its 
princ.ipal oppos1 tion obviously rising in Lords, the last 
stronghold of landed power. In Cocrmons, the opposition was 
not given muah or a cha-nce. The Liberal whips shuttled the 
bill through under something of e "forced draft." This bill, 
however, left still unresolved the question of the distribu-
tion or Parliamentary s·ea ts and the women's vote. 
9 Cf. Public General Statutes, XXI, 3 f.: 49 V1cto.r1ae, 
c. 3, for-a copy of· this act. ££· also the Index of the 
Parliamentary Debates, 1883, ~or debates on the issues involved. 
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Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885. 10 One taste of 
reform- apparently produc-ed the quest for a little more. In 
less than a year the ouestion of the distribution of the seats 
in Commons received 1 t s solution. According to the bill _, the 
remaining rotten boroughs were abolished and the number of 
seats in Commons increased to 6.70. England was g1 ven 465 of 
these se-ats, Ireland 103_, Scotland 72, and Vla.les 30. Though 
there was some vociferous opposition, the bill passed readily. 
Representation in Conmons was now rather evenly distributed 
on the basis of population, property rights, and means of 
l1vel1hood 1 b-ut for men only. 
Ensuing redistribution of ~ vote. Four out of five 
males~ as an end result of the bills of 1884 and 1085, now 
had the vote, where one in thirty or forty had this right 
in 1832. Young men still 11 ving at .hoi:J.e, servants, and men 
who did not maintain separate households were now about the 
only males who did not have the franchise. Because the in-
crease in the population largely represented births among the 
laboring cl-asses in the c ttie s, these bills tended to keep the 
balance of power 1n Commons shifting more an~ more toward the 
ideas of laboring groups, the most nunerous elements in the 
10 Cf. Public General Statutes, XXI, 128 f.:48-49 
V1e: toriae, c. 23, ror a copy of this act. 
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total population. N.ot many years later., in 1896, Labor SBW 
1 ts first full-fledged Represents ti ve, Kei.r "Hardie make 
Labor's maiden speech in Cot!lillons. Middle-class ideas, however, 
were still dominant in Parliament and would continue to be so 
until Labor .caught up to them in Parliamentary representation 
in the third decade of the twentieth century. 
Franchise and electorate reforms in the Twentieth Century. 
For the twenty-six years following the bill of 1885, the ener-
gie·s o-r liberal reformers were pretty directly taken up., as 
they had be-en in other franchise reform intervals, with mor-e 
immediate questions of domestic reform such. as poor laws and 
soc·i.al secur1 ty, though franchise reform pro :)osals still 
hovered in the af1""1ng.. The first new reform i .n the electorate 
came in 1911 on the heels of Lords' action in regard to tte 
Lloyd George Budget of Hno. Twice the issue of tte budr e.t 
went berore the electora~e, and twice Lords refused the budget 
which contained measures proposi:r:g to area te social security 
11 d for workers. This led to th-e Parliament Act of 1911 aime 
specifically at smashing once end for all the power of the 
House or Lords. The prir.c1pal provision of this bill declared 
that onc-e a bill had p·a ·ssed. in Coilll'!lons over a second v-eto of 
11 Cf~ Public General Statutes, XLIX, 38 f.:l-2 George 
V, c~ 13, for a copy of this act. 
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Lo.rds it automatically became law. Lords was blackmailed into 
the passage of this bill by a threat of flooding the civil list 
(and therehy Lords} ·,vi th enou~!1 new peers to force acceptance 
of the bill. More social reform followed, but as its .backing 
petered out and World ~ar I approached, the cry for franchise 
reform again arose, this time from the women. "Suffragettes" 
bega:n their clamor r-or the introduction of the "feminine 
prerogative" into the electorate. By 1918 the governoent was 
ready and willing to grant them the right to vote. In that 
year Parliament passed the Representation of the People Act12 
whic·h gave voting privileges to women over thirty. The act· 
also res,tricted traditional "plural" voting privileges to 
people holding university degrees and to businessmen whose 
enterprises produced an. aggregate income of ten pounds per year. 
~omen were enraged by the age restriction; so, though they 
exercised the franchise privilege granted them, they still kept 
up the tumult. In 1919, there·fore, they received appeasement 
in the Se·x-D1squal1ficat1on Removal Act13 which granted them 
the rranc.hise on an equal ba-sis with men. Uni ver.sal suffrage 
was now nearly- en accooplis·hed fact. That same year, 191.9, 
l 12 Cf. Public General Statutes, LV, 253 f: ?-8 George 
V, c. 64, for a copy of this act. 
13 cr. ~O· J LVII, 325 f: 9-10 George v, c. 71. 
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also saw the passage of the Re-election of Ministers Act. 14 
This bill put an end to the _nuisance of "by-electicn s" f .or 
oen who accepted paid offices while s.i tting as members of 
Parliament. The bill limited the number of such elections to 
three in any one Parliament. The last step on the road to 
universal franchise was taken in 1928 with the passage of the 
Eaual Franchise Act •15 Prope-rty and financial qualifications, 
the historical basts of the franchise were removed, end uni-
vsrsal suffrage on the basis of person was substituted, thus 
giving franchise r!.ghts to all those- men end women -who had 
been ignored or overlooked in earlier reform bills. Universal 
suffrage for all adults had becomes reality. 
Recapitulation and addenda 2.!!. Franchise Reform. Re-form 
had been a long road -strewn with many pitfalls. Changes had 
been gradual, and the over-nll tendency of the reforms had bee:n 
to shift the balance of political power into the- hands of the 
:more numerous popul.ar groups-. The impetus behind the reforms 
had been almost wholly internal, though the whole general sweep 
of Western civilization had given ideas and strength to it. 
All of w·estern civilization had for some ti-:ne been drifting in 
14 Ct. Public General Statutes, LVII, 4 f.: 9 George- V, 
c-. 2. 
1 5 Cf. Public Genera-l~~ 1928, 2·7 f.: 18-19 George v, 
c. 12. 
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the general direction of governments representing a plural-
!stio basis for all pol1 tical decis.ions, goverrunents gener-
ally referred to as republics, or representative democracies. 
This. movement was charact·eristic of the whole civilization, 
and from its sweep English reformers had borrowed ideas end 
arguments with whi.ch to bolste·r their own indigenous trends .• 
Still, the particular instrumentation taken by ·the English 
·people was pe-culiarly their own and predicated upon influences 
rising in the British Isles. The only foreseeable we·akness 
in the system the British have developed 11-es in t h e potential 
evil inherent in the fact that the less numerous popular groups 
are without effective voice 1n government. In moments of 
national stress such a condition could lead to ochlocracy, 
government intimidated by mob rule. However this may be, the 
problem or this study is now to assess the effects, if any, 
or these major franchise changes upo.n the cour·se of Bri tain' .s 
imperial rule. 
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CP'..API'ER V 
PARLIAMENT Al"lJJ IMPERIAL LEGI~LAT ION 
Since the course of impe.rial rule orecedina the .A.-nerican 
. - 0 
Revolt has already been discussed. it should suffice to review 
its trends and then ~roceed with the course of imperial rule 
since that time. Legislation or royal writs preceding th.is 
period and concerned with imperial rule were issued, for the 
mo.st part, under the guidance of the meroant111stica.lly-or1.ented 
Privy Council of the Crown •. True, there had been the Act Creat-
ing The Commonwealth passed by the Interregnun Parlia~ent 
{1.6-49), but this had proved pretty much a dead issue, never 
having been resorted to for any decision of consequence after 
the Re·atoration ( 1660). Britain's technioue was to superi:npose 
imperial order on colonies after they had been established by 
her own or· other Caucasian nationals. Agencies charged with 
the successful acconplishoent of this transition had first been 
instituted by and in the interests of the Crown. Tl:!e first to 
take up this task was the Crown's own Privy Council. l~ext, 
in 1695, the Board of Trade and Plantations ~as organized. 
Most of its energies were directed toward the rnanegecent and 
direction of colonies Caucasian in population, particularly 
those 1n North .America, sin.oe 1 t was during the period or its 
tenure that England, largely through the efforts of indi v.idual 
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oit1zen groups, was carrying on the decisive duel with the 
French which spread her control and influence into Asia. As 
she cont.inued her expansion in Asia, a colonia secretaryship 
was ere a ted , a bol.i shed, and re ere ate d 1 n order to 1 n tegra te 
management over the member units of the growing ond far-!lung 
colonial system. Direction wes still largely in the hands of 
the Crown, but the middle of the eighteenth century began to 
see Parliament assert its desire to usurp control. Parlia-
mentary attempts began w1 th e series of leg1slA ti ve r.-1ensures· 
aimed at making the Thirteen Colonies share in the cost or 
their de:tense. 1 Next came Nor·th's compromising India Regu-
lating Act (1773) which a&serted Parliament's authority over 
the government of India but left actual rule and regulation 
almost wholly in the hands of agents or the East India Company. 
This was followed by the equally compromising Quebec Ac·t 
0 (1774)~ which bargained tor the quiescence of the Canadians 
1n the event of :further troubles in the Thirteen Colon-ies • .liext 
came· the series of eo-called "Intolerable Acts" which helped 
lead to the American Revolt.~ Parliament had not tared very 
1 Among these pieces or· 1egisla tion was the Stanp Act 
(1765) Statutes at Larfe, XXVI., 179 ff.:5 GeorBe III, c. 12 , 
quickly repealed and fo lowed by the Declaratory Act (1766); 
Ibid., XXVII, 19 r.:6 George III, c. 12, asserting e right 
Pa.rrtament and Crown had been unable to enforce. 
2 Statutes e t Large , XXX, 549 t. :14 George III, c • 83 .• 
for a copy of this act. 
3 Ct. supra, pp. 74-77 for root of troubles in ~er1ca. 
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well as yet in her at t.ernpts to don the "imperial robes," but 
the American Revel t appears to have pointed out the· path 
Parliament might trod successfully.~ It was road which ·com-
promised not only with the Crown, but with a~enities of stra-
tegic, political, and economic realities as well. 
I o. SELECTED IMPERIAL LEGISLATION PRECEDING 
THE FIRST MAJOR FRANCHISE REFORM BILL 
AND FOLLOWING THE .AMERICAN REVOLT 
The Irish Appeals ~ (~). The AI!le.rican War was no 
.sooner over than Britain donned her "new look'' in colonial 
arf·airs. The year 1 ?83 saw the passage of the Irish .Appeals 
Act,4 which asserted the joint tenure of' Crown &nd Parliament 
over Ire land and " ..... the e xcl us 1 ve rights of the. par 11 amen t 
and courts or Ireland in matters of legislation end judicature~ 5 
To all intents and purposea Parliament and Cro~n were thus 
assenting to the valid! ty or the claims of the ra.d1cals who 
had stirred up the revolt in the Thirteen Colonies6 end, per-
haps hoping to avoid a similar conflict in the face of pending 
dif f1 cul ties w1 th Fre nee ... Ire land was .given internal autonomy , 
4 Statutes a·t Large, XXXIV, 2·55 f.: 23 George III, c. 2.8, 
for e copy of thi-s8ct. 
5~. 
0 cr. supra, pp. 56-?8, particularly Note 18, p. 63, 
for the roots of the American Troubles • 
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but the question of her share in certain tax natters and con-
trol or her external affairs renained still unresolved because 
she had no representat"ion in Parliament. An a tteopt was soon 
to be made to remedy this situation, but not before Parliament 
had give-n further considera-tion to the Canadian question. 
The Canadian Constitution Act (1?91). Parliament's 
- _..:,...;;;._.;;. 
-answer to the potentia-lly dangerous Canadian probleo. was the 
Canadian Constitution Act (1791) 7 which did several things: 1) 
solved a potentially disruptive religious probleo by dividing 
Canada into two provinces, ·upper and lower on the basis of 
dominant religion; 2} gave the Canadians a great deal of tnter-
na-1 autonomy, though its legislatures were answerab.le to a 
royal legislative counc1.l; 3) .sugc:~ested the Crown's ina bill ty 
to legislat·e for the colonies without the adv"ice and c.onsent 
ot Parliament, the Crown's prerogatives being liMited by cer-
tain provisions of this act; 4) adapted the ~nited Kingdo~'s 
franchise regulations to the purposes or Canadian gover~~ent, 
property still being the basis of the franchise; 5) asserted 
the Crown's prerogative of a two-year legislative veto period 
on any piece of internal legislation in Canada_, and 6) t.hus 
retained :for Br1 ta1n control of Canada • s external affairs. The 
7 Cf. Statutes at Large, ~CCVII, 2~4 ff.:31 George III, 
c. 31, ror a complete c-opy of t ·his act. 
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constitution bill also helped ouiet the cla 0 r 1 d . ~ r or n epend-
enc~ being raised by certain Can9d1an and outside groups~ 
Parliament's next step was an attenpted solut-1-on of the I-rish 
problem. 
~ of Union .!!.!..!!! Ireland ( 1800.). Though the Irish 
question ~s rarely considered a phase of British 1m,er1al 
maneuvering during this period of the ~pire, there appears to 
be more than a little basis for considering it in this 11r,ht. 
Certainly the Irish have ever viewed it in this manner end 
, J 
by 1922, the British Parliament appears to have been reAdy to 
concede the point·. Though the modern phase of this c:uest1on 
really dates from Cromwell's occupation durine the Interregnun, 
the real purpose at the ti.:ne under consideration, 18.00, appears 
to have been three-fold: 1) an attempt to answer o.nce and for 
all the arguments raised by ·the ..tu:ler1csn Revel t; 2} to ouiet 
Irish clamor in the face of difficulties with the French, acd 
3) to protect the Protestant north of Ireland fran troubles 
with the Catholic south. Cronwell's occu~etion haa led to 
serious religious problems and the problem or ,.absente-e land-
lordism .• " From c·romwell"' s ti::ne forward the Irish have con-
tinued to scheme and fi ght for independence while English 
interests have concerned thenselves with protecting sympath-
etic and Protestant northern Irish groups fron aloost certs1n 
Predomin~ntly Roman C9thol1c re=ainder of reprisals from the ~ 
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Ireland should it succeed in breaking free. At the time under 
consideration here, however, c. 1800, the atte~pted legis-
lation was more concerned with satis-fying conse·rvati ve parlia-
mentary interests who wished to consolidate end make uniform the 
administration of the empire. The Act o:f Uni.on with Ireland 
(1800) 8 was on the order of a ""trial balloon," conservattve 
stimulated, aimed at pointing the way troward a satisfactory 
solution of the problem of creating a uniform impe.rial admin-
istration tree or troubles stemming from the American argument. 
and strategic difficulties. The "Act or Union" had followed 
relatively rapidly on the heels of the "Ap·peals Act" and would 
seem me.rely the next logtca.l step to\lard parliamentary rep-
resentation for colonies. "Union" legislation attempted to 
gain this end by ·uniting the United Kingdom and Ireland under 
joint allegiance to the Crown and by giving Ireland a relatively 
fair representation in the British Parliament. Ireland still 
preserved her control over internal affairs and was g iven the 
added voice of parliamentary representa-tion to preserve 1 ts 
interest in its foreign affairs. 
Parliffmentary consideration of the Union Bill. The 
someti"!:lles conical union issue began with a join·t resolution ot 
8 Cf. Statutes at Large, XLII, 648 ff.:40 George III, 
c. 67, ror- a cor.lplete copy of this a at. 
~--·-·- · 
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both houses oT the British Parliament proposing the act ot 
union. Uproar followed in Ireland, but Parliament went 
blithely -ahead. Lords quickly i~plemented the resolution by 
passing a Bill of Union and sending 1 t to CoM!:lons. In Cor.m.ons· 
the· question .of bringing up the report on tt moved rapidly. 
Befor-e too long a somewhat bo·red end nearly er.1pty Conn.cns, 
sittin-g as a Col!ltlitte·e of the Whole, pa-ssed this amended bill, 
dividing 140 to 159 in its fevor, and suboitte·d it to the Irish 
for ratification. Ireland wanted no part of the union and said 
so, but Parliam.en t was in a mood to persist despite the re je·c-
tion. When needled on the issue in Commons, trr. \!. Smith 
an:swered for the "Bench" that he " •.• did not think the union 
absolut.ely a bad measure, but contended, that having been 
rejected by the Irish Parliament, we ought not to fsi~ per-
severe it at present."lO The question was put to continue 
and continuation so ordered: Ay·es 149, Koes 24. 11 Again the 
bill went back to committee whil-e negotiett-ons were undertaken 
9 cr. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, 
XXXIV, 32IT 39 George III. 
10 1 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Seres, 
XXXIV~ 387: 39 r~orge III. 
11 Ib.id ,. , 387. 
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by imperial authorities to see ~hat could be done about 1n-
st·1lling in the Irish a measure of the proper attitude requi-
s-ite to presiding over what the Irish considered t...~e1r o'.ttl 
national down:rall. As these negotia-tions continued, the 
question of bringing up the amended report on union divided.: 
Ayes 120, Noes 16. 12 It was shortly after this division that 
the Crown, in the person of George III, in an address to a 
joint session of both houses indicated the success of negotia-
tions in the follo,"''ing word . .s: 13 
~zy Lords and Gentlemen; I receive with the greatest 
satisfaction, the deliberate opinion or my two Houses 
o-r Pa-rliament on this in terest1ng subject; and you may 
depend upon my embracing the first favourable oppor-
tunity of communicating to my Parliament of Ireland 
the propositions which you have laid before me, as 
calculat-ed to form the basis of a complete and entire 
union between Great Britain and .Ireland. such a settle-
ment established by mutual consen·t, and founded on a 
sense of mutual interest and affection, -would. I am 
persuaded, produce the happiest effects in promoting 
the security and happ·iness of both kingdoms, end in ££!!_-
tainins and aueroenting the stabilityr power, and~­
sources of~ empire. T!talics~ Zd.J 
Ensuing debate on th.is audress indicates the sub ~ agree-
ment o~ the Irish Parliament to countenance an act of union 
1 containing the proper safeguards and representation. The only 
/ voci:t"erous opposition to the final bill ce·me from the conserv-
ative Charles Grey, afterwards the Earl Charles Grey, who did 
I 
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I 
1 2 Ibid .. ,p. 512. 
13 Ibid., pp. 978 ff. Address presented on April 26, 
1800, to a joint session of both houses of Parliament. 
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not think that the bill would a.ccompli.sh its purpose, " •.• con-
taining and augmenting the· stability, po\'Jer, and resources or 
the empire," but he was continually voted down. 14 Grey's 
view also indicates that oonse·rvattve opinion was as Vihole-
heartedly behind suc·h a measure in Commons as 1 t was in Lords. 
The first reading of the final bill passed a business-like 
Commons: Ayes 133, Noes 58,1 5 though the· mea gre vote indicates 
the issue was a roregone conclusion; most of the members of 
Co!l:lnlons considered it not worth debating. Interest, ·however, 
picked up enough by the second reading to produc-e a d1v1s1cn: 
Ayes 208. Noes 2·6. 16 The third r-eading pass·ed a voice vote 
without an objection. 
Significance of the Ac·t o:f Union with Ireland. Accord-
ing to ·the Act of Union, England and Ireland were to be 
united as the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Ireland 
was to receive ·100 seats in Commons and appropriate repre-
sentation in Lords, but the s1gn1fica:nce of the bill herdly 
rested in this ~act. Rather, in terms of iffiperiel rule, the 
bill was significant for far more cogent reasons. First, 
14 Cf . Hansard's Perliementery Debates_, Third Series, 
X:X:X:V: 39 George III, pp. 85ff., 117 ff., et· seqq • 
1 5 Ibid., p. 143. 
16 ~., p. 150. 
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combined with the ''Appeals Act," it appears to have been a log-
ically developed, but somewhat abortive attempt to avoid the 
pitfalls or the American Revolt and to answer the pleas for 
representation the t . "radical" elements had used during events 
leading up to it. As such it wGs never repeated because it 
did not succeed. Rather, the kernel of the le g1slat1 ve dyarchy 
contained in the principles· of the "Appeals .Act" was to prove 
to be the key to later maintenance of relative stability in 
the imperial structure. Second, aside from the little debated 
act or 1801 which established the Colonial Cffi·ce, 1 t "nas the 
last important piece of imperial le-gislation prior to the 
.major rranch1se reforms. As such it gave some indication or 
the attitude of the English Parliament regarding not only its 
own prerogatives 1n imperial affairs, but its· view of then. 
The bill appears to have originated from motives of the Crown 
and aristocracy, who desired stable control of Ireland, and 
Parliament appears to have viewed it as a practical and 
necessary experiment. In fact, Parliament's attitude seens 
to have been, "the more quickly implemented t ·he better;" 1 t 
was an act which had to be countenanced in order to escape 
a repeat of the American debacle tn which dissat.isfied elem-
ents had stirred up the populace on the s·ubject of repre-
sentation and foreign powers had suppo·rted their insurrec-
tionist movement in order to encroach upon British preserves. 
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French intrigue was again hovering in the background and cay 
have worried British planners. Thir·d, the act revealed the 
position that the House or Lordst until the Parl1s~ent Act 
of 19·11, was to take in future imperial legislation concerned 
with colonies of Caucasian origin, the area in which British 
attempts to establish a unified imperial order were first to 
"c.ome a-cropper." In these areas Bri ta1n was to lose control 
or much of her logistical potential and thereby be forced into 
retreat· elsewhere. The fact that Britain never really e.ncour-
aged the development of heavy or finishing 1nd·ustr1es in 
these a-reas was to make her stre tegic post t!on even weaker. 
II. DJPERIAL EVENTS SUBSEQ.UENT TO THE FIRST REFCRM BILL 
India Office!£! (1858). Follo~ing the establishment 
of a full-blown Colonial Office {1801), imperial affairs, with 
the exception of those concerned with India, appear to have 
separated the·mselves into two general categories: Caucasian 
affairs under the legislative dyarchy and non-Caucasian affairs 
under the principles of the administrative dyerchy. Parlia-
ment seems to have taken unto itself the general and direct 
nanagement of Ca.u.casian affairs, though 1 t did designate the 
Crown as symbol of au·thority and executor of its wishes. 
Royal prerogatives, however, were directly li~ited by Parlia-
ment and the crown would be answerable to that body for the 
.-----
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actions of its agents and emissaries. Non-Caucasian units, 
on the other hand, appear to fall to the lot of the Colonial 
uftice, which was little interfered with as long es the 8 ~~1n­
istrative dyarchy it set up preserved order over its domain. 
The Colonial Offic~, t bl ~ oo, was answera e to Parlie~ent but 
' 
the Crown en.j_oyed a goodly number of privileges in its domain .. 
The one exception to this ceneral d1 v1s1.on of rule was India 
which for many years was to be treated as a non-Caucasian unit 
and later to be treated as a Caucasian unit. The year 1784 
had witnessed the first example of this separate treet~ent 
or India with the establis.hment of the Board of Control for 
its affairs. This structure had superseded North's India 
Regulating Act {1773), which had delivered nominal control 
of Indian affairs into the hands of Perl.iament, though actual 
executi-on of this control resided symbolically in the Crown 
and, perhaps dia-bolically., in the hands of the agents or the 
East India Company. North's regulating act had asserted 
Parliament's wish to take a more active part in the direction 
of the Indian. eovernment. The disturbances a·nd dishonest 
administration it was intended to curb, ho~ever, continued 
intermittently until serious disturbances led to the introduc-
tion in Parliament of the India Office Act (1858), which, 
aside rrom the Ionian question to be taken up momentarily, 
i .s the first important piece of colonial leg1sla tion rollow-
ing a major franchise reform. ~uti.ny among the "Sepoys" had: 
i 
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initiated Parliament" s acti vi t .Y. A · d ppr~se or this situaticn, 
the East India Company, whose agents had been tryint.: to restore 
order· along with Her MaJesty's forces _, petitioned Parliement 
to rorego its own wishes until the disturbances had been quelled 
and the problen could be considered in a less inflamed li e ht.l7 
Conr:::.ons·, pretty well fed up with the activit 1e s of the .:::est 
India Company, ordered the re~uest laid on the tab le and con-
tinued proceedicgs on the India Office Act which had already 
sailed through en angered Lords. In rapid-fire· order t-his 
bill whic.h put an end to the East Indi.e Company, as~er·ted 
Parliament's primacy in rule over India, and es-tablished an 
administrative dyarchy for India in the nam.e of the Crown 
passed three· readings. Divisions on the first readine, the 
only ones ·available, were: Ayes 318, Noes 1?3, pairing .1n-
cluded,l8 with the Irish vote dividing: AYes 36, noes 24, 
and comple·te abstentions for absence or other r e asons, 44. 19 
1? Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, CXLVlii, 
970 ff.: 21 Victoriae, 185?. 
18 Ibid.~ pp. 1715-1718. 
19 Ibid.~ pp. 1?15-1?18. The Irish vo t e was derived by 
compar.ing ~official tabulation of the division with the 
official membership list. The vote is indicated as a partial 
answer to persistent rumors that Irish menbers of Parliament 
were effective in helping colonies free thenselves froo British 
res uleticns. .Except on matters of home rule, the IristL do not 
appear to have made any attempt, judged on tte basis of avail-
able Parliamentary divisions, to hamstring legislation oinimiz-
ing British rule nor have they, on the other hand, shown any 
special interest in it. Apparently, it concerr.ed them not at 
ell. 
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Thus passed, ignoring the oinor Ionian matter, the first 
_;:~ieee of major imperial legislation foll.owin g the major f .ren-
chise reform of 1832. 
~ significance of the India Office Act. The signifi-
cance Of this act lies in the fact that it indicates no 
appreciable change in the attitude of Parliament toward imper-
ial legislation following the Franchise Reform Bill of 1832. 
Parliament still asserted its paramount authority in colonial 
affairs and still paid its respects to the S)~bol of· authority 
repres.ented in the Crown by making the Crown the executor of 
its wis-hes, the procedure it had developed in the C5se of the 
Irish question in 1783 and 1800 following the American Revolt. 
Further, it appears to have adapted the underlying principles 
of the legislative dyarchy, division of internal end external 
rule. to the purposes of Indian government end stability and 
introduced the first real sample of the administrative dyarchy. 
Not even the addition of the Irish members to Parliament, as 
their attitude in the division available indicates, made any 
difference. The Irish could hardly have been less interested 
in the issue~ though they still continued to plaGue Par-liament 
on the question of "Hor1e· Rule." Lords as· usual had first try 
at the bill end everyone but the East India Compeny was made 
hap?Y· For those who would argue the contrary, that this bill 
j 
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did in fact· indicate a change in Parliament, 6 etti tude, there 
are several facts to consider. First, the bill first steru1ea 
from an uprising in the House of Lords. Second, it was passed 
.by a Conservati.ve Commons and ministry. Three, it adapted the 
principles of a system of colonial rule experimented wt t ·h 
berore franchise reform to the purposes of -stable rule in India. 
The bill was in ract a beautiful adaptation to circumstances; 
it preserved the prerogatives desired by the United J(1ngdom 
while freeing it for some time fran two possibilities equally 
undesirable: 1) possible full scale war in India, and 2} 
civil disturbances which threatened to disrupt needed trede 
relations. Parliament bargained wisely. 
Colonial laws valid! ty act and the Colonial l!arriages 
Valid! ty Act· (1865). The next important piece of colonial 
legi.slat1on, foregoing again for the Monent t .he Ionian ques-
tion, were two proposed bills conce-rning the validity or 
colonial laws and coloni-al marriages. These laws were formu-
lated and suggested by the Colonial Office as a solut·ton to 
certain problems which had ·begun to plat.t;Ue administration 
in various parts of the empire. They ·\Vere en answer to cer-
tain technical and legal problems ~hich had arisen froo extra-
legal practices such as "co~on-lawn marriages on colonial 
frontiers where no religious auspice.s ~ere aV"'!ilable. .i:s·tates 
left by t -he deceased ma.le partner in such unions were clutter-. 
ing colonial courts, -and there seamed to be no legal precedent 
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available for untangling these estates and settling rights 
or questions Of heirs and inheritance. For the -purpose of 
solving such problems, t -he Colonial Harri.eges Validity Act 
was proposed. The Colonial Laws Validity Act, on the other 
hand, was intended to clarify the legal aspects of the term 
"colony~ and to establish the areas of validity for colonial 
lews. 20 These bills were first read in Commons on the pe-tition 
of' a :Mr. Chichester Fortescue and were apr>roved .ins.tsnter with-
out debate. 21 The bills were passed by a voice vote, the need 
:for them having been corn:::lunicated to Cof.ti4lons b:•;r the Colonial 
Of':fice. The seoond and third readings 'vere also passed r.1 th-
out deba-te- by later cornrni ttees of the whole. Here agsin Parlia-
ment had bowed to necessity, for Lords passed the bills just 
as swiftly, even though 1 t was the stronghold of Lords Spiritual. 
Significanoe of the Colonial ~Valid~ Act. The 
22 true significance of this act lies in its declaration that the 
".-•• terms- 'legislature' and 'colonial legislature' shall 
severa-lly signify the authority, other than the i:n~erial 
parliament or her majesty in council, competent to make , 
laws _for any colony. The term 'representative leeislature 
20 Statutes of the United_ Kingdom, CV ,_ 129 ff.: 28-29 
Victor1ae, c. 63. 
21 Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, CL~IX, 1042. 
22 Statutes of the United Kingdom, CV, 129 ff.: 28-29 
Victoriae, c. 63. 
·· -......-.. . 
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shall signify any colonial legislature which sh:1l.l con-
prise a legislative body of which one-half are elected 
by the inhabitants of the colony. The term 'colonial 
law' sha-ll include laws !:lade for any colony e 1 ther by· 
such legislatur-e as aforesaid or by her naj esty in 
council. .An a·ct of Parliament, or any provision thereof, 
shall, in construing this act, be said to extend to any 
colony by the express words or necessary inten~~ent of 
any act of parliament • 
••• no colonial law shall be deemed to ha~e been ~oid 
or inoperative on the ground of repugnancy to the ·law 
of England ., unless the same shall be repugnant to the· 
provisions· of .some such act of parliament, order, or 
regulat1nn as aforesaid .••• {Ed.: aforesaid being .•. re-
pugnant to the pro~isions of any act of parliament ••• or 
repugnant to a·ny orcier or regulation mede under au thor-
ity of ..• parliament.). 
In .other words, Parliament had openly asserted its supre~acy 
in colonial affairs and indicated that the Crown' s· authority 
derived from its deliberations. Thus far the pro·gre ss of 
i~perial authority had shown no disposition to change in res-
ponse to the reform bill of 1832. Par·ltament was recop,n1zing 
areas or validity for colonial law and finishing off the job 
of taking any semblance or royal colonial prerogative awey 
from the Crown. 
The Ionian: question ( 1809 -1864). ·It is at this point 
that the etiology of the Ionian petition for independenc-e had 
be.st be taken up in order that its bases and procedure o.ay be 
contrasted with those of the !~orth America .Act, a co:::::.parison 
which may serve to expos·e Br1 tain 's basic interests in colonial 
holdings. The Ionian _problem began in 1809 when Eritish forces 
d th I 1 I 1 nds as One Pha se of a strategic occup1e most of e on an s a 
i 
I 
\ 
! 
,.--------
} 
148 
deployment during the 1\apoleonic ·.-:ars. Together w1 th He-ligo-
land, Gibraltar, a~d Malta, they helped provide en effective 
blockade to Na-pol-eon's ambi tio·ns ,_ ens•~ering his e r.:bargoe s and 
effectively blocking any rurther designs he mi ght have U?On 
the Near East,_ Europe, or North Afri.ca. The c ont 1nua.t1on of 
the Napoleonic Wars brought to the Ionians a prosperity there-
t~for unheard o.r; yet, as the war ended, they petitioned Great 
Britain f'or the "restoration of the·ir independence.'' Signa-
tories to the peace treaty session at Paris, in 1815, however, 
overlooked their request, declaring that these islands, in 
the interests of peace and prosperity, were to be a "free re-
public under protection .of the King of Great Br1 tain." Some-
one set down a const·i tution for this so -called Sep t insular 
Republic, ·but, though the outward aneni ties of the republicen 
process were observed, control really rested in the hands of 
the- Bri tis·h Lord Hig h C"o;'TlDissioner, Mai tlend, 1\'ho ke·pt firm 
rein on it in order to protect the avera ge citizen from the 
''tyrannical and arbitrary control" of the old noble fenilies 
in the islands. Prosperity had ended with the war as quickly 
as 1 t had begun and the .British found the:nsel ves saddled with 
1mner1al obligations they ~ere not at all hap~y to assune; 
a portion of the Bri t1sh treasury was rapidly dete·rio.rati.ng 
in to an Ionian almshous·e. As accidents wfll happen, Britain's 
interests in the Ionian Sea forced her into a closer associe-
I 
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tio~. with the forces of the Greek national reviva l and ~ar 
of independence. Once Greece was set f'ree the. ba sis of 
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the treaty of 1815 was removed and the British protectorate, 
therefore, became an anomaly. British rule over the islands 
cont1nue·d for sometime, but when the Ionians, in 185?, peti-
tioned for reunion with their ancestral homeland, Greece, the 
~oreign and colonial offices, tired perhaps of the financial 
burden they represented, consc.ious perhaps of persona 1 obliga-
tions to patriots o~ the infant Greek republic, or too aware 
of the fact that they no longer served any strategic function, 
Wldertook negotiations with t ·he signa tory pmvers of 1815 wi t .h 
a view toward granting the Ionian's request. The general 
attitude pervading the whole matter s·eems- to .ha.ve been: "Since 
they no longer serve any useful strategic or economic purpose 
and ·a ·re therefore a sooewhat pointles s expense, why· not grant 
the islands' request?" Consequently, by 1864 negotiations 
with the signatory powers were brought to fruition and the 
Ion1ans quietly restored to their ancestral unio.n.. Except 
to give its assent to the relief of the treaty, Parliament 
had little t ·o do with the problem, most of the work falling 
into the hands of e1 ther the Colonia 1 or Ho.ne Offices. The 
value o.f the islands was of so little moment that Parliai!lent 
\ 
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was not evan interested enough to debate the issue of relief 
9r.:. 
of the treaty ............ 
The Ionian ouestion end the t!"orth Ai1ler1ca Act. This 
procedure may be contrasted with that undertaken in the case 
of Canada. French end English in origin> Canada presented 
the United Kingdon with a problem vastly diff·erent frora that 
in the case of the Ionian Isla·nds. It was, first of all, a 
~uch vaster territory. It was continually beir.g plagued with 
insurrectionist movements. It e.lso represented rapidly 
advancing percentage of the United K1nedoM's bread {food) 
supply. Canadian wheat and minerals were becoming nore and 
more vital to a British economy which ·would soon absorb forty 
24 per cent of the world's annual grain ·movement. The Canadien 
Const 1 t ·u tion Act (s.:.y. supra,. p. 123) he d never proven entirely 
setis-t"actory. Perhaps its worst fault was that it left the 
United Kingdom still saddled with the costs of governing and 
defending the Canadian area and wi t .h no acceptable r::eans or 
persuading the Canadians to accept their share of the burden. 
23 Q!. Carrington,££·~., p. 257 ff., for a fuller 
exposition of this problem in its historical context and for 
the views and actions of Maitland and Oswald, the two 
dominant figures in this issue. 
24 cr. Smith and Phillips, oo. cit., PP• 398-428, or 
G.eorge T. Renner; Loyal Durand, Jr -:--et al., ·:;or1d Econoo.ic 
Geography (New York: Thonas Y. Crowell Co., Hl 51) , PP • 231-42 .• 
I ) 
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Administrative costs coupled with the influences of revolu-
tionary movements and strategic factors led to a number or 
imperial coram is sions organ! zed to exa:n.ine. the :problem end 
suggest solutions; for example, the Durham Co~~1ss1on. In 
implementing the recom.menda t1ons of this c or.mi ss·ion, adminis-
trations were far more canny than they hed bee·n in the case 
of the Irfgh Union Bill. They apprised ?-arl1ament of a forth-
coming Constituti~nal Convention in Canada, to which Parlia-
ment had no objection and whi.ch 1 t ,. in feet, encourAged. This 
body, composed largely of Canadians, was convened tor the 
purpose of laying down a permanent constitution for the 
eovernment of the Canadian colonies. Avoiding one of the 
principal pitfalls of the Irish Union Bill, colonial adminis-
trators allowed the Canadians first to conpose a bill to their 
o•.vn liking ber-ore Parliament t.as to act upon it. The Con-
stitution laid down Ties then sent to the Parliacent of the 
United Kingdom for its approval. 
.Action upon the Canadian Constitution Bill: The l;orth 
America Act of 1867. Parli-ament cou-ld hnve done any number 
---
of things with this constitutional bill subnitted by the 
Canadians, but it did very litt.le. As events turned out, 
this bill with a few minor changes turned out to be the sum 
and substance of the North .Ar.lerica .Act ( 1867), which set up 
what was to be the final icpe·rial government of Canada until 
I 
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1932 when Canada escaped from t ·he reins of British adminis-
trators. The bill in Parliament asking for the acceptance 
of this cons-titution originated in the House of Lords and 
was introduced by the Enrl of Carnavon on February 12, 
1867. 25 After relatively quiet debate had a scertained the 
fa~t that British-desired prerogatives were being protected 
in the bill, 1 t passed quite- rapidly and uneventfully on 
February 26 and was imnediately sent to Comr.tons. 26 In Con~ons 
the bill became the imnediate order of the do.y and was "voice-
·voted" clause by clause, su-ch anendments as were de-sired by 
interested parties being taken up for debate i~ediately upon 
their introduction. Those amendments desir ed were largely 
a matter of wording. 27 The bil.l was then rewritten to include 
such amendments as were passed, and the second reading was 
agreed to, again by a clause by clause vo1ce-vote. 28 The 
embossed bill quickly pass-ed a third reading end wa s sent bac-k 
to the House of Lords for approval in its amended foro. "Lords~ 
25 Cf ... Parliamenta-ry Debates (B. L. Debs .. ), CL~f, 
273: 30 Victoriae, 186?. 
2.6 Ibid. , 1020. 
27 Ibid., (H. C. Debs.}, 1310~1322. 
28 { .,. c D b ) CT ·r ~rxv, 132'2: Par11amenterl Debates H. • e s. , ~~ 
30 Viotoriae, 1867. 
~- ... 
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quietly nodded its heed, hardly bothering to protest amend-
ments. 29 Embossed copies were Quickly delivered t .o the Crown, 
!'lnd the bill rec·ei ved the royal assent on l!arch 29. Truly, 
as the "Bench" sagely remarked, there was ttno reel sentiment 
against the bill." In a short matter of forty-five days 
Parliament had with good grace swallowed whet @ight turn out 
to be a bi t ·ter pill and, what is more rernarkable, had swallowed 
1 t at ·1 ts own request as the only practical solution to the 
imperiel problem with which 1 t was faced. Under the lef·:is-
la ti ve dye rchy set up by the bill, Canada VIas to be saddled 
with the cos·ts of her own internal governr.:t.ent, ~hich was 
·to be lett pretty much in 1 ts own .hands, the royal veto now 
being largely a matter of "window d·ress:ing" in regard to 
int·ernal affairs, while the United Kingdom was precariously 
to retain certain governmental prerogatives it desired in 
Canada's international dealings. 
1 t T·he final till, Significance of the North Amer ca A£_. 
the North ..Amerioe. .Act {a.v.) i.s highly signiftcant in the 
-
~istory of the empire for e ntrnber of reasons. It illus-
trated to the civilized wcrld just how precarious British 
colonial tenure had becone. Strategic, de~oeraphic, end 
economic factors were already forcing the United Kingdom into 
29 Ibid .• {H. La Debs.}, 1710. The royal assent is 
indicated in the order of the day for I.:arch. 29 • 
i 
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a der·ensive end con cilia tory role, pa rticulerly ir. regard 
to the more technologically advanced units of the empire 
T.hioh were Caucasian in origin. Then, too, e number of 
Parliamentary precedent·s were set .by the bill. Henceforth _, 
all bills concerned with legislation upon imperial matters 
in the Caucasi-an colonies were to or1.ginate in the House of 
Lords. They would arrive there from the desk of the Colonial 
Office which, in its turn, had received them from constitutional 
conventions it had instituted in the colonies cor.cerned. The 
technique of the constitutior~l convention would serve to 
avoid the pitfalls of the Irish experiment, and it would 
serve also to produce the successful refinm1ent of the legis-
lative dyarchy· desired by the United Kingdom. It would serve 
to produce for some time the end expressed in the words of 
George III, " ••• containing end augmenting the stability, 
pO\"ler, end resources· of the emp.ire." (Italics, Ed.). 30 The 
~~rth America Act also served to illustr?.te the fact that 
Parliament • s attitude in imperial ma-tters had shown no particu-
lar disposition to change in response to the changes in its 
makeup introduced by the Frar.:ch.ise Reform Bill of 1832. Rather, 
the bill was the relatively successful conclusion of the 
exp·erimen.t begun by the Irish Appeals Act \":hich preceded 
30 cr~ supra, p. 138 f., address of George III. 
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rrenchise reform. Controversy ever the Irish Union Dill had 
!!lornen tarily sidetracked this experiment, .but the Union Bill 
itself' had pointed out the pitfalls to be avoided in esta.bl1sh-
1ng the successful le·gisla ti ve dyar.chy. The desire or the 
United Kingdom appears alway.s to have been to preserve rela-
tionships established with those colonies or value to the 
imperial structure. Colonies which did not return enough 
profits to the United Kinedom in the form of food or raw 
material credits were somewhat quickly dispensed with as was 
the case with the Ionian Islands. Imperiol holdings would 
be pointless i:f the United Kingdom has to return all the bene--
:f1 ts derived in the form of adm1n1strat1 ve or strategic costs .• 
Since the bes·t solution to the problem of these costs would 
be compromises which reliev·ed the United 1:1r~dom of them 
while still insuring the persistence and protection of exist-
ing and expanding economic arrangements with the member units 
of the empire, the United Kingdon avidly sought such en event-
uality. Food and raw ~aterial supplies had to be protected. 
The Horth .Anerica Act is the first successful example of such 
a compromise, and the road toward it had been pointed out 
by the experiments represented 1n the Irish Appeals and 
Unio·n Bills. The "Act" quieted revolutionary clamor in 
Canada, pointed out the way to successful com.prorai se in th-e 
f'uture, an.d incidentally and rather guardedly pointed out 
just how important a factor trade was to become in the United 
I 
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Kingd~'s grip upon the em~ire. As the follo~inr tr~de 
tables- show, trade was to becone the key to imperial rise or 
decline_. 
Analysis of Br1 ti.sh trade (.1887-1927) based on dAta 
---- ---- --
from the statistica.l_ abstracts of the Un1 ted Kint~dorn ( 108?-
1927). The trade to.tals of the United Kinc:dom (Cr. Tables 
I-IV, PP. 162-165), digr-essine for the mocent from the sub-
ject of imperial legislation, prove very reveRlin~ on a num-
ber of points. These table.s cover ye-ars in v.-hich -the Un1 ted 
Kingdom maintained the "gold s.tandard." This !!leans the t the 
United Kingdom had to balance annual trade deficits thrcugh 
money shipments, gold_ or silver bullion or s-pecie. Because 
of this fact, even though for many years the United Kingdom 
shows a very large surplus of inports over exports (result 
of returns on her extens1 ve "foreign investment-s), actual 
trade- losses in a ~;iven year are revealed by a surplus or 
money exports over money imports, thoueh in some cases sur-
plus money exports probably indicate unusual activity in the 
export of investment capital ra-ther than trcde losses. The 
latter is probably particularlY true of the years 1895-1897, 
1903-1904, and 1908, years when the Ur.i ted Iar..gdom was pour-
ing tremendous amounts or capital into the developwent of 
Australia, canada, the prospective dominion of South Africa, 
and Southeast Asia. On the other hand, in the years 1915-
/ 
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1925, the totals available reveal whet are probably not only 
tremendous trade losses but t ·he 11 quida tion of the United 
Kingdom's investments abroad, particularly in the United ~tates. 
These losses- and liquidatior~ had occurred, for the most part, 
during the key years of war payments, 1917-1919, years- for 
which even the usually unsecreti ve British arc hi ve_s h~ve no 
available records.. The _rapid ri:se in the totel of 1mnort-s 
in these years not .coupled with a corre spending increase in 
the total of exports, however, givea some indication of just 
how tremendous these losses and liquida-tions must have been. 
The years 1913-1918 show a rapidly increasing export deficit, 
the total f.or- 1913 being 133,914,413 pound::;: -and that for 1918 
31 being 783,?86J825 pounds, sterling at that. Yearly imports, 
as the tables reve-al, increased during these years to -an annual 
average or .200 per cent ove_r those of 1913 while experts, at 
best, just managed to hold their former levels and, at worst, 
show drops in totals during the years 1914-1915. For the 
years prior to 1913, however, export deficits combined with 
bullio.n import suroluses serve to provide a rough index to 
the total earnings of t ·he United Kingdorn 1 s inves.trn.ents abroad 
1
1 
31 These export deficits are the "invers-es" of the 
i~port surnluses shown in Table I. For exa~ple, the import 
surnlus fo~ 1913 is 133,914,413 pounds; its inverse, the 
export deficit , would be 133,914,413 pounds. 
\ 
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as well as a rough index to the investment total itself. The 
"inverses" of these export deficits~ the import surpluses 
shown in the tables, do not rep.rese·nt, as J,ia ck1nder32 end 
others would have 1 t, "1P.J.perial tribute" nor do the~,. represent 
or contain any estimate of the smount of money to be returned 
imperial holdings in the form of "imperial costs.'' Costs ere 
hidden in the annua.l budget of the United Kingdom .and derived 
fron texes, the base of w·hich is only part19.lly made up by 
t .rad-e totals. Short of a detailed year by year analysis or-
the annual budget, any e-stimate of "costs" would re9resent 
the sheerest guesswork. .Any estimate of "imperial tribute'' 
is utter nonsense because the United Kingdom has earned from 
its investments any ma·terial benefit 1 t has derived from an 
ir:.peria.l holding; it has never looted a colony. Import sur-
pluses, then, for the purposes of this study, represent, 
for the years prior to ~orld War I~ return on investments. 
As the tables indicate, these import surpluses, for the cost 
part, show a steady pattern of rise, t ·hough there are a rew 
backv;.ard movements, until the year 1913. Bullion 1nports 
also show a continuous surplus (exceptions have been noted), 
now rising now falling, but a continuous pattern of ·surplus 
32 Cf. Sir Halford J • .Mackinder, Britain~ the British 
Seas (New York: D • .Ap :)~eton &. Co., 1902}, Chap. XX, PP· 342 -
352. llackinder a·dmi ts that he is making a comr.1on estimate, 
but he has a tendency to regard these estimates as absolute. 
The United Ki~gdom has never collected tribute; it has earned 
its way. 
( 
___..---
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nonetheless until the year 1913. From these surpluse.s soce 
ides· of the amount of British ·capital invested abroad can be 
gathered by adding together the bullion and trede ii!l!Jort 
surpluses :for any given yea.r , o le.ar ing out trans sh 1 pme n t s 
fir.st, and then multiplying this to tal by a factor of lb, 
thus allowing for a slightly better than six per cent return 
en investment. Obviously, this will produce only an estimate, 
but it will serve to give some idea of the grauual rise of 
the Uni.ted Kingdom's investn:ent totals abroad, end its use 
on the key years 1913-1925 will also serve to give some index 
to the amount of British cepi tal 11 q:uida·ted from foreign 
investment by the exigencies o.f ~Vorld ~"lar I end the depressed 
economic conditions which followed. Sampling this estimate, 
one would find that by the yeer 191.3, in round ficures, the 
United Kingdom .must have had some~here between two end two-
and one-quarter billion pounds of capital invested abroad. 
Also, sampli·ng frco the bullion exp.ort deficits available 
ror the years 1915-1925, one can readily see that the United 
Kingdom liquidated an observable 150,000,000 pounds of cspital 
in order to balance its t.rade books by 1926, but this takes 
no account of what must have been tremendously greeter 
liquidations of foreign 1nvestme·nt capital during the :,.~ears 
1917-1919 for which no bullion figures are ave.ileb"le end dur-
ing which the United Kingdom maintained e large surrlus of 
I 
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imports over exports. Certainly the surplus of i~norts had 
to be paid for in some manner, the United Kingdom'~ trade 
books having- lef't but a sm.all bullion import surplus- oefore 
that time to compensate for a tremendous rise in -imports. 
The uniform bullion losses between 1915-1925 also attest to 
a radical change in the United KiDf;dom' s po.si tion in inter-
national financial circles, particularly ,.,hen th.e~.r are rela-ted 
to the tremendous acceleration of exports frcm the United 
Kingdom followi_r..g ~1orld ·.7ar I. This rapid ri-se in export 
totals suggests that the United Kingdom was makinG up its 
investment losses by ir:cre"lsing the export trade volume, 
particularly when this rise is related to the re-export trnde 
totals • not in the tables given_, which had risen from a ·total 
of less than two per cent of the United Kingdom's annual 
trade volume in 1887 to about four per cent in the years 
i~ediately preceding \7or-ld r:ar I and had leaped subsequent 
to that time to a total of about t~enty. ?er cent of the 
annual trade volume. 33 All these facts attest to the pro-
gress of the United Kingdom's econor:1ic fortunes, t; ood. and bed· 
: 33 Cf statistical .Abstract of the United Kingdom, 
: no-s. c1 tedo;low in Hote 34,. for taOI'esof re -expo.rts for the 
au~ropriate years. The re-export totals are contain ed in the 
·tables on the pages cited but were cleared out for the 
purposes of this study. 
I 
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Statistical Comryilations of Significant ~nnual Tr~de 
Volumes of th.e United King dom (1887-192?) .34 
34 
all figures in the following tables are derived 
fran tables in the following sources: 
A. Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom {lR87-
190l), 49th ~o~ (London: H. E. s tationery 0f f ice, 
1902), pp. 28 0 ff. 
B. Statistical ~bstract of the United Kine dom (189 3 -
1907), 55 th i·jo. (London: '.'lyma n end ~ons, Ltd.., 
109 Fetter Lane, E. C., 1908), pp . 69, ?7, 80-81, 
and 221 f •• 
C. Stat·istical Abstract of the United Ling dom ( 1908-
1922), 68 th l~o. (London:~. 1.!. Stationery Office, 
19 24) , PP. 356 rr .. 
D. Statistical ~~bstract of the United Kingdom ( 1913-
1~ 27}, ?'2nd ito. (London: :n . 1.1. t>tationery Office, 
1929), pp. 377 ff. ~ 
It is to be noted that the totals g iven do not include the 
transshipment of goods under bond which, with the exception of 
the starred totals for the years 1902-1903, were clesred out 
to provide the figures used in this· study. For the yea.rs 
1902-1903 there are no tra ns·shiument fi g ures available. 
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T • .;.BLS I 
D!PORT -3XPORT TOTALS OF. ':'HE tnJIT3:D KIKGDO~.~ { 1887-1927) * 
Yea-r !ret Total !iet 'I'ots1 Surplus of Imports 
1!!38? 
of' Im~orts of i!:xoorts Over Ex.norts 
302 ,87 , o89 221,9l!j,910 80,965:679 
1988 323, 5-g3 ,114 234,534,912 89,058,202 
1889 360,980,111 248-,935,195 112,044,91-6 
1890 355,970,464 263,530,585 92,439,8?9 
1991 373,562,696 247,235,150 126)327,545 
1892 359,370,115 23?,216,389 122,_153,?26 
1893 3"45,809,626 218,259,?18 126,549,908 
1894 350 ,_564 J 580 216 '005 J 637 154,559,943 
1895 356,985,497 226,128,246 130,85?",251 
1896 395,575,241 240,145,551 155,429,690 
189? 391 '07"4, 550 234,219,?08 156,854,842 
1898 409 ,889 '9 54 233,359,240 1?6,530,714 
1899 31~,993,136 254,492,211 165,500,925 
1900 459 ,893,405 291,191,996 168,701,409 
1901 454,148 ,::S06 280,022,376 174,125,930 
l.i3 .02 462,576,461 283,423,965 1? 9 '152 1 49 5 
1903 483,026 '?25 290,800,108 19 2 _, 2 26 ' 61 7 
1904 480,?34,34? 300,?11,040 180,023,307 
' 
1905 487,240,004 329,816,614 157 ,423,390 
j 1905 522,785,020 075,5?5,338 19?,210,-682 I 1907 549,855,858 426,035,083 123,830,7'75 .1908 513,329,'790 37? ,-103, 284 136,226 t 505 1909 533,360,138 378,-180,347 165,1'79,?91 
I uno 574,495,979 430,384,772 144,111,207 
I 1911 
577 ,398,39 3 454,119,298 123,279,095 
I 1912 
632,902,940 48'7,223,439 145 ,_689, 501 
1913 659,168,008 52 5 I 2 53 1 59 5 133,914,413" 
1914 601 '160, 947 430,721,357 1 ?0 ,439, 590 
1915 752,831,169 384,868,448 357,9-62,721 
1916 850,940,314 506,279 ,?0? 344,66.0,607 
191? 994,487,217 527,0'79,746 46? ,407 _,47.1 
1918 1, 285,205 ,B22 501,418,99-7 783,786,825 
191.9 1,461,409 ,897 ?98,638,362 662,7?1,535 
1920 1, 708,895,550 1,334,469,269 3?5,426,281 
1921 9 7 8 1 580 17 55 ?03,399,542 2?5,181,213 
1922 899 '404 , 229 719 '507 ,410 1 ?9 ,89 6,819 
I 1923 977 ,682,409 '767,257,771 209 _,424 '638 
I 1924 1,137,469,001 800 , .9-66 _,839 336,502,.164 
! 1925 1,166 ,6'78,391 773,380,702 393,297 ,_689 
192"6 1,115,866,309 653,046,909 462,819,400 
1927 1,09 5,388,311 '709,081,263 286,30?,048 
'* All Totals are in English pounds. 
. - __/ 
I 
I 
153 
.;CLO!~liL nrPORT-3XPCRT TOT..t1.LS OF ~HE 'UNITED KILGDC:.i ( 1AS7 - 19 27 ) * 
Year 
1887 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1.908 
1909 
1~10 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
'1922 
1923 
19.24 
1925 
1926 
1927 
Net Imports 
From Colonies 
76,898,857 
?9 ,429,357 
90,708,960 
89,009,128 
92,_082,687 
91,303,280 
85,336,305 
88,114.753 
89,655,353 
86,694,965 
87,738,468 
92,939,042 
100,177,167 
101,886,179 
97,243, 7'43 -
106,916 ,457 *"' 
113,570,792** 
88 ,0?4 '704-
92,832,903 
102.~133 ,072 
114,527,560 
89,540,169 
100,020,252 
120,670,201 
121,945,774 
129,799,630 
135,355,788 
137,983,834 
215,052,795 
248,914,683 
316,794,566 
410,882"045 
494 ,_376, 562 
436,563,563 
276,525,148 
260,021,561 
263,_219 ,077 
316,145,178 
341,809,349 
304,364,967 
296,271,569 
r:et Exports 
to Colonie-s 
75,370,256 
83,241,512 
83,278,990 
8713701383 
85,956,088 
'74,748,130 
7 2 ' 150 ' 1.6 3 
72,788t545 
70,197,294 
84,136,9.3'7 
80,675,063 
83,426,761 
87,597,472 
94,.379,596 
104,'788,401 
117 ,578,862** 
119 ,484,189 * .. 
88,839,804 
97,677,09? 
90,614,883 
103,'844,687 
126,765,027 
127 1.238, 084 
147,302,942 
158,844,144 
1771092,638 
1951311,399 
171,629,498 
148,419,684 
186,175,871 
1721657,8-16 
178,362,122 
205 _, 622 '460 
501,470 ,_423 
298,616,6.33 
285 1 568 t 7 24 
'300 '602 ,626 
337,454,361 
33511.141162 
316,851,4-27 
326 '650 '2.10 
* All Totals are in English pounds. 
Surplus of I~oorts 
Over ::xrort.s 
1 1 528,GOl 
-3,5121155 
7,429,970 
1,6:.-58,745 
61126,599 
16 1 55·5 t 150 
13,186,142 
15,226,208 
29 ,_45!3 ,059 
2,559 ,028 
7,063,405 
9 J 512 I 2.81 
1'2 , 579 , 69 5 
7,5061581 
-7,544,658 
-10,662,405 
-5,813,397 
- -765 '100 
-4,844,194 
-lll5l8 ,.199 
10,682,973 
-37,224,856 
-27.217,832 
-26,632,741 
-36,898,370 
-4 7 t 29 3 , 008 
-59 , g 55 , 611 
-3:.-5,645,664 
661633,111 
62,738.,812 
144) 136 1750 
232,519,923 
'288, 7'54 ,102 
-54,926 ,860 
-22,091,485 
-25,54?,163 
-37 t 383 1 549 
-21 ,319,193 
-6,685,187 
-12,486,460 
-30,3781651 
•• Thes-e are total figures. For -sor.!le uneccountsble reason, 
no transsh1pnent figures are available for these- yeers. 
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TABLE III 
!.~CNEY I1PORT -EXPORT TOTALS OF T_P"....C Ln~ITi:D KI!TGDO!J ( 1887 -19 2 7 ) * 
Year 
1387 
1388 
1889 
1390 
lS9l 
1892 
1B93 
1894 
1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
190:5 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
Hll6 
191? 
1918 
1919 
1920 
H~21 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
l:l26 
1927 
Total Imports Total Exports Import Surplus 
Bullion and Specie Bullion and Specie or Deficit 
17,774~764 17,131,018 643,746 
22,001,528 22,559,571 -558,043 
27,099,439 25,121,630 1,977,809 
33,953,708 25,170,072 8,763,636 
39,591,218 37,.228,971 2,362,247 
32,3-29,614 28,910 '690 3 ,4_18, 924 
36,748,122 33,092,018 3,656,104 
38,577,764 27,812,600 10,765,164 
45,675,661 31,726,759 14,948,902 
38,797,696 45,172,059 -6,374,363 
48,840,949 49,589",5:59 -1,.?38,610 
58,400,759 52~213,701 6,18?,0~8 
45,261,486 35,491,184 9,770,302 
39,513,173 31,97.2,039 7,341,134 
32,217,306 26,015.102 6,202,204 
31,393~345 26,125~206 5,268,139 
38,96.7 '728 39 ,233,238 -265,510 
45,563,927 46,302,832 -738,905 
51,559~909 45,391,519 6,168,390 
63,330,653 61,482,552 1,848,101 
73,072,439 ~7,736,858 5,285,581 
56,479,203 63,252 '987 - -6 177.3, 784 
6.6, 506 '71.8 60,034 '718 6 ,4-?2 ,000 
?1,422,077 64,724,213 6,69?,864 
62,987,500 57,024,077 5,953,423 
69 ,4-67"' 185 64,871 ,488 4, 59 5 '697 
74,028,598 62,142,038 11,886,560 
70,595,001 41,488,125 29,106,876 
21,388~527 46l578,689 -24,190,162 
31,467,952 49,190~254 -17,722,302 
Figures for 1917 - 191.9 Unova1lehle 
Uo Record Kept of ~hem 
60,601,317 
59,940,490 
44,642,057 
53,597,710 
49,?23,410 
52,073 ,450 
49,745,611 
39,577,563 
104,058,403 
71,393,580 
58,073,561 
69,122,069 
61,842,268 
61,836,021 
!38,086,024 
"36 ,205' 587 
-43,457,088 
-11,453,090 
-13,431,504 
-15' 524,359 
-12,118,858 
-8,762,571 
11,659-,589 
3,371,976 
* Totals represent bullion (both gol_d and silver) and 
specie. All totals are in English pounds • 
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TABLE IV 
UO~·;EY-ll!PORT EXPORT TOTALS OF THE UNITED KINGDO~.f ( 1987-1927) • 
t :Cl\'"EY EXCHAI..;G:...; BET','iE::~l: COLOf:I ;::s Al'!D THE Uli.JTED :i':It~GDC!.: 
Year 
188? 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1891 
1892 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1896 
189? 
1898 
1899 
1.900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
190-8 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
'1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
Hl20 
1921 
1922 
.1923 
1924 
1925 
1925 
1927 
Total Imports 
Bullion and Specie 
2, 67 3:., 522 
6,677,567 
7,168,096 
5, 718,518 
9,382,416 
12 '664 ''7'31 
12,143,792 
17,498,473 
17,900,735 
15,458,562 
27 .,001 1125 
27,162,509 
22,831,863 
11,615,267 
15,679,651 
17,733,275 
26,596,608 
30,9?7,053 
34,031,516 
38,543,254 
40,913,916 
41,057,632 
41,157,097 
43,095,691 
44,280,402 
50,302,264 
49,382,997 
31 J 512,407 
7,622,85? 
Total Exports 
Bullion and Specie 
7,259 ,2·23 
7,930,089 
13,167,153 
'12 ,499 ,884 
7,734,355 
:10,193,241 
13,?88,387 
9,139, 591 
131249 1 859 
9,15'7,864 
9,961,94'7 
9,259,321 
13,426,449 
13,92'7,527 
11,889,833 
11,6?8,762 
11,560,226 
14,885,838 
12,811,1.16 
21,945,638 
20,551,004 
13,800,698 
12,995,?60 
21,2?0,900 
20,432,471 
26,724,259 
22,643,853 
14,065,0?'7 
8,699,819 
Inport Sur~lus 
or Def1c1 t 
-4,585 '701 
-1,252,522 
-5,990,05'7 
-6,781,366 
1,548,061 
2,47.1,490 
-1 ., 641 '59 5 
8,359,882 
4,650,8?6 
6,300,698 
17,039,178 
1? ,8·6.7 '188 
9,405,414 
-2,312,260 
~ 789 818 
' .t 6,054,514 
15 1 0 3() 1 38 2 
26,091,215 
21,220,200 
16,597,618 
20,362,912 
2~, ,256,944 
28,161,337 
21,824,?91 
23,847 '931 
23,578,005 
26,739,144 
17,447,330 
-1,076,962 
Figures for 1916 - 1919 Unsve ileble 
No Record Kept of Then 
41,452,988 
48 I 762,229 
35,846,459 
42,884,026 
33,448 ., 192 
26,139,199 
35,224,176 
28,240,452 
37,683,802 
9 ,9 ·22 '511 
22,851.,108 
28 J 402 '9 55 
17,661,063 
22,244,384 
13 , '555 , 504 
8,513,176 
3 '769, 185' 
38,839,718 
13,.995,351 
14 ,_481 '071 
15,787,129 
3,894,815 
21,668,672 
19,727,276 
• · Totals represent bullion (both gold and s-11 ver) and 
specie. All totals are in English pounds. 
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Relati.onsh1o of Colonial trade volumes to 1mnerial - __ ..._ __
legislation. Abstractine from these tables a·lso _, one finds 
that net imports from colonies, totals most germane to the 
issue of imperial legislation, represent a steady percentage 
o_f the- total net imports into the United Kingdom in the years 
between 1887-1913, varying between twenty-four ADd thirty per 
cent of the annual net volume of imports. Of even more inter-
e.st is the fact that these imports are almost entirely made 
up o-r food and raw material shipments. 35 Of further inte_rest 
is the ract that in this same period, 1887-1913, colonial 
goods climb from about five per cent of the Cnited Kingdom's 
36 
re-export business to almost fifty per c-ent. Total colonial 
imports during the war years are something of an anomaly. but 
the percentage of the United Kingdom's import totals they 
represent remains about the same. Up to 1908, the same may 
be said of exports to colonies as is said of imports; they 
represent a steady pe-rcentage. But beyond 1908, a high1y 
significant fact in 1m,erial relations, colonies begin to 
35 Cf. 11The Statistical Abstracts of the United King-
dom," nos. cited in Hote 34, p. 161, for the detailed analys-is 
or these shioments. They are pages and pages of "breakdowns'' 
of colonial shipments of food and raw materials from the 
various colonies. These tables are remarkable for the pau~ 
city of finished goods contained in imports from colonies, 
just as the export "breakdowns" are remarkable for the amount 
of finished gpods they contain. 
36 cr. Ibid. for- re-exports which have been cleared out. 
-· I 
re_present a greater and greater percenta~-::e or t.he t"ni ted 
Kinedom's export market. i-'lhere in 1908 colonies had 
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absorbed about twenty-rive per cent or the United Kingdom's 
erports, by 19Z8 they were absorbing fifty per cent of them. 
This tact suggests three things in terms of irr•TJerial relations 
and legislation: 1} that economic competitors were making 
successful inroads into the British export ma-rket; 2} that 
the United Kingdom's financial relationships with co"lonies 
was undergoing a reversal, tha·t · colonies ·were beginning m 
assume a self-determining international economic position; 
and 3) that such Inter-imperial Conferences as thoDe of 
1926 and 1928 could end in no other way than they did, the 
enactment of the Statute of ~estminster (1931), which merely 
served to plac.e the official sanction or· the United Kingdom• s 
Parliament on a condition already a fait acco~oli. All these 
devel~ping facts the United Kingdom was only teo ~ell eware 
o-r·, a.s the "abstracts·u attest, as the last half of the nine-
teenth century progressed. Administrators knew that it was 
only a matter of time until the events which took place in 
the first half of the twentieth century should come to pass·· 
They were only too well awsre of the United Kingdon's vul-
nerable strategic position end precarious economic tenure. 
co~unonwealth of Australia Act (1900) and the govern-
- -
ment of New Zealand. The general drift of these economic 
---
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trends and the str.ategtc difficulties they present have had 
a profound influence on the United Kingdom's 1~'er1al con-
duct subsequent to the North A.lleric-a Act, especially when 
co~pounded by demographic factors {particularly population 
differentials and the food problem), the rise of nationalism 
e.mong colonials, end already established legal end Parlia--
mentary traditions. ~-!ore and more the food and rew material 
supply problem has loomed large. The United Kingdom has had 
to develop f .ood and raw material sources in areas whose 
stability could be depended upon. L.~any colonial adrninis-
trators appear to have seen just such a possibility in the 
rapidly accelerating Australiam development. True, Australian 
a.d.minist·ration was pretty well bogged down in feuds and 
rivalries among its five colonies, but this did not appear 
to be an insuperable problem. Largely be-cause of the Canadian 
precedent the way was already open for federation, and the 
Colonial Office took great pain to encourage 1 t. seve.ral 
conferences pointing toward t~e developoent of A constitution 
uniting Australian colonials, using the Car.ad1an precedent, 
bed been called at the behest of the Colonial Office. ~he 
first was a oommi ttee appointed. in 1852 to prepare a con-
stitution for New south ~ales. It was little more than a 
deliberative body, and it met annuallY untfl 1899. It was 
able to do very little except publicize the desirability of 
j 
I 
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and need for federation or the Austral_ian colonies, and it 
died in 1899 with the dawn of the effective federation ~ove­
I!:!.ent. The reel beginning of effective movement toward the 
federation of the Australian colonies stemned from Major-
General Edwards' report on the def-enses of Austral_ia, a work 
which was brought to public attention in 1889. The unnerv-
ing nature of this report led Sir Henry Parkes to call an 
irrJnediate conference to ex~lore its ramifications. All seven 
colonies in the Australian area were invited to the conference, 
and its purpose, as events quick ly showed, was to persuade 
the Australian colonials of the wisdom of speedily 1mplenent-
ing union under the Crown. This conference led almost ir.~ed-
iately to a constitutional convention to which the various 
Australian administrations ap~ointed delegates for the pur-
poses of drafting a federnl const.i tution. The six resolu-
tions adopted by this body, whose v.ork ultiEately failed, 
fortned the basis of the le_ter suc-cessful constitution con-
vention which took place in 1899. These six resolutions 
were: 1) that the pow-ers and rights of existing colontes 
~ere to be retained by them under federation so long as they 
were concerned with matters not or conmon concern to ell 
colonies; 2) that without the exuress consent of the ado1nis-
tret1on of a stat.e. in question no liberties \vere to be taken 
by the proposed federated government with the structure and 
'· 
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geography of that state; 3) that t~ere were to be no restric-
tions upon trade among the proposed federated colonies; 4) 
that excise and tax powers were to be within the province of 
the ·proposed federal government and 1 t -s parliament; 5) that 
naval and other military defenses were to be broucht under a 
single unified command; end 6) that the constitution 1tsel~ 
should provide that each state should be able to propose such 
amendments as it thoueht feasible in order to insure ado?tion 
of' the constitution. Unfortunately, by the time t -hat thi-s 
convention had rinished its work, public fears brour,ht on by 
the -"Edwards" report had somewhat abated and its work fell 
absolutely dead. Again, in 1894, another attempt was ~~de 
to produce an effective federation movement. This a~tempt 
was ~ade by en unofficial convention which net at Corowa 
in that year and strongly advocated union, but a :_ ;a1n the 
matter died. Then, in 1895, G~ H. Reid (later Sir G. H. Reid) 
of' l~ew South -:Jales brought forth the proposal which gave 
effective life to the federa-tion movement. He convened a 
neeting of the premiers of all the colonies, co~r l;ew Zealand 
excepted, et which it was proposed that all colonies should 
draft a legislative bill seeking the eppointoent of ten. rr.en 
r ·ron. each colony to a proposed constitutional convention. 
There is 1.1 ttle need here to eo into the trials and tribula-
tions of thia constitutional convention and the public refe-
I 
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rendums which followed. It should suffice to note tha-t one 
or another colony staved off the adoption of this constitu-
tion for some t1~e. Finally, the Enabling Bill which the 
Colonial Office had so avidly sought, was passed by en agree-
ment of New South ~ales, Victoria, South Australia~ ~ueens­
land, and Tasmania, but it still needed the ap~roval of the 
home parliament. Some areas, particularly- ·,;estern .nu.stralia 
and New Zealand, had chosen to hedge for one reason or another, 
so they were temporarily left out of the bill. ~·;estern 
.Australia soon made up ·1 ts mind and was included in the :r.:nsb-
ling Bill, but New Zeeland kept procrastinatinb even ·after 
the bill had reached the Parliament of ·the United Kingdom. 
Consequently, it was only after some hue and cry that she 
was amended into the Constitution Bill then undergoing its 
second reading in the home Parliament. Also, as A conseouence, 
I~ew Zealand was until the Statute or- i".'estmin.ster ouch more 
a colony under the legislative dyarchy than was Au.strelia 
because the British governor-general under the proclenation 
extending dominion privileges to r;ew Zealand could refuse 
to prorogue an unpopular ParliatJ.ent. 37 a ri ght the A.ustrel-
ian governor-general could not exercise. The proclatJ.ation 
37 Cf. Statutes of the United King_dom, 15-1.6 "Victoriae, 
1852, c. ?z-tor the background of this proclamation. It con-
tains the prec-ede-nt for the governor-general's prerogative • 
creating t ·he uominion of New Zealand was issued by -the Crown 
on ~eptember 9, 1907,38 in accordance with provisions laid 
down in the Cor.wonwe al.th of .Australia Act { q. v. ) • 39 
Parliame-ntary consideration of the Bill Creetinf the 
Coz:nmor..wealth of Austrel.ia. As e parliame ntary issue, the 
consti·tution of the Cornmonweal.th of Australia first rece1 ved 
the attention of Cor:u::1.0ns during the re·ferendums of 1898 and 
1899. The matter was brought to public at·tention by a spokes-
man for the Colonial Office. In Coomons this led a ~ :r. Charles 
Dilke to question the "Benc.h'' as to whether in the case or 
the forthcoming Australian Con.-nonweal th Bill " ••. Her ~~:a jesty t s 
government propose [s] to suggest to Parliament t ·o mal::e any 
chang es in ·the const1 tution as accepted by the five colonies :t4° 
Mr • .Toseph Chambe-rlain, Secretary of otate for the Colonies, 
replied for the minist.ry that exactly the same precedent would 
be :followed as had been es·tabltshed in previous colonial 
legislation and that " .•. delegates from the Australian colonies 
are coming to this country to give and receive explanations 
as to certain point-s ••• [and] that ... the introduction of the 
c. 12 ·' 
38 Cf'. Public. 
fora copy of 
39 Cf' ... Ibid., 
--
General Statutes, A.OQJIII, 63-64 Victorice, 
this proclenation. 
24 f., par. 2 and 3, for these provisions. 
40 Parliamentary Debates (.Authorized Ed ... , H. C. Debs.), 
Fourth Series, 63 Victoriae, 1900, L~/III, 1051. 
,-- - -.-- . 
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bill will be deferred until they have arrived."41 Cha!lberlein 
and Parliame.nt were already well ar.rare of the co nc"iliatory 
nature of the bill, but prece:dent ha-d to be paid 1 ts due 
respect in such delicate ~otters. The fate of a strategic 
problem, partial amelioration of the food problen, the fate 
or the wool industry, and the fete of certAin other strategic 
raw materials hunG in the balance. Consequently, once the 
delegates arrived, the bill received what was beco~ing the 
usual QUick trip throUGh Lords. Sent on to Commons it 
rece1 ved quick introductio.n by ChambBrlain, guiding lieht 
of the Colonial Office, who presented the bill on behalf of 
the ministry. Again, ~s was beconing the· precedent in Co~~ons, 
i Cornaons ad.journe·d instanter and re-convened as a Co~"li ttee 
I 
1 of the Phole to consider the bill, subjecting it to a clause 
42 by clause voice-vote on e-ach provision. It c_uickly passed 
with minor amendments, and the amended version was so ordered, 
ordered printed, and sent back to a coiiliDi ttee set up to 
expedite the problem. There had been little amending to do 
since the Colonial Administretion and the colonial governnents 
41 Ibid., 1051. 
42 Parliamentary Debates (Authorized Sd., H. C. Debs •) ,. 
Fourth Series , 63 Vi c·tori a e , 19 00 , LXXXI II , 46 -10 3. t.mendmen t s 
here were largely a matter of wording, muc·h of the debate 
being given over to impassioned but ineffective ~ratory by 
those who would sto_p the destruction of the "enp1.re ·" 
I 
I 
l 
I 
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cor.cerned has already ironed out nost or the real parlia-
mentary problems. 43 ~uch of the deb~te was the usual ineffec-
tive oratory about the preservation or the prerogatives for 
which "our ancestors so mightily strived." On !.~arch 21, a 
few days later J the bill was sub j-ecte·d to its second re oa1ng 
by voice-vote, clause by clause. It wes during this reAding 
that ~ew Zealand, now not so coy, was emended into the proc-
lamation provisions of the bill because she had raised a hue 
and cry subsequent to the passage of the first reading of the 
Bill. New Zealand's representatives were souewhat chagrined 
at being included only in the proclamation provisions of the 
bill, but they had to bow to precedent and ~ake what they 
could get; Parliament wanted no part of oeihg the agency of 
possible disturbances in New Zealand stemming from the 
-exercise of "1uperial author! ty" without a·n Eno.bling Act. 44 
This second reading of the bill was actually its final ver-
sion, and 1 t was ordered printed and cor.ani tted for t.he order 
of the day for Uonday, June 18, 1900. 45 Oth-er m.a tters twice 
delayed the third reading, but when it was brought up on 
43 cr. the general tenor of the debate in Ibid., 
LXXXII, pp :-46-103, which st:.ggests· that attempts at any 
amending would be largely a waste of tit ~e since the bill 
appeared satisfactory to both Australian and United Kingdom 
1nt·erests. 
44 c·r. Ibid., uca::III, pp. 758-806. 
- ·--
45 ill_£., pp. 805-806. 
I 
I 
' i 
I 
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June 25 it passed a voice vote without a protest.46 Roy-al 
essent was thus a matter of course, end the Crown , 
out its share of the responsibility, soon issued 8 prcc-
lamat1on (Septenber 17~ 1900), declaring that on en~ after 
the first day of Jenuary, 1901, the people of ~~ew south ~Teles, 
Victoria, .South Australia, ~ueansland, Tasmania, and :iestern 
Australia should be united in a federal coononwealth hence-
rorth to be knovm as the "Connom-real th of .Australia." 
Significance of the .Australian Coranonweal th B.ill. The 
--- -
significance of this bill lay in the fact that it a Ga in 
illustrated to the civilized world ho'"' the union of strategic 
necessity and the economic verities of the colonial picture 
were stimulating the activity of Parliament on the subject 
of· imperial legis1a·tion. The bill also illustrated the fact 
that as long as arraneements could be ~ade which preserved 
the interests of the United Kingdom, Perliarnen t was \•rilling 
to let imperial prerogatives take whatever course they would. 
Legislators appeared to view the price of any other possible 
arrangements as altogether too costly end fraught with d~nger 
to the survival of the United Kingdom. Coi~~ons e~erged during 
the de·bates on this bill es t"he conpletely do!llinant force in 
the United K1ngdo~'s inperial maneuvering. Lords was to take 
46 Cf. Ibid., LXXXIV, p. 638, P· 923. 
I 
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a back seat, however unwilline::;ly, in tha course of Fri tish 
history. Lords was to be paid the respect due to precedent, 
the right to first pass judgnent upon imperial legislation, 
but it ·would have little effect upon it. There also emerg.ed 
in t ·be co·nsideration of the bill recognition of the fact 1 .in 
the light Of the "~dwards" re_port, that strategic poLicies, 
diplomati·c policies_, and colonial policies of the United 
Kingdom were e unity. The suocesss of any one of then was 
predicated upon the delicately balanced articulation of all 
three end their relations-hips to the Dri tish econo::nic ~)Otential. 
The Union of South Africa Act (1909). Just ho~ aware 
Parliament was of this oneness of foreign policies and its 
position 1n imperial. affetrs is reflected in the aura surround-
ing the enactment of the next important _piece of imoeriel 
legislation, the Union of South Africa Act (1909) , 47 a neces-
sity brought on by actions of Cecil Rhodes, prime ninister 
and benevolent desoot of the Cgoe Colony who, acting es a 
~ ~ 
private citizent involved himself in an insurrectionist move-
me.nt in the Transvea 1. 'l'he ul tinate result of nhcdes' inter-
fe·rence was t.he Boer \i-ar, end once 1 t wes settled Parliament 
was only too eager to give the Boers end othe·rs internal 
self-government, but 1 t wen ted no part of forc·ing such arrang-e-
47 cr. Public General Statutes, XLVIIt 4~ f.: 9 Edward 
vr·r, c. 9 ,for 8 copy of this act. 
- ---- ·. 
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cents and thereby providing fuel for possible future insur-
rectionist movements. Parliament had a number of interests 
to preserve, among them the developing mineral wealth of 
South Africa end the strategic value of the "Cape," and it 
could not see ho\v th-ey could be insured if union were forced. 
Consequently, the at ti t ·ude of the Boers b-eing so::1ewhat 
recaloi trent, the somewhat ttmiddle -of-the-road" co.nserveti ve 
government of Lord Asquith was hard put to bring the South 
Africans to any kind of terms at ell. Colonial adminis-
trators worked long end hard to persuade the Transvaal and 
the Orange Free State to accept British rule and even harder 
building up sentime:nt for a contemplated federated uni.on of 
the South African states, a task in which they were aided 
no end by the encroachment of German interests upon the 
reaches of South .Africa. Finally, after what wa.s now the 
usual constitutional convention, an Enabling Act proposing 
a Union of South ~rica was forwarded to the United Kinedom 
and introduced into Parliament. Lords 1 ffi was now usual, 
geve 1 t a quick n·nodding" treatment. Corm1ons, except on 
the matter of "apartheid," gave the bill, if ·possible, an 
evEn more cursory trea tmen t -M c·on.ur.ons k~ew 1 t ·was barge in1ng· 
and therefore, took what it could get. 3ven on the matter 
of segregation, about which 1 t might have wisr ..ed to do s-oi!l.e-
thing, Parliament did iittle except observe the amenities 
178 
or .idle protest. ".Apartheid • "' or segregation • was taken up 
by a somewhat nonplussed special committee formed in response 
to considerable pressure froo special interests in the United 
Kingdom, but this corn.mi ttee did little. After a !1U1ck r ·eview 
or the 1~plicat1ons of "apartheid" and a rather frustrated 
"shrug of its shoulders," the committee di·vided: Noes 155, 
Ayes 55: on the subject of removing the segregation clauses 
f'rom the. "Union Bill. "48 Its attitude seems to have been 
that regardless of the desirability of removing the segrega-
tion c1auses nothing could be done about them unless one 
wanted the painful .,Boer fiasco" repeated. 49 Otherwise, 
the bill quickly passed three readings with little protest, 
another important piece of imperial legislation again being 
subjeoted to a clause by clause voice-vote. 50 According to 
this bill, union was again established symbolically under the 
Crown as the e.xec·utor of Parliament's wishes .. The Un1 ted 
Kingdom again retained control of external affairs while the 
African states obtained a large measure of 1ntarnal autonomy, 
though in this case colonial administrators were to retain 
48 Cf. Official. ·Reports, Parliamentary Deb-a·tes (R • C • 
Debs.) • .IX:-1063-106&, 9 Edward VII, for the taoulat!on of 
t .his division ... 
49 Cf. Ibid., pp. 1059-1063, for the committee report. 
50 Cf. ~., pp. 951-1058, 1533-1660, for readings and 
debates. 
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more than the u-sual mea-sure of authority under the legislative 
dyarchy, a rete-ntion related to the unusual potential for 
explosiveness in the unsettled Arri~en situation. The way, 
however, was left wide-open. for re-negotiation on this point. 
In other respects, there was little new or significant in the 
action on this bill. 
Poli.tical ministries and im-oerial legislation. Action 
on the African Union Bill, however, does serve to focus atten-
t .ion on. an aspect of ii:lperlal legislation not yet considered, 
the effect of the "political oa:at" of a ministry upon its 
implementation of suggested or needed. imperial legislation. 
This question directly relates to franchise changes a.nd the 
modifications they introduced into the makeup of commons and 
into British government in general. Among British historians 
it appears generally to be conceded that Conservative minis-
tries would be inclined to be and were more imperialistic 
than Liberal historians, but is this really the truth of the 
matter? In the face of the actual record, this belief would 
hardly appear to be valid. Examination or· the record would 
hardly substantiate it. For example, the sonewhat Liberal 
first Pitt ministry passed both the Irish Appeals act {1783) 
and the Canadian Constitution Ac·t ( 1 ?91). It also pess.ed 
the Irish Union Bill ( 1800}. On the othe-r hand, tha India 
I 
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Office Act ( 1858) was the produat of the Conservative -second 
Derby ministry, though much of the spadework upon it bad been 
undertaken by previous ministries both Liber-al and Conserv-
a t1 ve. Solution of t -he Ionian problem was also a joint 
maneuver. Negotiations attendant upon 1 t were ini t 1at-ed by 
the Liberal first Palmerston ministry (1857). They were 
continued by the Conservative second Derby ministry and fini-shed 
by the Liberal second Palmerston ministry (1864). Two Liberal 
ministries, those of Palmerston I and Russell II, account 
f'or the passage or the Colonial Laws and Marriages Validity 
Acts ( 1865) ,_ while the North America Act ( 1867-) was enacted 
by the Conservative third Derby ministry on the basis of 
recommendations formulated during the previous- Liberal 
ministries of' Peel and Melbourne. Acquisition of the strate-
gic Suez Canal (1875), which circumvented established proced-
ures, and the declaration elevating Victoria to "Kaisar-1-
hind" or India (1 January 18?7) took place under the direct 
manipulation of Disraeli, a Conservative Prime Minister. 
Though the_se might be termed imperial acts, they were, as 
shall be discussed further on, hardly anything or the kind 
nor any more so than the seemingly flagrant violations of 
national sovereignty directed by the Liberal, Lord Pel~erston, 
particularly his use of the fleet to enforce seemingly 
c-ap-ricious, but really vi tal strategic demands upo_n Turkey 
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and other areas of the Near East. Conservatives, headed 
by Lord Salisbury, next turned their backs upon the D1srael1 
technique when, but a few short years later, they enacted 
the Australian Commonwealth Bill, though in so doing they 
were merely carrytng to 1 ts logical fru.i tion the establish-
ment or the legislative dyarchy for which previous Liberal 
and Conservative ministries unstintingly had strived. Con-
servative attempts t ·o stabilize the South African situation, 
however t we·re not quite as succ·essful, foundering on a wave 
or public sentiment directed against the government for 
countenanoing ·the importation of "coolie labor" into south 
Africa and foundering upon the stubbornness of the Boers. 
Consequently, passage of the Union of South Africa Act (1909) 
fell to the lot of a subsequent Liberal ad.min·istration headed 
by Asquith. Up ·to this point certa 1nly, the continuous 
nature· of colonial policy would argue against the influence 
of political bias in imperial affairs, which is what the 
franchise influence argument amounts to. Rather, the con-
duct of the· ministries involved would argue for continuous 
and intelligent action toward predetermined ends, the ends 
in mind being the already· mentioned "containing and augment-
ing the stabilit.y, power, and resources of the· empire." 
British administrato.rs were only too aware of the unity or 
European policy, other foreign policy, i~perial policy, 
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strategic policy, and econo~ic policy. The "checkmate" 
of one would be the "checkmate" or another.._ They were all 
of a piece because of the United Kingdom's seoaration rrom 
raw materials and food and because of the vastness of the 
colonial enterprise itself. Trouble in Europe would un-
doubtedly mean trouble in the colonies if the United Ki~gdom 
became involved. This is the real meaning of Disrseli's 
purchase of Suez and the real meaning of Palmerston's con-
duct in the Near East and Turkey. They had to contain 
Russia and stabilize Europe, prevent trouble before it 
started, else the fate which has overtaken Britain since 
1900 would have arrived that much_ sooner. If .franchise 
changes have tended to bring more and more Liberal minis-
tries into power, this has apparently had_ 11 ttle effect upon 
changing imperial policy becau-se no more than any other group 
have they been able to ignore that famous dictum of British 
imperial policy which suggests that "Britain has no perma-
nent enemies and no permanent friends; she h3s only perma-
nent interests." Just how permanent these interest~ were 
has been shown again and again since the opening of the 
twentiet.h century, and t _he poli-tical cast of a ministry has 
ha-d just as little to do with the matter of how they were 
preserved. Always. the empire perched on a precipice from 
which the mos.t seemingly in.si gniticant trouble-s- could fling 
- ·- - ·· . .. .. 
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it to disaster. And always, the British have traded their 
way out of possible troubles if they could, particularly in 
their relations with their colo.nies upon which their strong--
hold, the United Kingdom, was becoming more and ~ore depend-
ent, almost insupJOrtably so~ 
The strategic and economic imnact of World War I· 
It remained for World War I to expo.se to the world-at-large 
the nea·rly insupportable syndrome of stretegi.c, economic, 
demographic, and ·psychological ract.s which the Un1 ted King-
dom was protecting from public view, as it had always done. 
and upon which the empire was slowly but surely disintegrat-
ing. World ;Jar I ·was hardly under way r-;he.n the German U-boat 
campaigns began to snipe· away at Brttain watery life-line 
and seriously reduce food and raw n:at·erial supplies. The 
vulnerability of merchant vessels soon had the beleaguered 
islands in a virtual state of siege ., exposing to public 
view a fact long known by British administrators but bluffed 
into ineffectuality; it was the fact that shipping was the 
most vital end weakest link ln the too-thinly-deployed-be-
cause -too-widespread British st·re tegic arnor. Bri t ·ain had 
too many geographic areas to protect. Food and raw material 
supplies were soon diminished and rationing was introduced. 
In the Orient, fortunately,. Bri tein was abl-e to bargain 1 ts 
way out ot really serious trouble by persuading th-e nascent 
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Japanese power to enter the war on the side or tte Allies 
because ~apan probably did not yet feel ready to start upon 
its campaign for the subjection of the Orient. As if the 
exposure or strategic weakness were not enough, the United 
Kingdom soon found 1 t se·lf faced with tt;e 1I!li:l1nent der11se of 
1 ts "famous and fortuitous series" of coal and iron depos1 ts. 
By 1917 re·ser·ves of high-grade iron ore were depl·eted and t ·he 
mines nearly played out, making t~e United Y.ingdo~ even more 
dependent upon outside sources for the functioning of her. 
ir~dustrial end strategic machin.ery, forcing her while the 
war was yet in progress to turn more and more to the use of 
suo·h ores as she could import from Swedish, Spa-nish, and 
Portuguese sources and thereby tying up a good deal of her 
naval potential in a line stretched :from t ·he Jlorth Sea across 
the Atlantic and one through the llediterrenean into As1Bn 
waters·. Coal seams also began thinni.n6 out while Sweden, 
the source of "pit props" for the oir.es began to se-em fur-
ther and rurther away until Geroany realized ttat it. was 
similarly dependent upon Swedish resources. Population 
differentials enjoyed by· non-c·aucas1en areas beea~e a fur-
ther source of troubLe, the risinG :forces of nat1cnel1sm 
stirring up one disturbence after another· end beine encour-
aged to do so by agents of the Central Fow-ers. As a con-
sequence,. in many of these areas colonial ad.mtn·istrators were 
I 
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rorced into more precipitate concessions or promises than 
they might otherwise have made under other than the United 
Kingdom '"s beleaguered c ircul!lstsnces. Had it not be-en for 
the timely intervention of the United States and his coali-
tion with other European powers, ".Tohn Bull" might then a-nd 
there have had to pull in his horns and countenance the com-
plete collapse of the empire. As things worY.ed out, this 
eventual! ty dld not quite come to pass, but was staved off 
-ror some time. It was the British economic fortunes- which 
su:ffered worst during the war, the war eventually provtng 
itself a vital period of transition. The center of ~orld 
f'inanoe began its celebrated shift from London_ to New York. 
Caucasian colonies began their inroads into homeland economic 
prerogatives, a-nd by war's end they were well on the road 
to becoming the real centers of British economic ·power. Here 
the Untted Kingdom was confronted with the maturation of in-
-rluences she herself had stimulated by her failure to develop 
heavy and finishing industries in her colonial areas. In 
all probability, the Untted Kir:gdom could hardly have done 
otherwise, granted the historical matrix in which the empire 
developed. In this matrix it found itself more and more 
confronted with the necessity of garnering profits from 
processing raw materials in order to obtain the ~cod credits 
-1-t needed throughout the world. The- historic gamble on free 
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trade was thus producing the long-feared backlash upon the 
exercise of imperial controls and would continue to do so 
as the twentieth century progressed. By war's end Canada, 
Aus-tralia, and India, using their ovm and borrowed capital, 
we.re well on the road toward developing heavy and light 
industr-ies of their own, thus freeing them in great meesure 
from dependence upon the United K1Lgdom~s finishing indus-
tries. Though percentage-wise they wou1d continue to absorb 
the usual portion of the United Kingdom's exports and a great 
deal more, the additional arithmetical. amounts were more 
than likely absorbed at the expense or the United Kingdom, 
p.artioularly in the years .following the war when .British 
gold reserves were rapidly· being· depleted to balance trade 
ledgers. As already observed, the United Kingdom had 
apparently liquidated a vital percentege of its foreign 
investments during the desperate war years and during the 
years following the war had displayed an inconplete recovery. 
The liQUidation of capital placed the United Kingdol!l in a 
position fro= which it has never quite recovered. It has 
led to conferences frankly wooing trade with anybody end 
everybody w1 thin and without the empire in a fev·erish ·effort 
to produce the proper export balances which meen the acqui-
sition or food and the continuous operation of the British 
economy. Though not too readily apparent unt·il Wo.rld War II, 
this effort appears never quite to have succeeded. The first 
-······ 
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indication or this failure was the United Kingdom•s discard 
of the gold standard, and the second, a continuous indica-
tion, has been the progressive devaluation of the pound, 
first in sterling areas and later in the dollar and other 
world trad.e areas. In .regard to this devaluation of the 
pound, one must view- with frank admi.ra tion the adro1 tness 
with whioh colonial administrators, protecting the United 
King-dom's "per~anent interests," kep inflated in many areas, 
particularly the dollar area, the value of the pound when 
th·e economic roundation behind it had long since lost 1 ts 
·relative position. In this way, apparently, British admin-
i .strators managed to use former prestige. to recover some 
o~ ·the war losses and offset the cheapening of the pound 
in their own backyard, but whether 1 t has ever been enough 
is doubtful. 51 
~ .Irish~ State !gree~ent ~ (1922) and the 
--
Irish Conseouential Monez Bill (~) ~ These straitened 
post-war economic circumstances provide the context in whic·h 
the United Kingdom was again confronted with the problem of 
home rule tor the Irish. From the moment of the outbreak 
of world War I Ireland had been in a continual state of tur-
moil, one rebellion after another having to be put down. 
51 Cf. Edward H. Carr, The Twent~ Ye·ar' s· Cri 1 1939 (New York: The :Macmillan Co., 1940 312 PP ~ 3 ' ~-
discussion of Britain's postwar economic ., crisis.·' or 8 
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Here again nationalism, harking back to old cultural 
traditions, reared its ugly heed in such movements as Sinn 
Fein. Ireland appeared determined upon the freedom it had 
·demanded si-nc-e the time of Cromwell, and Irish patriots 
apparently felt that there would never be a more opportune 
time to gain it th-an during the period of post-~ar diffic-ul-
ties. There is little need here to go into the cont·rov-er-
sie.s which raged over the question end led to e trea-ty 
between the United Kingdon and the Irish guaranteeing home 
rule. What is oi' interes-t, however, is- that the United King-
dom refused to countenance such a treaty unless it provided 
for separ-ate treatment of Protestant Ulster, guarantees or 
civil rights in the new Irish Free State, end guarantees of 
lasting ~free trade" between Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Consequently, the treaty. having been signed, a constitu-
tional conve-ntion was conven.ed in Ireland, and Parliament 
began to g~ve official notice to the matter. As the Ir~sh 
convention got under way Lt. Col. Murray questio-ned the 
"Benoh" as to whether the Australian and African _precedents 
would be followed: " ••• in the case of the Constitution of 
the Irish Free State before His 1!ajesty's government eit-her 
assents to or dissents fron the terms of the draft eon-
stitution."52 It will be- recalled that in bet~ these cases 
52 Parliamentary Debates, 152 H.C. Debs., 5s, 1922, 
p. 642. 
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the government was somewhat confronted with a fait accornnli 
requiring 1 ts si.gnature, so Sir H. Greenwood's reply wa.s not 
at all surprising. "It is true~" he remarked, "that the 
Draft Bills embodying the Australian and South African Con-
stitutions were submitted by the governoent of tte day for 
the consideration of Parliament, and exactly the same pro-
cedure will be followed in the case of the Irish Bill." 53 
This meant that Lords, though now fallen :rron power, would 
f'ir.st stamp 1 ts approval on the measure and then send 1 t to 
Commons where it would be introduced by the Secretary of State 
ror the Colonies. Few· words except profound disgust can des-
cribe the attitude of Commons as the Enabling Bill was 
introduced. Though Parliament was determined to be rid once 
and ror all of the Irish nuisance, it was determined to pro-
tect the Ulsteri tes and "free trade" regardless of the cost-s. 
In fact, Parliament did absorb both the costs of the trens-
i t io.n and what would have been Ireland's share of the 
national debt merely to implement its determinet len to be 
rid of the Irish who were disrupting governmental processes 
at a time of grave national dif'ficult1es. The.re -was Also 
pervading the issue an undercurrent which suggested that 
nothing else practical could be done, that the matter ~as 
beyond controversy any longer. This was reflected in the 
53 Ibid., p. 643. 
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fact that both Agreement Bill and the Consequential Bill were 
introduced and considered simultaneously, :Mr. Bonnar Law, 
the Prine Uin1s·ter, remarking ·1mr:1ediately prior to their 
introduction that " ••• quick passage of these bills cen be 
expected only if they are regarded as al ·together non-con-
troversial. w54 That he ·expected this attitude was only too 
well attested by the rapid manner in which the passage of 
these bills was implemented. ~lmost imne·diately after the 
Prime Minister's remarks the bills were formally introduced 
and the House took a ;1ri"'ileged adJournment _, reconvening 
instanter as a Committee of. the lVhole to eonsider them, 
Irish members observing tn abstentia. In rapid fire o . .r.der 
such clauses of the bills as produced no controver.sy passed 
the first reading. while those the subject of any argument 
at all were s.ubmitted to a .recess cornni ttee for reworking 
and the order of their reading set. 55 ~u1ckly they were 
brought back from recess and subjected to a second r.e·ading 
which they quickly passed, though certai.n financial clauses 
of the Consequential Bill and a clause pertinent to the 
Governor's duties in the Agreement Bill were held over for 
54 Ibid., 159 H. C.Debs., 5s, P· 1?4. 
55 Ibid., pp. 174 ff. 
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further cons1derat1on. 56 Further discussion cleared up the 
reBsons for the United Kingdom's share in the costs and 
pension aspe~ts of the Consequential Bill and the clauses 
concerned were approved, the co·rnm1 ttee d1 v1.d1ng:. A:res ·225, 
Noes 100. 57 Somewhat tardy and recalcitrant approval was 
also given the definition of the G<:>vernor•s· duties, a 
dertnition whereby his prerogatives were largely hamstrung, 
interest on this issue picking up to a division; Ayes 258, 
Noes 150 .• 58 Once these neasures were approved the bills 
were subjected to a third reading and passed by a somewhat 
subdued but unanimous voice vote. 59 The bills in their 
final shape gav·e Ireland a government sharing all the 
prerogatives of the dominions, while the United Kingdom was 
saddled with most of the costs. 60 The Royal Assent was again 
a matter of course. 
Significance of~ Irish Free .Gtete Agreement_ Act. 
The passage of Irish Bill and the Consequential Bill attend-
56 Ibid. _, PP .. 350 rr., 387 ·r:t .. 
57 Ibid., p. 463. 
58 Ib 1 d .. , p • 6 34 • 
59 t ·bid. •· p .. 764. 
60 Cf. Public General .Statutes, IX, 4 ff.: 12 George V, 
c 4, for ecopy Of these measures. 
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ant upon it made· obvious to the rest of the e!!lpire and the 
world-in-general just how helpless was the position tn which 
Britain found itself. An overwhelming combination or stra-
tegic, economic, denographic, and :psychological ( 1. e • . , nation-
alism) dilemnas was strangling the empire and loosening the 
United Kingdom's precarious grip upon ·tt. All that would be 
needed was anot·her serious \'.'ar and the empire might well fell 
to pieces. Liberal sentiments directed at Parliament during 
the course ot the Irish troubles appeared to have had little 
to do wt'th the resolution of the problem. A Conservative 
Parliament revealed the British pliGht when it held out for 
guarantees of lasting "free trade" between the United King-
dom and Ireland before it would even consider the measures. 
Either the· .remainder o'f the United Kingdom desperately needed 
the continuance of the trade relations with Ireland, or there 
was no point in hold·ing out for this guarantee.. Obviously, 
it must have needed the trade. 
Inter-imperial Conferences of ~ end 1930. Just how 
badly B.ri tain needed trade and just how seriously her econon.ic 
might have been impaired by the war r.es revealed in th.e con-
duct of 1:nper1al conferenc-es subsequent to the Irish Free 
State Agreement Act. These conferences were nothing new, 
having long been held under the auspices of the Crown and 
Colonial Office. Their purposes had been to resolve inter-
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imperial problems relating to judicial and parliamentary 
matters and to encourage inter-imperial trade relations and 
cooperation. In conferences previous to 1926, ~he United 
Kingdom had alwa·ys had more than the best o:r 1 t, having had 
and preserved its initial advantages 1n the "Technological 
Revolution." Capital investments also gave it a further 
cushion. But in the years following World War I this cushion 
disappeared and the United Kingdon's position was consider-
ably weakened. In this context there arose a growing senti-
ment, directed largely from the United Kingdom, for the 
cre.ation of en imperial parliament. This was ., in feet, -a 
last despera·te measure to preserve the empire. The United 
Kingdom also frankly wooed 1nc·reased ·trade relations. with the 
colonies, and it is through this gesture and the sentiment 
toward the c·rea tion of an imperial parl.iament that colonies, 
particularly the Caucasian units began to see the light. 
They observed carefully the fact that the United Kingdom was 
now almost totally dependent upon outside sources for the raw 
materials upon which 1 ts industries de_pended and for the food 
supplies so vi tel t ·o· the survival of i t .s c1 t iz·enry. Canada 
with her wheat, car.rper, nickel, iron, end asbestos--.Austr·elie 
with her wheat, beef, mutton, and wool--South .Africa wtth 
her minerals and potentially vest food sup?ly--Ind1a and Ceylon 
with their rubber, tea _, spices, hemp, tin, etc. --:Kew Zeala·nd 
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With her beef, mutton, wool, and minerals-- all the colonie 5 
knew they held the controlling necessities. They ~ere only 
too well aware of the economic and strategic pli t?,ht or the 
"mother country." Is 1 t any wonder the·n that the Inter-
imperial Conferenc-e of 1926 so auspiciously un·jertaken at 
the behest· o.t the Colonial O.ffice in the United Kin ~doc should 
end as it did? Is it any ·wonder that the sentiment for the 
cre·at1on of an imperial parliament so carefully nurtured by 
the Colonial Office should have been so preemptorily brushed 
aside as it was? Or is it any wonder that the conference 
should have come forth with the reco~~enda tion it adopt~d? 
~ny else should it suggest the adoption of a resolution declar-
ing that " •.• the dominions together with Great ·3rito1n are 
autonomous coOL~unities within the British empire, eoual in 
t t d 1 b d th "?61 s .a us, an n no way su or inate to one ano er ••• The 
handwr1 ting was plainly on the wall. The United r:ingdorn 
could do what it liked, but the colonies would have tteir way. 
In the subsequent conference in 1930 this vie~ wa s co= posed 
into a formal resolution urging also e union under a co~on 
allegiance to a "powerless" Crown. This resolution enbody-
inB the proposed Statute of 71estn1nster was to be sub!:li tted 
to all dominion parliaments for ratification and to be sent 
on the Dominion.s Office for transmission to Parliament· 
The legislative dyarchy was to become a deed 1 ssue • 
&1 Cf. Parliamentary Papers, 1925, Vol. XI, for the 
records of-rhts conference. 
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Statute of' Westminster {1931). Dominion parlia~ents 
acted quickly. Early in 1931 !~r. J. H. Thomas, Secretary of 
State for Dominion _Af'fairs, notified Conrn.ons thet " .•• resolu-
tions in the sense of the recommendations of the Imperial 
Conference of 1930 regarding the proposed Statute of ~estrn1nster 
have been passed in al-l the Dominion Parliaments ••• "62 and 
the measure was formally introduced. Conmons could not have 
been more bored w1 th the issue, which the_y did not even bother 
to debate, but passed rapidly through three reading s by voice 
vote. Their attitude seems- to have been a recognition that 
nothing else cou1d be done; the dominions had already called 
the turn, so why indulge an empty protest. So sputtered out 
the le g1slat1 ve dyarc-hy over the Caucasian colonies, though 
India might chafe for soi!le time. Though MacDonald and Labor 
might ~la1m credit for fulfilling Labor's pledge to decimate 
the empire, there wa_s really 11 ttle else they could have done; 
the dominions had already stated the case and Parliament had 
to accept it or face perhaps more defiant or unpleas9nt 
poss-ibilities. Aside from: the matter of Labor's claim, the 
whole subject had been started by Baldwin Conservatives, and 
62 Parliamentary Debates, Off. Rep. H. C~ Debs, 5s: 
22 George V, v. 255, p:p. 2626-252?. Cf. also t -he H.. C. Debs· 
_:for 1930 for what 11 ttle consideration Commons gave to a 
discussion of the matter. 
Labor was merely lending official sanction to what had al-
ready taken place. Cast or ministry made no difference here. 
Rumbles in the administrative dyarchy. The legis-
lative dyarc_hy was thus no soon.er written off the books when 
the United Kingdom was faced with murmurs of discontent in 
the adminis tra ti ve d::;rarchy. Everywhere 1 t was conf ro_n ted with 
the burgeoning demands for autarchy focused by the rampant 
rise or nationalism in non-Caucasian colonies~ There had 
already been the Act of 1919 creating the new Council of 
State and Legi-slative Assembly for India. Obstructionist 
and India-n ·nationalist movements- following i t .s establishment 
in 1921 had led quickly to demands for home rule and t .he 1nst1-
tu t _ion of the Simon Comr.J.ission to study 1 t. This coill!lli ttee 
made its report in 1930, and the report appears to have been 
poorly recei-ved both in India and the United Kingdom b-ecause 
1 t did 11 ttle more than suggest an extremely limited_ re-estab .. 
lishment or the legislative dyarchy- without many or the 
63 privileges of' dol!linion :status. By 1935 Parl18lllent had passed 
a f'ederal constitution bill embodying the principles of the 
Simon rep-ort 1 but this served only to inflame- Indian national-
ists sueh as (}andhi even more. India 'I":Bs but a samp-le of what 
the United Kingdom was having to face everywhere throughout 
63 Cf. Renort of the Indian Statutory Conm1ssion 
(Simon Com!iii sst oil) ,_ l London: H.:k: • Stationery Gffi c e, T9 30) • 
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the non~Caucasian reaches of the empire. Various gradations 
or civil disturbance, from mild to serious, were breaking 
out in the more advanced segments of the administrative 
dyarchy. Burma, Malaya, and East Africa were displaying 
serious sympto~ of discontent. Labor ministries as well as 
Conservative in ·the United Kingdom were just as nonplussed 
and just as severe wit-h these .outbreaks; pol-1 t 1 cal bias made 
no difference. In fact, it had been a Labor ministry which 
all but forced the Simon Report down the throats of both 
Indian Nationalists and Moderates who were seeking doninian 
status. 
Prec.is of background for V1orld War II. As tf these 
c .ondi tions were not enough, Dri ti sh diploma tic policies were 
going awry all over the world. The Statute of Westminster 
was no sooner on the books than the United Kingdom .had to 
face the ambitions of ~apan in Asia. First there was the 
Manchurian incident. Britain did little. Next came the 
reckless advance into China. Britain could no longer even 
observe the e~enities with the ~apanese, and British stra-
tegists were quaking in their boots for fear or where the 
Japanese would strike next, pe-rhaps their own backyard. This 
rear stemmed from a possible conbination of strategic diffi-
culties which the United Kingdom had long avoided, the 
necessity of full scale war in Asia and Europe at the same 
ti~e. In Europe the cordon saniteire so carefully nursed 
about the "Bolsheviks" at Versailles was coming apart at 
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the seams ., and 1 t would not be too meny years ·bet'ore the 
"protection of permanent interests" would see British forces· 
aligned with those of the "Iva-n!t they had so peinst ~kingly 
ostracized. Such an "unholy" alliance, unthinkable in 1919, 
would come· about in the interests of a national survival 
threatened by the paranoid and ruthless careers of o one-
time Milan journalist, Benito :Mussolini, a.nd an erstwhile 
Vienna "schickelgruber," Adolf Hitler, men whose delusions 
of grandeur were forcing Europe to the brink of the "abyss. n 
Everywhere the British turned they f ·aced the futile trinity 
or s.trategy, economics, and politics. Helplessly, al:nost 
incredulously, British planners watched the developing 
nightmare explode in all its fury. 
World War II. Uorld War II was upon the British in 
all 1 ts horror almost before the United Kingdom was a•sare 
of what had happened. Despite all the efforts to st-ave it 
o.:t"f--including the grudging accep·tance of Italy's r~1p 1d or 
Ethiopia and the ignominious Munich Pact abjectly accepted 
by a frustrat·ed Chamberlain--the war descended upon t ·he 
united Kingdom with disheartening indifference. Germany 
over-rode Europe and pushed the tardy British defenders or 
France into the. sea. German U-boats began their garroting 
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o.f · the merchant life-line, while the Luftwaffe's "Bl1 tz" 
turned the islands the~selves into a bloody abbatoir. The 
horrors of the Blitz w-ere not enough, 1 t s-eemed. Suddenly, 
but not unexpectedly, Japanese dreams of the "Asiatic Co-
prosperity Sphere" ran amok and stabbed the British in the 
.Asian "back-reaches."" One hy o.ne, aided by n3tional1stically-
insp1red collaborationist forces, Japan took over the British 
strongholds in As1a4 Eong Kong, r,raleya ,_ Singapore ., Burma, 
the East Indies (Dutch), New Guinea, and the Solomons fell 
to -advancing .Tapa.nese hordes. .India, Ceylon, end the whole 
or Australasia were threatened. Even. worse, the .Ta~nese 
fleet was forcing the retreat .of its British counterpart from 
Asian wate·rs. Germm:y was now advancing into B.ri tish pre-
serves in Africa and threatening the Near East. The back of 
the empire was actually broken, and had it not been again for 
the timely interference of the United States, en event 
brought on by the pre-cipitate actions- of the .Japanese in .As-ian 
waters, the enpire pr-obebly would have r .emained dismembered. 
As it was, before and after the intervention of the United 
States, the British had made any number of promises to var-
ious elements in the non-Caucasian units dissatisfied with 
the Japanese occupation. They made all sorts of pronises 
-ror prospective au·tonomy in exchange for irnr.1ediate war-tin:e 
aid. These promises were to bring the post-~ar deluge. 
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~-World \iar II imperial deluge. ~.vo-rld :'lar II was 
no sooner over than the deluge of demands for autonomy for 
non-Caucasian colonials descended upon the Brit 1.sh .. Colony 
by colony, in the light of war-time pro~ises and the fact that 
it really could do little about it, the United Kingdom has 
had to give in and watch the adoinistrative dyarchy disin-
tegrate ·tn Asia. India, Ceylon, and Burma hav·e gone the -way 
of self-determination. Nehru put an end to what appeared to 
him to be British procrastination in the matter of home rule 
for India by calmly announcing at an imperial meeting in 
London, a meeting incidentally called to solve Indian con-
stitutional problems, that he "was .going home to form a govern-
ment for India, that the Moslems could ro.rm one in Pakistan, n 
and that, in erfect, the British could go .hang; they would 
not delay him longer by arguments about· the preservation or 
British or native rights and interests. This he did, and 
the British did nothing. Indian action is but a small sample 
o.f what the Br.i tish have had to watch nationalism do to the 
administrative dyarchy in the past eleven years since the 
ending of the has till ties of Horld liar II. The British have 
watched and been able to do little to stem the tide which 
is now rising in Africa and everywhere else through what 
remains of the administr-etive dyarchy. Is this an ar.gUl!lent 
for the effectiveness of franchise changes in the dismember-
ment of the empire? Has anything in this study substantiated 
this ·point of View? 
CHAPI'ER VI 
COl~CLUSIONS AlW SL'lJ,L\.RY 
On the basis o.:f the select-ed :facts presented, 1 t is the 
conclusion of this study that franchise reforms were only 
incidentally end contextually related to the disintegration 
or the British empire and tha-t they had extremely 11 ttle, if 
at all measurable, effect upon it. The decline of British 
imperial rule appears, rather, to have been brought about by 
a syndrome of fActors much more practical than political bias 
in troduce·d into gov·eril!!lent by franchise changes. This syn-
drome was composed of a combination of legal, strategic, 
economic, demographic, technological, and psychological fa.c-
tors which eventually proved too much for British plannerB to 
handle. 
Legal factors combined with strategic end Parliamentary 
d.ifficulties brought -about the retreat of Bri tein in North 
America. War with the "Thirtean Colonies, though not generally 
viewed so, appears to have ended in a strategic defeat 'l":hich 
the British appear never to have for[otten. The Anerican 
revolt ·occurred as a part and parcel of the ccntext of a 
strategi-c due·l with France and clean-up operations on Dutch 
and Spanish power. Relative technological inadecuacy--
technology was not yet sufficiently advanced--had made the 
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strategic situation involved in invading the Thirteen Colonies 
and giving logisti-ca-l support to the army carrying out this 
ta-sk_ while c.onfronted with mill tary cornmi tments elsewhere 
somewhat insupportable. The three year siege ot Gibraltar 
by French and Spanish forces, shipping difficulties 1n the 
West Indies because or French and Spanish marauding, and 
similar difficulties in the Far East were all a part of this 
strategic complex and materially aided, in fact almost pro-
duced, the success of the American colonies, and so did the 
:feud between Crown and Parlieme.nt. The latter was reinforced 
by the genera.l drift of Western civilization toi'iard auto-
nomous fo_rms of government. All combined brought about- the 
success of the American insurrectionist movement which broke 
up what appears to have been Britain only real attempt at 
the establishment of an hegemony containing the prerog8tives 
of imperium. From that time forward one of the major premises 
or colonial administration appears to have been the avoidance 
or situations that might again lead to such a frustrating 
strategic stalemate. The policies of the Colonial and Home 
Offices- developed after this time appear to have been predi-
cated consistently upon this strategic consideration and 
preservation or the economic and diplomatic prerogatives 
which kept it under control. 
Also in the light of this strategic consideration 
colonial planners- appear to have predicated their course upon 
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a desire to a-bsorb t .he minimum amounts .necessary or the c·osts 
attendant upon the administration of i~perial holdings and 
consistent with their stability. In the t.hree-quarter cen-
tury period following the American War {1775-1850), this 
attitude appears to have been reinforced by the reelization 
of British planners that, granted the economic situation in 
which they operated, Britain was becoming more and More depend-
ent upon outs.1de resources for the maintenance of 1 ts n~t1onal 
existence: -economic attitudes conditioned the minimizing or 
costs, while the actual economic situation combined with 
strategic· difficulties conditioned the modes of rule worked 
out with various colonial areas during the nineteenth century. 
All during the nineteenth century, while the economic-
strategic relationship ~as progressively worsening, Britain 
round i-tself confronted with the preservation of the status 
quo in Europe, .Asia, and the Near East* a stability upon which 
the British grip upon the empire depended. British planners--
strategists, and diplomats--appear early to have reali.zed 
that their diplomatic policies had to be total policies, that 
European policy was colonial policy, that war in Europe was 
one phase of colonial policy, that strategic polic-y had to 
predicated upon economic :policy which was colo·nial policy • 
Everywhere the British turned they realized tbe totality of 
their efforts and planned accordingly. They knew that as 
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long as the United Kingdon was kept ott balance in Europe 
by ·civil disturbances colonies would have to be treated 
bingerly ·or compromised with. They never lost sight of the 
fact the t eve·ry colony was a potential enemy. Europe proved 
to be the empire's greatest enemy. First, there were th~ 
Kapoleonic troubles. The Uni te.d Kingdom had no sooner 
brought these to a conclusion than a continuous series of 
troubles followed in rapi.d fire order. Re·vol t ·simr.tered in 
the ~editerrenean and then exploded. Greece revolted and 
Europe's "sick man," Turkey, had to be calmed by Codrington 
only to raise further difficulties with Russia. ~Vhile the 
Russian problem was just coming to a bo"il, the downfall of 
monarchy proceeded apace. One revolt after another topple·d 
eonerchial thrones and led Britain into postures of Euronean 
stabilization. The French Restoration led to adventure in 
the Crimea, while Africa and the r-:ear East began to simmer. 
Then Prussia fell hungrily on hapless France, a problem no 
sooner settled than purchase or Suez, an F.!ppsrent strc.~tegic­
economic necessity, led to further troubles in the Sudan and 
Africa. All these problems occupied a considerable portion 
of the British strategic might, and all ~ede even more vi~l 
the stability of colonial holdings as the situation or the 
United Kingdom's dependency upon outside resources proeress-
1 vely wor.sened. That Britain wa.s only too well aware of 
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this fulcrum of the colonial policy is amply attested ·by the 
exist-ence, makeup, and progressive modification of the 
"Stat"istical A·bstracts," in e xistence since the der1ise of the 
Board of Trade and Plantations • 
.As· a consequence of these matters, the United King dom, 
at the behest of t -he Colonial Cff"ice and faced witt unsettled 
Europe, was mor·e t .han willing to conpromise on matters or 
colonial rule r ·ather than f'ac.e the test of again having simul-
taneously to quell di -sturbances in Europe .and the colonies 
which would divide the forces of its strategic power and 
attack their industria 1 base. By 1867, Britain was well aw.are 
of its dependency upon colonial areas for food end raw mater-
iels. As the nineteenth century drew to a close this d-epend-
ency situation grew progressively more perilous to the United 
Kingdon and created ·a situation in which efforts to stabilize 
colonial arrangements were to run afoul of' an unholy union 
of nationalism and economic theory in bot-h Europe and Asia. 
More s ·nd more • particularly in Asia, nationalist forces 
howled about ·"exploitation" and thre-atened revolt when British 
forces were otherwise occupied. Caucasian colonials also 
chafed under similar, but much more lenient feelinGs about 
national destiny. These r-ealities led Britain into msny 
concessions, and population differentials further complicated 
the problem. By 1900, some 45rOOO,OOO citizens in the United 
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Kingdom found themselves staggered with the problem of stabil-
izing- government for half a billion colonials and some 
250,000,000 Europeans over whom they supposedly had no con-
trols at all. ~y the end of the nineteenth century the 
British were sitting on a powder keg, concerning the contents 
of which they were ~nti~ately aware. All that was needed was 
a major war and the empire would _show the cracks in its s·eans, 
the patchwork of legislative and administrative dyarchies 
might well fell apart. Astute British diplomacy combined 
with adroit colonial policies had managed to stave off this 
eventural1ty and stabilize both colonial and l!:uropean gover-n-
ments for most of the nineteenth century. Colonial holdings 
had been stabilized by a division of rule between colony and 
homeland in assorted grf. dations from colony to colony, the 
ps rticular colony being allow-ed to charge "only what the 
traffic would bear" at a given time. Europe w9s stabilized 
by force and conferences. Such economic arrane enents as the 
sterling block, inter-imperial conferences, and free trade 
also he1ped toward stabilization of the empire as did colonial 
dependence upon British manufactures and the ready market 
f'or colonial r -ood and raw materials represented in the United 
Kingdom. 
By 1900, the shaky foundations of the empire so long 
hidden from public view were ready for -exposure. It was only 
2.07 
a matter of ttme until Germany or some ot~er European power 
challenged them. Germany had rapidly overtaken the British 
industrial might and was just about on equal terms ·Ri th it. 
The Boer diffioulti~s and the subsequent efforts made to 
settle them added further fuel to the fires gnawing at the 
imperial vitals. 
The progress of the twentieth century has seen the 
British empire, slowly at first and th.en more precipitately_, 
disintegrate as the cumulative and combined effects of stra-
tegic problems, economic problems, demographic problens, and 
the problem of nationalism tn Europe and colonial areas--a 
st·ngle problem in terms or imperial rule--have exacted their 
long-feared tolls. Stability in the empire flashed a-gli~ter­
ing with the somewhat emotional and pointl~ss assassination 
o:f a minor arc-hduke in Serbia. World ~7ar I was no sooner under 
way than the United Kingdom had ·to fGce the horror of a tech-
nological development, the U-boat, against which it had yet 
to develop adequate defenses, and it also had to face the numb-
ing reality of the fact that 1 ts high-grad-e coal and iron 
supplies in the Midlands- were all but exhausted. 7lh1le these 
troubles had the United Kingdom in a virtual state of siege, 
disrupting mov em:ents of a-ll varieties--economic, political r 
nationalistic, and strategic--erupted throughout the enpire. 
By war's end it was only a matter of time until the major 
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segments. of the empire would cast themselves loose r ·rom the 
imperial stream because the exigencies of the war had wrenched 
them free or many of the old imperial relationships and pre-
rogatives. Between the ·tw.o wars {World Wars I and II} 
Britain was able to do very little to stem the developing 
tide because of the known and almost co~~lete dependence of 
the United Kingdon upon outside resources for the contin.uance 
of its national existence. Almost as soon as the war was 
over. the Caucasian units cast themselves loose, and the non-
Caucasian coloni-als began to "champ at the bit." Such non-
Caucasian units as were held on to were held on to in des-
peration by the United Kingdom because it feared that it 
these areas were cast loose they would fall within the 
orbits of hostile powers thereby ending the stream of supplies 
:from them. They were vi tal to the United Kingdom's w·elfare. 
Franchise reforms· have had .little to. do with these 
changes. Regardl e·ss of g-overlli:lent, Conserve t1 ve or Li be.ral, 
British colonial policy has been realistic and consistent 
since the time of the Irish Appeals Act. The basic process 
colonial adm1n1.strators develope-d to manage the empire was 
based upon a realistic appraisal o·r the context in which the 
empire operated. The process of dividing rule between 
colonials and home government was the most practical which 
could have be-en devised, given the context 1n which the 
209 
United Kingdom matured and the e.nd.s toward whicn it strived. 
It is this latter context which conditioned the separation 
Of raw oaterials and manufactures, thus saddling the United 
Ki.ngdom with the major burden of the strategic costs; end 
it is this se.parat1on whic.h materially aided in producing 
the principle of divided rule in colonial affairs. The 
Crown may have started out to inaugurate an 1moeriu~, but 
Parliament appears to have preempted and ·ended with a pre.car-
iously held empire which 'llorld ·,:far II all but put an end to. 
Regardless of whether or not libera.lis.m of one type 
or another were introduced into British government with the 
advent of franchise reforms, franchise reforrn appears to have 
had lit·tle bearing of the issue of the imperial fate. For 
example, the economic liberals introduced into Pa·rliament 
following the Franchise Reform of 1832, could. they have 
gotten aw.ay w1 th 1 t--acc.epting the t they were poll t .ically 
biased--would more likely have held on to i~per1al holdine s 
as such if they could; after ell, as the situation matured, 
this type of liberal wa.s to realize more and more his depend-
ence upon colonial holdings for the progress of his industrial 
enterprises. He was caught in a trap froo which there was 
no rea·l extrication. He could not bear the internal expense 
of thes·e governments, nor could he bear the loss of their 
raw materials and food. Once in political power, all he 
.--·· 
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could do was use the already devised and practical system of 
governmental dyarchies which made it posstble to reel17.e the 
maximum utilization of the colonial potential. .He had to 
compromise to profit and continue in business. Unfortunately, 
he could not profit forever. After further maturation or 
the historical context, the colonial caught on to the fact 
that this economic liberal was the same fellow he .had been 
dealing with yesterday, only then he called himself a con-
servative. The colonial realized the consistency of col-
onial policy and he also realized that he held the key to 
the Un1 ted Kingdom's control, food and raw materials. Ire 
realized also just how badly this weakened the strategic 
potential of the United Kingdom. The consistency of col-· 
onial policy had to persist despite governmental bias,. else 
the empire would be dismembered. It is at this point, the 
food and raw material nexus, that the non-Caucasian colonial 
began the attack which burst int-o flame in the period be-
tween the two wars. Conbined with a strateg ic factor, this 
ne:xus also accounted :for the behavior of t.he MacDonald 
Labori tes in oost ... world 7lar ·r, India. They mi ght prate 
about the necessity for dismembering the empire while out 
of off1ae, but once in office they would have to face the 
realities conce.rned with preservation of national existen.ce • 
Everywhere Britain was retreating, but t ·he Laborites given 
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the chance to augment this mcwement procrastinated; much 
more than internal politics was concerned. It was a Qatter 
or life and death realities, the preservation or permanent 
interests and protection of national existence. Indian 
demands for national sovereignty were by-passed and com-
promises proposed. But this. as always. was only a stop-gap 
measure, an attempt to plug a "leak in the dike~ holding 
.ba·ck the flood waters of imperial disintegration. 
World War II let loose the :floodgates. This war and 
its aftermath is already writing the final chapter of the 
Brit 1 sh emp 1r e. Unit by unit the a dminis trat 1 ve dy·ar chy 1 s 
:falling to pieces. Much of Asi-a has already escaped the 
imperial hold and the rest of administrative dyarchy, partic-
ularly Africa and the Near East are growling louder and louder. 
British attempts to promote the use of Africa as A bread-
basket for both t ·he United Kingdom and the Africans are felling 
on deaf ears. Colonials no longer have to be polite. It 
seems only a matter of time until the United Kingdon will 
b·ecome a cooperative world worl~shop totally depend upon the 
puissance· of other powers for the continuation of its national 
and economic existence. The United Kingdom is now almost 
totally dependent upon outside sources for food and raw 
materi·als, and almost totally dependent upon the world market 
for· its national survival. In effect, this means that it .has 
r--·- · · 
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becom-e a-lmost totally dependent upon other powers for the 
1'18 intenance of sta-ble world conditions, the only c ondi t1 ons 
in which in the face of atom bombs and other technolog ical 
monstrositie-s 1 t can survive as a nation. Anotr1er war would 
ruin the United Kingdom; it ·might even leave it a hopeless 
atoi!lic ruin. 
Faced with the ominous rumble of Cor.uJunist C.l:ina and 
Russ-ia, the present diplomatic position of the United Kingdom, 
as the former are only too well aware, is a colossal bluff 
al-:nost wholly dependent upon th-e mig ht of the United StRtes 
ror its effectiveness. The Chinese and the Russians both 
know why Chamberlain suffered the "indignity at Munich" and 
why Hitler was let loose upon Europe. They also know how 
rar Britain can be pushed, and so does India and the rest of 
Asia. This is why they are all pushing •. It is also, incident-
ally, the reason the empire appears to be almo_st a dead issue. 
SoT'!leone _, perhaps -the United States, will :tave to fill the 
.. pow-er vacuum'' being created by the in!linent end total collaps-e 
of the imperial structure. 
Franchise reform has had little to do with this eventu-
-s..li ty. Britain has be.en beaten by her dependency upon out side 
resources and technologic3l developments which have created 
a stratee;ic situation in which the United Kingdoi!l is totally 
vulnerable. 
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